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Foreword by Sotiraq Hroni
Executive Director, Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)

In April 2018, IDM launched its benchmark study on religious
tolerance in Albania. The study found that an overwhelming
majority of Albanians welcome religious diversity, accept
interreligious differences and reject the notion of supremacy of
a given religion above others. This religious tolerance is a core
value of Albanian society that, according to even Pope Francis,
should not be taken for granted.
Indeed, continuous efforts are made to preserve the good
interreligious relations in the country. A prime example is
the work done by the Interreligious Council of Albania, which
has made tireless efforts to promote interfaith dialogue both
at home and abroad. Its unique experiences, challenges and
lessons learned may find cross-border applicability. Individual
input derived from the experience elsewhere, could play a
similar role for neighbouring countries or contribute to interfaith
dialogue at a global level.
This opportunity to learn from each other’s experiences and
discuss how religion can play a positive role in our societies, was
one of the main catalysts to organising this regional conference.
It offers a unique opportunity to discuss among religious leaders,
politicians, academia and civil society leaders of the region,
how we can enhance societal and policy mechanisms to better
respond to future challenges with regards to religion in society.
To foster the debate, IDM and its regional partners have drafted
this conference volume, which explores the role of religion in
Western Balkan societies. Given the uniqueness of our project,
the first of its kind in the region, our call for evidence-based
analysis garnered a high level of interest from researchers and
practitioners from the region and beyond. Their findings are
complimented by contextual research carried out by partner
organisations in individual countries. Combined, this research
enhances response mechanisms for policymakers and the society
to face challenges, explore opportunities, and foster stakeholder
capacities. While this study marks an important development,
we believe the role of religion in our societies deserves further
efforts of this kind.
It is important to note that this event would not have been
possible without the generous support of the Netherlands
Foreign Ministry and its efforts to furthering reconciliation and
Europeanization of the societal relations in Western Balkans. I
would also like to take the opportunity to thank the President of
the Republic of Albania, HE Ilir Meta, for his continuous support
to initiatives that foster cooperation and understanding, in the
country and in the wider region.

Foreword by Guusje Korthals Altes
The Ambassador of the Netherlands to Albania

For the Netherlands, freedom of religion is a fundamental
freedom and an important part of our foreign policy on human
rights. The focus of this policy is at international cooperation,
promoting the universality of individual human rights and
strengthening the resilience of society.
The Netherlands is firmly committed to promote and protect the
freedom of religion and belief, and does not distinguish between
religious groups when doing so. Enjoying fundamental rights
and freedoms is an essential part of an open and free society.
A society that understands and embraces differences, that
tolerates and respects without judging or discriminating. It is up
to every individual to have a theistic or non-theistic belief, to
change one’s religion or choose not to believe.
Religious harmony and peaceful coexistence is an asset
of Albania and its people. A characteristic to cherish and
strengthen. Albania is an important example of a country where
people of different faiths have the ability to coexist peacefully
and with mutual respect for one another. An inspiring example to
countries around the globe.
Religion has long been an essential element in the societies
of the Western Balkan region. It has achieved a prominent role
in almost all aspects of society in the post-communist era.
Differences in religious diversity and interreligious dialogue can
be observed in the region’s multi-ethnic societies. The Western
Balkans have a recent history of conflict in which religion played
an important role. For ongoing reconciliation processes in the
region, for the strengthening of democracy and for building
resilient societies, the interfaith dialogue is essential.
It is for that reason that we are pleased to see so many of the
religious and other leaders from the region gather in Tirana for
the regional Conference “Role of Religion in the Western Balkan
societies”. We look forward to an active and open discussion.
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Country snapshot Albania
By Leonie Vrugtman

Albania has a long history of peaceful religious coexistence and tolerance. Over the centuries,
Albanians embraced and assimilated a variety of monotheist religions under the influence
of a series of occupying powers; be it Rome, Byzantium or the Ottoman Empire. Aware of
this longstanding religious diversity, leaders of the National Renaissance movement in
the nineteenth century sought to emphasise an overarching national identity by removing
religion from the identity of Albanians. From 1912, when Albania gained independence
from the Ottoman Empire, state institutions have embraced secularism. Enver Hoxha, the
communist dictator who ruled the country from 1944–1985, supressed religion through
legislation. Organised religion was banned though a 1967 constitutional reform, which
prohibited religious literature, initiated the further destruction or repurposing of places
of worship and leading to the arrest or execution of religious leaders.1
Following the collapse of communism in 1991, religious institutions in the country were
in an abominable state. Foreign religious foundations, eager to train a new generation
of clerics and finance the (re)construction of religious sites, came to the rescue. Some
of these had a conservative outlook, which was at odds with the mainstream moderate
religious traditions in the country, or they were connected with foreign governments that
aimed to advance their influence in the region. During the 1990s, these groups were able
to operate in Albania without any restrictions due to weak state institutions, lax borders
and high crime rates.2 In the early 2000s, the Albanian government and the Albanian
Muslim Community (KMSH) took measures to tackle the issue of foreign-backed religious
groups. A national action plan against terrorism was adopted in 2002 leading to sweeping
enforcement measures.3 Also, to facilitate the re-establishment of religious communities,
the government promised compensation for religious buildings, land and other property
that was confiscated by the communist regime. The Agency for the Treatment of Property
(ATP) was established to manage restitution claims; however, most remain unresolved.4

Religious composition of the country
Today, most Albanians lead a secular life. According to a 2018 IDM study on religious
tolerance, Albanians have limited knowledge of religion and rarely condition their
everyday lives according to religious norms. Instead, the study argues, ‘Albanians welcome

1

B. Tönnes, ‘Religious persecution in Albania’, Religion in Communist Lands, 1982, 10(3), pp.
242–255. doi:10.1080/09637498208431032

2

S. Woehrel, ‘Islamic terrorism in the Balkans’, Congressional Research Service, 26 July 2005, p.
7

3

Ibid.

4

US Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2016 – Albania’, 15 August
2017, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2016&dlid=268782
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the religious diversity that is present in the country and strongly reject the idea of the
supremacy of a given religion, irrelevant of the size of the religious community’.5 Religious
coexistence and tolerance are considered a fundamental value, which is also embedded
in the country’s constitution. There is no official religion, the state is neutral on questions
of belief, and freedom of religion is guaranteed.6 The state recognises the equality and
independence of religious groups and prohibits discrimination based on religion. The four
largest religious communities (Sunni Muslim, Roman Catholic, Orthodox and Bektashi)7
also receive financial support from the state, which is mainly used to cover administrative
expenses and the salaries of educational staff.89
According to the latest official census in 2011,10 Sunni Muslims constitute 56.7% of the
population; Roman Catholics 10%, Eastern Orthodox adherents 6.8%; members of the
Bektashi Order (a sect of Shia Sufism) 2.1%; and the Protestant Evangelical community
0.14%.11 Approximately 2.5% of Albanians identify as atheist, and there are a small number
of Jehovah’s Witnesses, followers of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
(Mormons), in addition to around 40 or 50 Jews living in Albania.12

Interreligious issues
Unlike its neighbours, Albania has not been subject to major interreligious conflict.
Nonetheless, in the last three decades, some isolated cases of tension have been recorded.
In early 2000s, the Bektashi community outside Tirana was the target of vandalism,
intimidation and threats of violence, which, according to Bektashi leaders, was the result
of the division created by foreign-influenced, intolerant interpretations of religion.13 In

5

Institute of Democracy and Meditation, ‘Religious tolerance in Albania’, 25 April 2018, p. 5,
available at: http://idmalbania.org/religious-tolerance-albania/

6

Constitution of the Republic of Albania, 28 November 1998, Art. 10, translated into English by
OSCE, available at: https://www.osce.org/albania/41888?download=true

7

The Evangelical community does not yet receive financial support, despite being recognised
as a religious community.

8

See the recognition agreements between the state and religious communities via Albanian
State Committee on Cults, available at: http://www.kshk.gov.al/legjislacioni-per-fene-pasvitit-1990/

9

Council of Minister Decision 245, ‘Agreement on the allocation of funds from the state budget
to religious communities’, 9 May 2018, available at: www.qbz.gov.al/

10

Representatives of all religious communities have stated that the 2011 census presents
an inaccurate picture of the religious demographics of the country, not least because the
question was optional. The census is available in Albanian and English at: http://www.instat.
gov.al/media/3058/main_results__population_and_housing_census_2011.pdf

11

At the time of the 2011 census, the Albanian Evangelical Community (VUSH) was not yet an
official religious community and has grown significantly since. According to unpublished
research conducted by VUSH, the Evangelical Community consisted of approximately 68,000
people in 2014, or 2.2% of the population. See the report ‘Raport kërkimor për Ungjillorët në
Shqipëri 2003 – 2014’ by Reverend Akil Pano.

12

World Jewish Congress, Albania (Report), http://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/about/
communities/AL

13

US Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2003 – Albania’, 18
December 2003, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/24328.htm
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2005, media reports targeted Jehovah’s Witnesses for being involved in a series of juvenile
suicides, although it remains unclear what the involvement of the religious community
was, if any.14 A year later, Shkodra’s municipal decision to place a statue of Mother Teresa in
the city centre was opposed by a small group of local Muslims. A local Catholic church was
vandalised after the installation of the statue. Tensions were lifted with the announcement
that the Albanian Muslim Community recognised Mother Teresa as a national rather than
religious symbol.15 In recent years, the majority of complaints regarding religious tolerance
have concerned schools banning female students that wear a headscarf. 16 Most public
educational institutions do not allow students or staff to wear religious symbols, which has
led to several female students being prevented from attending high school or university
classes. As a result, many parents and students instead choose private educational
institutions, where headscarf are allowed.
In response to current and future challenges, religious communities, in concert with state
institutions, have made efforts to enhance interfaith cooperation. A good illustration of
this is the increased visibility of the Interreligious Council, which was established in 2007
to promote dialogue and interfaith harmony in the country through joint projects and
activities.17 Over the past few years, the Interreligious Council has met more frequently
and has been more broadly engaged, for example by issuing statements on the political
situation in Albania and on the EU accession process.18

14

US Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2005 – Albania’, 8
November 2005, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2005/51536.htm

15

US Department of State, ‘International Religious Freedom Report for 2006 – Albania’, 15
September 2006, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71364.htm

16

See, US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Reports for 2003, 2009, 2010
and 2015, at: https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2003/24328.htm; https://www.state.gov/j/
drl/rls/irf/2009/127295.htm; https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168289.htm; http://
www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=256157

17

Interreligious Council of Albania, ‘History of the Interreligious Council of Albania’, http://
knfsh.al/en/historiku-i-knfsh-se/

18

Interreligious Council of Albania, ‘Press Releases’, http://knfsh.al/en/category/deklarata/
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Country snapshot Bosnia and Herzegovina
By Lejla Hodžić

Since it emerged as an independent state in the 12th century, Bosnia and Herzegovina has
been home to a great variety of religious groups: members of the Bosnian Church, which
largely disintegrated after the Ottoman conquest; Catholics; Eastern Orthodox Christians;
Muslims, Sephardic Jews (following their expulsion from Spain and Portugal in the late 15th
century), and Protestants who settled after the Austro-Hungarian occupation in the 19th
century.19 Being at the crossroads of different confessions and ethnic migrations, defined
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multireligious and multi-ethnic country. During the socialist
regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one of the republics of the Socialist Federative
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), religion was propagated as retrograde leading to the
exclusion of religious communities from socio-political matters, and atheism was endorsed,
but not violently imposed, by the political regime.20 Despite being officially excluded from
the state-building process under the socialist regime, religion was and continues to be
a pillar of ethnic identity and ethnic differentiation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has
had a substantial impact on the creation of a strong relationship between political affairs
and religion, which intensified in the years preceding its proclamation of independence in
1992.21 Moreover, religion was a decisive element in victimisation during the armed conflict
that ensued, since it was the key element of ethnic identity. Despite this context, in postconflict Bosnia and Herzegovina religious doctrines are often used to support national
political ideologies and legitimise new political establishments,22 which have largely been
characterised as ethno-nationalist.23 Consequently, this has instigated a religious revival
particularly among younger generations,24 and has strengthened the relationship between
politics and religion in present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina.25

Religious composition
According to its legal framework on religious communities, Bosnia and Herzegovina is
a secular state where none of the dominant religions or religious communities can be

19

A. Alibašić and N. Begović, ‘Reframing the Relations between State and Religion in Post–War
Bosnia: Learning to be Free!’, Journal of the Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, vol. 19:1, 3
January 2017, p. 20.

20

D. Abazovic, ‘Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina’,
European Yearbook of Minority Issues, vol. 7:1, 2010, p. 321

21

Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence from Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY) after a positive referendum vote on 3 Mach 1992.

22

D. Abazovic, ‘Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics’, p. 323.

23

Ibid. p. 323

24

US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Bosnia and
Herzegovina: International Religious Freedom Report for 2006’.

25

D. Abazovic, ‘Rethinking Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics’, p. 323.
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given official status.26 The state may not interfere in the internal organisation and affairs
of the religious communities, while the representatives of the communities may not
formally participate in political affairs.27 Taking into consideration the religious diversity
of Bosnian society, the law allows the state to provide equal financial support for the
cultural, heritage, educational, social and charitable services of all religious communities,
provided that these services are supplied in a non-discriminatory manner.28 Freedom of
religion and freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion are constitutionally
protected categories,29 which may be limited in accordance with the law and international
standards for the purpose of protecting public security, health or morality, or the rights
and freedoms of others.30
The religious demography of Bosnia and Herzegovina makes it one of the most diverse
countries in the region and on the continent as a whole. According to the 2013 census,
Muslims constitute 50.7% of the population, Orthodox Christians 30.7%, Catholics 15.2%,
while the remaining 3.4% belong to religious minorities (Jews and Protestants primarily)
or consider themselves as having no religious belief.31 Due to a strong correlation between
ethnicity and religion, the three dominant religious groups broadly correspond to the
three dominant ethnic groups – Bosniaks are predominantly Sunni Muslims, Serbs are
predominantly Serbian Orthodox, whereas Croats are mainly Roman Catholics.32 This
strong correlation is demonstrated in the census results, where the ethnic composition
correlates almost directly with the religious composition of Bosnian society, with Bosniaks
constituting 50.1%, Serbs 30.8% and Croats 15.4%.33 Indeed, changes in the territorial
distribution of religious groups after the wars of the 1990s also correspond to equivalent
changes in ethnic composition.
There have been no comprehensive surveys on religious observance recently, but according
to the US Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report in 2006, the rate
of religious observance varied among different religious and age groups, with higher
observance recorded among Catholic Croats, and the younger generations of all three
dominant religious groups.34 This is some evidence of the religious revival in post-conflict

26

Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, Law on Freedom of the Religion and the Legal
Position of the Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 5/04, Art.
14(1), http://www.mpr.gov.ba/biblioteka/zakoni/bs/ZAKON%20o%20slobodi%20vjere.pdf

27

Ibid. Arts. 14(3) and 14(4).

28

Ibid. Art. 14(4). Emphasis is placed on prohibition of discrimination based on religion.

29

Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Art. II(3)(g) and Art. III(4), available at https://www.
wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ba/ba020en.pdf

30

Bosnia and Herzegovina Official Gazette, Law on Freedom of the Religion and the Legal
Position of the Churches and Religious Communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 5/04, Art.
14(7).

31

BiH Agency of Statistics, Final results – Census 2013: Religion, via http://www.statistika.
ba/?show=8#link3

32

US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report – Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 15 August 2017, p. 2.

33

BiH Agency of Statistics, Final results – Census 2013: Nationality, via http://www.statistika.
ba/?show=8#link1

34

US Department of State, 2006 International Religious Freedom Report – Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 1 September 2006, available via https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2006/71372.
htm.
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was partly triggered by the role played by religion during
the conflict itself.

Interreligious issues
Given that religion had played a major role in defining ethnic and cultural groups in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, it became the key element in the victimisation of ethnic groups during
the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992–1995.35 Indeed, despite the conflict being
characterised as ‘ethnic’, religious identity played a defining role in what we understand
as ‘ethnic cleansing’ during the war. For instance, Bosnian Muslims used the designation
‘Muslims’ to express nationhood in the former Yugoslavia’s legal framework, which meant
that the term became primarily a cultural and ethnic one, instead of religious.36 For these
reasons, the policy of ethnic cleansing was directed at ‘Muslims’ (or Bosniaks today),
regardless of their actual religious observance. Moreover, the destruction of mosques and
other Muslim buildings during the conflict, has been considered as evidence of the intent
to destroy Bosnian Muslims as an ethnic group.37
This historical background has defined interreligious issues and obstacles towards
reconciliation in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. Crucial interreligious issues
nowadays include the lack of constructive dialogue between groups, religious segregation
in education and discrimination of religious communities – primarily returnees. Besides
from the creation of the Inter-Religious Council (IRC) in 1997 to promote the shared
values of all of Bosnia’s religions, religious leaders have not been sufficiently involved
in the peacebuilding processes, especially at the grassroots level.38 The absence or
underutilisation of interfaith dialogue at the local level has been detrimental for
members of religious minorities returning after the conflict. Most returnees have reported
selective enforcement of their rights by authorities, while religious leaders have reported
discrimination by local law enforcement agencies in their investigation of acts of violence,
vandalism and threats, and in providing protection to victims.39 Religious segregation in
primary and secondary education is another important obstacle in achieving an inclusive
education system. Religious education is provided in schools, but it usually involves
classes on the religion of the majority religious group within the community, compounding
discrimination towards pupils belonging to minority faiths.40

35

M. Oddie, ‘The relationship of religion and ethnic nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina’,
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe, Vol. 32:1, February 2012, pp. 34–42.

36

M. Sells, ‘Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion and Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’
Sociology of Religion, vol. 64:3, 2003, pp. 309–331.

37

Morgan, Op. Cit. p. 40.

38

J. N. Clark, ‘Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Are Religious Actors Doing
Enough?’ Europe-Asia Studies, 62:4, 5 May 2010, pp. 677–678.

39

US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report – Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 15 August 2017, p. 7.

40

OSCE, Institute on Religion and Public Policy, Religious Freedom in Bosnia, 7 October 2008,
https://www.osce.org/odihr/34244?download=true
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Country snapshot Kosovo
By Leonie Vrugtman and Diori Angjeli

Located in the centre of the Balkan Peninsula, Kosovo is of great historical and political
importance for the entire region.41 As with most Balkan countries, the dominant religion of
Kosovo has fluctuated over time, in accordance with its cultural and political contact with
its neighbours. Christianity first reached the area during the Roman period, and Eastern
Orthodoxy eventually became the state religion in the ninth century, amid competition
in the Balkans between the Bulgarian and Byzantine empires. Later, under the Serbian
Kingdom, the church split with Greece and the Serbian Orthodox Church was established
in Kosovo. When the Ottoman Empire took over, Islam became the official religion and
gradually supplanted Christianity as the largest faith by the seventeenth century.42
Kosovo experienced major demographic changes between the collapse of Yugoslavia
in the early 1990s and its declaration of independence in 2008. During the Kosovo War
(1998–1999), a large number of ethnic Albanians were forced to flee or were expelled from
the area. In a subsequent resurgence of civil unrest a considerable proportion of ethnic
Serbs were also displaced.43 Today, Kosovo has a population of approximately 1,830,700
people.44 According to the 2011 official census, 95.6% of the population is Muslim, 2.2%
is Roman Catholic, and 1.4% is Serbian Orthodox.45 However, this census was boycotted
by ethnic Serbs, resulting in the underrepresentation of this ethnicity and of Orthodox
Christians.46 The Serbian Orthodox Church, the representative of the Orthodox community
in Kosovo, claims that the actual Serbian Orthodox community in Kosovo is composed of
120,000, or 6.3% of the general population.47 Other religious communities, including the
Tarikat (a branch of Sufi Islam) and Protestant populations, also contest the census data.
The Protestant community claims 20,000 followers throughout the country, or 1.1% of the
population.48 Judaism is listed as one of the five traditional religions of Kosovo, but there

41

T. Judah, Kosovo: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford, 2008).

42

G. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London, 2000), p. 14.

43

Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples:
Minorities and indigenous peoples, March 2018, https://minorityrights.org/country/kosovo/.

44

World Bank, Population, total – 2017, via https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.
TOTL?locations=XK&view=chart

45

Kosovo Agency of Statistics, ‘The final results of Population, Households and Housing Census
Released’, 26 September 2012, http://ask.rks-gov.net/en/kosovo-agency-of-statistics/addnews/the-final-results-of-population-households-and-housing-census-released

46

Kosovo Agency of Statistics, Kosovo Population and Housing Census 2011 - Final Results:
Quality Report, via https://unstats.un.org/unsd/censuskb20/KnowledgebaseArticle10700.aspx

47

US Department of State, 2017 International Religious Freedom Report - Kosovo, 30 May 2018,
p. 2, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/281166.pdf

48

Ibid.
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are currently only 56 Jewish people living in Kosovo.49

Religious communities and the State
Kosovo is a secular state and its constitution guarantees the freedom of belief, conscience
and religion.50 Expressions of faith are only limited ‘to ensure public order and safety, to
protect public health and morals, human rights and fundamental freedoms of others’.51
In 2017, under this provision, the former imam of the grand mosque, Shefqet Krasniqi,
was arrested on grounds of encouraging terrorism and religious extremism but was later
cleared of all charges.52 While Kosovo is multi-confessional, the government does not
have a designated ministry or department responsible for religious affairs and current
legislation prevents religious communities from registering as legal entities. This has
the effect that the concerns of religious communities often remain unaddressed; that
religious communities receive no financial support from the state; and that they are not
able to conduct administrative activities such as buying or renting properties.53 As a result,
religious communities seek funding from elsewhere, including foreign governments and
non-governmental organisations, whose support often comes with caveats. In recent years,
concerns have been raised over Turkey’s religious influence in Kosovo,54 and the further
spread of conservative Islam through activities funded by Gulf countries.55

Religious tension
Although religion was not the primary driving force behind the war, it was an inseparable
part of how the conflict parties identified each other. Since most Albanians are Muslim
and most Serbs are Orthodox Christian, political leaders in the region emphasised

49

L. Luxner, ‘With US help, Muslim-majority Kosovo plans its first synagogue and Jewish
museum’, Times of Israel, 22 December 2018, https://www.timesofisrael.com/with-us-helpmuslim-majority-kosovo-plans-its-first-synagogue-and-jewish-museum/.

50

Republic of Kosovo Official Gazeta, Law No. 02/L-31 on Religious Freedom in Kosovo, 24 August
2006, Preamble, available at: http://www.gazetazyrtare.com/e-gov/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=64&Itemid=28&lang=en.

51

Ibid. Art. 1.3.

52

‘Kosovo court clears Grande Mosque imam of inciting terrorism’, Reuters, 23 March 2018,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-terrorism-verdict/kosovo-court-clears-grandemosque-imam-of-inciting-terrorism-idUSKBN1GZ14P

53

J. Mehmeti, ‘Faith and Politics in Kosovo: The Status of Religious Communities in a Secular
Country’, in A. Elbasani and O. Roy (eds.), The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. (London, 2015)
pp. 62–80; and Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018: Kosovo, https://freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world/2018/kosovo

54

M. Edwards and M. Colborne, ‘Turkey's gift of a mosque sparks fears of “neo-Ottomanism” in
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religious differences even if it had little or nothing to do with faith itself.56 This had a
significant effect on how ethnic groups perceived each other and fuelled tensions between
communities of different faiths. Following the withdrawal of Serb and Yugoslav forces,
some Kosovo Albanians engaged in acts of retaliation such as destroying churches and
other Orthodox sites between 1999 and 200457. In the last ten years, such incidents have
declined, but the country remains vulnerable to incidents of religious – or ethnically –
motivated violence, hate speech and vandalism, especially between Sunni Muslims and
Orthodox Christians. The government has stepped up its efforts to respond to ethnical or
religiously motivated violence and vandalism, including protecting religious and cultural
sites. Despite this protection, theft and vandalism continues and there have been some
instances of attacks being planned on Serbian Orthodox.58 In 2016 for example, four ethnic
Albanians with firearms, suspected to have links to the Islamic State, were arrested in front
of the Visoki Decani Monastery.59
Cases of religiously motivated incidents impact other denominations as well. Islamic sites,
including mosques, have been vandalised by ethnic Serbs during and after the war – most
notably the Ibar River Mosque in North Mitrovica, which was never rebuilt.60 In some cases,
rival Muslims groups have launched attacks on each other’s religious leaders.61 In the past,
the Protestant and Jewish communities have raised concerns over Kosovo’s freedom of
religion provisions, especially over discrepancies in their ability to obtain construction
permits for places of worship or their properties becoming subject to vandalism.62
Both the Muslim community of Kosovo and the Serbian Orthodox Church have also accused
the government of discrimination towards their communities, albeit for different reasons.
The Muslim community has complained that, due to rules prohibiting religious dress in
public schools, female Muslim students wearing headscarves had been sent home and
thereby denied access to education.63 The Orthodox community claims it has received
no financial support to rebuild destroyed religious sites. Meanwhile, the government has
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G. Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (2000); and L. Dunn, ‘The Roles
of Religion in Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia’, Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern
Europe, vol. 16 no. 1, January 2015, available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/
vol16/iss1/3/
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expanded its Interfaith Kosovo programme to promote religious tolerance by organising
conferences and workshops on the topic,64 with state officials and religious representatives
also attending the consecration of the Catholic St. Theresa Cathedral in Pristina.65
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kosovo's interfaith initiative echoes around the globe, June 2015,
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Country snapshot Montenegro
By Belgrade Open School

The history of religion in Montenegro is similar to the rest the region. Christianity was
present in the cluster of territories which comprise modern Montenegro from around the
4th century, with authority fluctuating between Rome and Constantinople, before Eastern
Orthodoxy became established in the late 9th century. In June 1920 the Orthodox Church in
Montenegro officially united with that of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians
to form the Serbian Orthodox Church.66 The Serbian Orthodox Church was in the rank of
the Patriarchate, and it was subsequently accepted by other Eastern Orthodox Churches
in 1922. In 1993 the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was founded, and was registered as an
NGO in 2001. Its leadership claims that Montenegrin churches were illegitimately annexed
by the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1920 and that it is the sole legal representative of
the Orthodox Church in Montenegro. However, the decision to unify was accepted by
all of the bishops from Montenegro, and the metropolitan Gavrilo Dožić was among the
most prominent candidates for the first patriarch of the united Serbian Church, a role
which he eventually took on (1938–1950). As such, the Montenegrin Orthodox Church is
not recognised by any other official Eastern Orthodox Churches. Islam was introduced
into the area with the Ottoman conquest in the late 15th century, whose influence in the
region lasted until the Balkan wars of 1912/13 when the Kingdom of Montenegro gained
independence and united with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians in 1918. The
Islamic Community claims that significant part of the Muslim population was deported
after the country gained independence from Ottoman rule.67

Religious composition
According to the 2011 census, about 72% of the population declare themselves to be Orthodox
Christian. The Orthodox population in Montenegro is divided between two Orthodox
communities – the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church
(MOC). Their mutual relations are complicated, and they have worsened since Montenegro
became an independent state in 2006. Local media outlets have estimated that about
70% of the Orthodox population are adherents of the SOC, with around 30% in the MOC.
However, these estimates should be taken with caution since there have been no official
studies conducted. About 3.5% of the population identify as Roman Catholic, and reside
mostly in the coastal area.
The second largest religion in Montenegro is Islam, forming around 16% of the total
population and are represented by the Islamic Community of Montenegro (ICM). The
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Đ. Slijepčević, Istorija Srpske pravoslavne crkve: Od početka XIX veka do kraja Drugog svetskog
rata, Vol. 2, (BIGZ: Beograd, 2002), pp. 369–376.
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majority of Montenegrin Muslims live in the northeastern part of the country in Rožaje,
Plav and Gusinje, which neighbour the Serbian predominantly Muslim municipalities of
Sjenica, Novi Pazar, and Tutin. A further 1.24% identified as atheists and 2.61% who did not
want to declare. The rest of the population (about 4.5%) are members of other smaller
religions such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Judaism, and various branches of Protestantism and
Buddhism.68

Interfaith relations
According to Article 14 of the Constitution of Montenegro, ‘Religious communities are
separated from the State. Religious communities are equal and free to worship and do
other religious tasks/works’.69 The government has agreements with the Islamic and Jewish
Communities and the Holy See further defining the legal status of the respective groups
and regulating their relationship with the state. There are no similar agreements with the
SOC, MOC, or the other recognised religious groups.
By law, religion may not be taught in public primary or secondary schools. The SOC operates
one secondary school in the historical capital of Cetinje, and the Islamic Community
operates one private madrassa at the secondary school level in the capital Podgorica –
both follow the state curriculum in non-religious matters.
There are 21 recognised religious groups in the country and all applied for official
registration except the SOC.70 The interior minister from May until November 2016, Goran
Danilovic (a member of the opposition party Demos), wrote a letter to the SOC supporting
the SOC’s assertion that it was not required to register because it had legal status before
1977 and was therefore not a new religious group.71 As a result, the SOC has experienced
regular difficulties with the issuing of residency permits,72 and visas for its clergy. There
is an ongoing dispute between the SOC and MOC, particularly over the ownership of 750
Orthodox sites.73 Police have prohibited members of the MOC from performing the liturgy in
churches on several occasions because of the security concerns, while numerous members
of the SOC were already in churches performing liturgies. Police have continued to provide
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protection around churches for events conducted by both groups.74 In recent years there
have also been tensions among the Islamic Community, with a dispute arising between the
head of the ICM, Reis Rifat Fejzic, and one of the two leaders of the Islamic Community in
Serbia, former Mufti Muamer Zukorlic, over who represents the Islamic community in the
Sandzak region (a historical term for a former Ottoman region now divided by the border
between northeast Montenegro and southwest Serbia).75
Religious groups have continued to complain that the laws regulating their legal status are
outdated and inadequate because they were created based on the demographic conditions
of the former Yugoslavia. The government has been working on a new law regulating the
legal status of religious communities since 2015.76 After three years of preparation, a
draft version was completed. However, during an international academic conference on
‘Freedom of Religion or Belief in Montenegro’ held in Montenegro on 3–4 May 2019, the new
draft law was heavily criticised.77
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Country snapshot North Macedonia
By Mariglen Demri

Many religious beliefs and cultures have existed on the territory of the Republic of North
Macedonia (RNM). Orthodox Christianity has been present in the geographical area of the
modern RNM since the first century AD and is the largest religious denomination of North
Macedonia. According to the most recent census, conducted in in 2002, 64.8% of citizens
identify as Orthodox Christians.78. Indeed, it has been inscribed into cultural memory that
the region of ‘Macedonia’ is cited in the Bible – its roughly 25 mentions are a source of
particular pride amongst Orthodox believers.79 As such, the followers of the RNM Orthodox
Church consider themselves to be the successors of the first Christians on the Balkan
Peninsula.
However, North Macedonia is also characterised by its religious diversity, having been
under the religious and cultural influence of the Bulgarian, Serbian and Ottoman empires,
as well as experiencing a major influx of Sephardic Jews from Iberia in the fifteenth
century. Positive interfaith relations have generally been preserved in the modern era
although at times they have experienced moments of tension. According to the 2002
census, the religious distribution of RNM is as follows: 64.8% are Orthodox Christians,
33.3% are Muslims, 0.35% Catholics, and 0.03% Protestants. A more recent study by Brima
and WIN–Gallup80, found that only 1% of citizens identified as atheists, while 88% declared
themselves as members of one of the religious communities. Similar to other countries
in the Balkan region, members of the largest ethnic groups in North Macedonia tend to
belong to distinct religious communities. According to research conducted by Abdul Gafffar
Mughal using data from the State Statistical Office, over 90% of ethnic Albanians in North
Macedonia identify as Muslim.81 On the other hand, more than 90% of ethnic Macedonian
identify as Orthodox.82
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Politics and religion
Given this historical context and the particular geography of North Macedonia, religion is
often interwoven with daily politics. More often than not religious representatives openly
communicate political positions on issues that fall out of the scope of their capacity as
religious communities. The ethnophyletism83 – the conflation of national and religious
identities – of the Orthodox Church enables it to claim certain responsibilities regarding
ethno-national issues. For example, during negotiations in the Macedonia naming dispute
with Greece (and the law on the use of languages, where Albanian was supposed to become
an official language of state), some bishops of the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC)
joined public protests claiming that the MOC is strictly against changing the name and the
constitution of the country.84
Considering that the theory and practice of politics in the region is often framed in ethnic
terms, such ethno-political conflicts have a major effect on the religious cohesion of North
Macedonian society, such as in the armed conflict between the government and Albanian
separatists in 2001.85 The principle basis for the conflict was inter-ethnic disagreement,
but inevitably involved a religious element too. The inter-ethnic conflict in this case grew
into an interreligious conflict between the two main religious communities. During the
armed conflict, objects of religious and cultural-historical significance from both sides
were demolished or destroyed.86
Even after the Ohrid Agreement ended the conflict, tensions have persisted. According
to the US State Department’s 2016 Religious Freedom Report the reconstruction of the
mosque in Prilep called ‘Charshi Mosque’ was facing obstructions by the government.87
Also, in 2011 a government decision to build a museum in the shape of church inside Kale
Fortress in Skopje led to a violent confrontation between young members of the two main
ethnic communities, Albanians and Macedonians.88 Albanians were angry for building the
so called church-museum on location which they claimed should have been a mosque.
Macedonians, however, felt the need to defend the ‘church’. All Albanian ethnic political
parties were against this project, calling it a provocation.89

83

See G. Papathomas, Course of Canon Law — Appendix VI — canonical glossary. (Paris, 1995).

84

(Video) The Bishop Petar: MOC is against change of the Constitution and the name of country.
[(Видео) Владиката Петар: МПЦ е против промена на Уставот и името на државата],
MakFax, 27 February 2018. Available on: https://makfax.com.mk/daily-news/... accessed on: 12
May 2019

85

The 2001 insurgency in the Republic of Macedonia was an armed conflict which began when the
ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) militant group attacked the security forces of the
Republic of Macedonia at the beginning of February 2001, and ended with the Ohrid Agreement.

86

V. Petroska-Beska and M. Najcevska, ‘Macedonia: Understanding History, Preventing Future
Conflict’, Special Report 115, United States Institute Of Peace, February 2004, http://unpan1.
un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN017851.pdf

87

US Department of State, 2016 International Religious Freedom Report - Macedonia, 15 August,
2017, p. 6, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/269084.pdf

88

European Commission. Working Paper, ‘The Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia 2011
Progress Report’, 12 October 2011, Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/mk_rapport_2011_en.pdf

89

S. Marusic, ‘Eight Injured in Clashes over “Church” Construction in Macedonia’, Balkan
Insight, 13 February 2011, Available on: https://balkaninsight.com/2011/02/13/albaniansmacedonians-clash-over-museum-church/

22

ROLE OF RELIGION
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS’ SOCIETIES

State interference in religious freedom
The Macedonian Orthodox Church (formerly the Archbishopric of Ohrid), which after the
Second World War had been reinstated an autonomous diocese of the Serbian Orthodox
Church, declared its independence in 1967. Its autocephality is still disputed by the Serbian
Orthodox Church. Besides internal administrative church motives, ecclesiastical inner
circles do not reject the possibility that movement for autocephaly has been led by ethnopolitical and ethnophyletist elements in the Orthodox Church, in general.90
In 2002, one of the bishops of the Macedonian Orthodox Church broke off and joined the
Serbian Orthodox Church canon. Bishop Jovan, also known as Zoran Vranishkovski, and
his followers then tried to register the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese (OOA) as a religious
community but was rejected by the state commission, which recognises the MOC.91 In 2017,
the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled that the blocking of registration
was in breach of Article 11 of the convention, and awarded the OOA 4500 euros in damages.92
Vranishkovski has been charged and served criminal sentences, but the Church is still not
officially registered.93
Similar circumstances exist within the Islamic community in Macedonia, although with a
lesser intensity. Namely, the law on religious communities from 2007 disputes the legal
status of the Bektashi Community which registered in 2000 in the Republic of North
Macedonia, as well as its right to the property of the Arabati Baba teke (Sufi religious
building). With the inability to register itself as a legal entity, and the subsequent denied
right to acquire property, the teqe has become the property of the Islamic Religious
Community (IRC) of the RNM. Representatives of the Bektashi community consider this to
be an instance of the state favouring the IRC at the expense of a smaller community.94 In
2018, the European Court of Human Rights passed a verdict requiring the state to pay the
Bektashi community in North Macedonia compensation for the damages caused by the
obstacles imposed by national courts that made it impossible for the Bektashi community
to retain its status as religious community.95
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Country snapshot Serbia
By Belgrade Open School

The Christian faith has been present in the territory comprising modern Serbia since the
Roman period. After the initial spread of Christianity to the area in the 2nd century, religious
authority fluctuated between Rome and Constantinople, before Eastern Orthodoxy became
established in the late 9th century. Under the medieval Nemanjic dynasty, the Serbian
Orthodox Church achieved autocephalous status in 1219, and was elevated to a patriarchate
in 1346. Islam was introduced in Serbia with the Ottoman presence in the Balkans from the
14th century onwards. Varying degrees of tolerance between the Orthodox and Muslim
populations of foreign and Slavic descent followed. Between 1804 and 1815, a series of
Serbian uprisings against Ottoman rule culminated in Serbia gaining autonomy under the
rule of Serbian hereditable princes in 1830, and eventually in complete independence in
1878. However, in southern parts of Serbia, a minority population of Slavic Muslims and
Albanian Muslims remains.
During the communist regime after 1945 when Serbia was a part of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, religion was tolerated but discouraged, whilst the property of
religious organisations was mostly nationalised. The impact of socialist political ideology
on religion in Serbia can be seen in the fact that data on religious affiliation was ignored
for ideological and political reasons in the censuses of 1961, 1971 and 1981.96 Moreover,
recent data has shown a decline in the proportion of people identifying as atheist since
then by a factor of 10, the underlying reason for which could be the changed political and
ideological atmosphere of Serbian society.97
The substantial overlap between religious affiliation and ethnic identity played a major role
in the wars that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, and continues somewhat to
this day. This reflects the role of religion in creating an atmosphere of mutual intolerance
among the different nations in the Balkans, with rises in nationalism being reinforced
by a rise in expressions of religious identity. This increase in the importance of religious
identity in Serbia was also demonstrated by the establishment of the Ministry of Religion
of Serbia in 1991, which lasted until 2012.

Church-state relations
The Republic of Serbia is a secular state according to Article 11 of its Constitution.
Churches and religious communities are separated from the state and no religion may be
established as a state or mandatory religion. The 2006 state law which regulates churches
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97

Ibid. p.182

24

ROLE OF RELIGION
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS’ SOCIETIES

and religious communities grants special treatment to the seven religious groups which
the government defines as ‘traditional’. These are the Serbian Orthodox Church, the Roman
Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church, the Reformed Christian Church, Evangelical
Christian Church, the Islamic Community, and the Jewish community.98 The law grants
these seven traditional religious communities tax exemptions, the right to have their faith
taught in public schools, and the right to provide chaplain services to military personnel.99
Besides the seven traditional religions, there are another twenty religious communities
and churches on the state register.

Religious composition of country
All statistical data on Serbian religious demography is based on the 2011 census, and does
not include data for Kosovo,100 which declared independence in 2008. The data for two
municipalities bordering Kosovo is incomplete since a number of Albanian citizens in
those areas refused to participate in the census. The majority of the Serbian population
identified as Christian (91.22%), belonging to the major denominations – Eastern Orthodoxy,
Roman Catholicism and various branches of Protestantism. Of the different Christian
denominations, the vast majority belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church (84.59%), while
4.97% identified as Catholics. The majority of Roman Catholics live in the northern part of
Serbia – Vojvodina.101
The third biggest religion in Serbia is Islam, according to the 2011 census Muslims
represent 3.10% of the population. They are organised in two different communities – the
Islamic Community of Serbia and the Islamic Community in Serbia. The first has its seat
in Belgrade and consists of three mufti units, while the second is located in city of Novi
Pazar, a Muslim majority area and is under the riyasat (executive body) of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The traditional Protestant communities constitute around 1%, mostly of the
Slovak and Hungarian national minorities. More than 90% of Serbia’s 36,000 Jews were
killed during the Holocaust, and as a result the Jewish community now has less than 1000
members.

Interfaith relations
According to independent reports, religious violence has declined in last years, although
it is sometimes hard to determine if a violent act has been motivated by religion or ethnic
identity. Interfaith relations are generally good in Serbia, but tensions persist between the
Serbian Orthodox Church and other unrecognised Orthodox Churches – the Montenegrin
and Macedonian – as well as divisions between the two Islamic communities.
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Religious identity continues to overlap with and reinforce feelings of national or ethnic
identity.102 A major outbreak of religious violence took place in 2004 when mosques in
the centres of Belgrade and Nis were damaged soon after a series of attacks in Kosovo
in which more than 36 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries103 were destroyed in
rioting by Kosovan Albanians.104

Kosovo
The situation in Kosovo remains very complex105, as tensions between the majority Albanian
and minority Serbian populations have not abated 20 years after the war of 1998–99.106
While Kosovo declared independence in 2008, it is still not recognised as a member state
of the United Nations and it is not officially recognised by approximately half of its member
states – despite the EU’s several resolutions that encourage its members to recognise
Kosovo’s independence. What makes the situation especially difficult, is that a significant
number of Serbian Orthodox Church properties are located in Kosovan territory.
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Elite survey reports

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Serbia

Montenegro
Kosovo

Albania

North Macedonia

Introduction

Religion has long been an essential element in the societies of the Western Balkan region,
primarily because religious affiliation was key to cultural characterisation and ethnic
differentiation,107 but religion has achieved a prominent role in almost all aspects of
society in the post-communist era. According to scholars, religion has not only witnessed
a revival in these societies considering the increased number of religious activities, but
the process of ‘de-secularisation’ of the public has been present as well.108 Also, religion
played a crucial role in the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s,109
which came to define contemporary interreligious relations across the whole region. These
are only some of the dimensions of the role of religion in Western Balkan society which
this cross-country report attempts to analyse.
The goal of this survey report is to gather information and opinions on the role of religion
in contemporary Western Balkan countries with regard to different societal issues such
as politics, the economy, social cohesion, interreligious coexistence, tolerance, and
democracy. In addition, the aim is to get an insight into multi-religious context and identify
the role of religious institutions and leaders, their activities and practices. Finally, this
survey report identifies areas for improvement, and the ways in which religion could be
more beneficial to each society. While the analysis focuses on each country separately, this
survey is part of an effort to better understand the role of religion in the entire region of
the Western Balkans.
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Survey report Albania
By Leonie Vrugtman and Dior Angjeli

Survey sample
In April and May 2019, more than one hundred surveys were distributed amongst influential
figures in Albania. The survey aimed to gather their views on the role of religion in Albania
and the Western Balkans. In total, 33 respondents provided quantitative and qualitative
answers to questions, including politicians and government employees (N = 3), religious
leaders (N = 4), academia (N = 6), civil society leaders (N = 7), journalists and opinionmakers (N = 6) and young leaders (N = 5). One respondent did not state his occupation.
Of the respondents, 25 were male (78.1%) and seven (21.9%) were female. The average age
of the respondents was 41.6 years, with the youngest respondent being 28 years old and
the oldest 54. In terms of education, one respondent was educated to a bachelor’s degree
level, 18 respondents finished an MA, eight have obtained a PhD and four have completed
post-doctoral study as well. One respondent did not state his education.

The role of religion in Albania
The daily life of most Albanians is largely secular. The majority of Albanians identify as
belonging to a religious community, but when asked about religion people often refer
to their family’s religious affiliation instead of their own choice of faith.110 According to
a study on religious tolerance in Albania (IDM, 2018), the majority of Albanians do not
consider themselves as actively practising a religion (62.7%). Instead, most only practise
the most important rituals of their religion (42.3%) or do not take part in any of the
rituals (26.8%). Religion, for most people, is something personal and their everyday life
is not really influenced by faith (71%). 54.1% of Albanians agree or strongly agree with
the statement: ‘Although I am a religious person, I refuse to let religious considerations
influence my everyday activities’; and 65.7% agreed or strongly agreed with the statement:
‘Although I believe in my religion, I think there are many more important things in life’.111
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UNDP Albania ‘Being LGBTI in Eastern Europe: Albania country report’, 2017, available at:
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Figure 1: Religion’s influence on social and political issues in Albania
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In the current survey, carried out only amongst influential figures in Albania, answers were
largely in agreement with those findings. Respondents were asked to comment on the
statement: ‘In your opinion, how important is religion for most of the people in Albania?’
On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 marks complete irrelevance and 7 marks significant influence,
the mean was 4.1. This suggests that, according to Albania’s influential figures, religion is
of moderate importance to most Albanians. Only three respondents thought of religion as
very important in people’s lives, of which two are influential members of one of Albania’s
religious communities and one is a youth leader.
Although religion in general may not be perceived as of great importance in people’s
lives, it may still influence people’s perceptions of societal or political issues. According
to respondents, religion has moderate influence on their attitudes about societal issues
such as poverty, justice, equality, crime and social cohesion in Albania. The respondents
answered with an average assessment of 4.16 on a scale from 1 (no influence at all) to
7 (significant influence). While journalists and opinion makers valued the influence on
societal matters as quite low to moderate, two of the influential members of religious
communities answered that religion has a significant influence on people’s perceptions
regarding societal issues. When asked the same question about political matters such
as democratic participation, voter behaviour or political parties, respondents felt that
religion had less of an influence (average assessment was 3.26). Only one member of the
religious community and a youth leader perceived that religion had a strong or significant
influence on people’s opinions on political matters (a 6 or 7).

Religious leaders
Since 2007, the leaders of the largest religious communities of Albania have formed an
Interreligious Council that promotes dialogue and inter-faith harmony through joint
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projects and activities. Over the past few years, the council has become more visible and
has been increasingly engaged with societal and political developments in Albania. The
council has received international recognition for its work and was awarded the awarded
Sérgio Vieira de Mello Prize in 2018.112 This sentiment of religious harmony is not only
embraced at the highest level. According to the 2018 study on religious tolerance carried
out by IDM, 74.4% of the respondents perceived that religious clerics at the local level also
embrace values of religious tolerance.113 In the current survey, the prominent members of
Albanian society were asked about the sphere of influence of religious leaders and other
clerics. Respondents believe that religious leaders have a considerable influence on their
own community of believers. On a scale from 1 (no influence) to 7 (significant influence),
respondents gave an average rate of 4.87. This influence sphere creates an opportunity for
promoting values of religious tolerance within the community of believers.
Despite their perceived influence on their own community of believers, the respondents
do not feel that religious leaders have a strong influence on public opinion in Albania
in general. Aside from the representatives of the religious communities responding to
the survey, the remainder of the elite were sceptical as to the extent to which religious
leaders influence public opinion. With an average answer of 3.43 on a scale from 1 (no
influence) to 7 (significant influence), the responses depict that religious leaders have yet
to substantially breach discussions pertaining to the public realm.

Figure 2: The influence from religious leaders in Albania
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‘The Interreligious Council of Albania receives human rights award’, Tirana Times, 8 November
2018, available at: http://www.tiranatimes.com/?p=139119

Institute of Democracy and Meditation, ‘Religious tolerance in Albania’, 25 April 2018, available
at: http://idmalbania.org/religious-tolerance-albania/
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The influence of religion on developments in Albania
Respondents were asked whether they felt that religion, as predominantly interpreted and
presented in the public discourse, has positively or negatively influenced developments
in Albania. Overall, the influential figures in Albania viewed religion as a positive influence
on the developments in the country, rather than a negative one. Respondents saw religion
especially as having a positive influence on the tolerance and peaceful coexistence in
the country (83.9% or N = 26), the highest frequency out of all the questions. On other
developments, such as social cohesion, inter-ethnic relations and democracy, religion was
also seen as having a more positive than a negative influence. For social cohesion, 58.1% of
respondents answered that religion had a positive influence. For inter-ethnic relations and
democracy this was 51.6% and 48.4% respectively. Mostly neutral responses were recorded
concerning religion’s effect on economic well-being (71% answered neutral) and political
developments (58.1% answered neutral), which means that respondents tend to perceive
that in Albania, religion does not really have an influence on these developments. Good
neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries was most-often reported as being
influenced negatively by religion. Six respondents believed that religion has a negative
influence on relations between Western Balkan Countries.

Figure 3: The influence of religion on politics and society
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Religious tolerance
In 2014, Pope Francis made the first of his foreign visits to Albania in order to highlight the
interreligious harmony in the country. Pope Francis hailed Albania because of ‘the peaceful
coexistence and collaboration that exists among followers of different religions’.114 Indeed,
according to the 2018 study on religious tolerance, the vast majority of Albanians believe
that religious tolerance is a fundamental value in Albania (93%).115 The reason for this is,
according to 76.3% of the respondents, that Albanians in general are not very religious.
What is more important to Albanians is to lead a moral life (69.5% strongly agrees or
agrees) and to be a good person no matter what religion you profess (72.5% strongly agree
or agree).
The findings of the current survey agree with some of the major findings of the 2018 study.
The respondents were asked to rate the interreligious relations in Albania on a scale from
1 (religious hatred) to 7 (religious harmony). The average answer from the respondents was
a 6, meaning that the respondents perceive that in Albania, there is religious harmony.
38.7% of the respondents rated interreligious relations with a 7 and another 38.7% gave
a 6. Only one respondent rated the interreligious relations in Albania with less than an
average score: a 3 on a scale from 1 to 7. Interreligious relations in the Western Balkans, on
the other hand, were rated as being much less positive. On the same scale from 1 to 7, the
respondents rated interreligious relations in the Western Balkans with an average score of
3.74. Only one respondent perceived that in the Western Balkans, interreligious relations
can be described as harmonious.

Figure 4: Interreligious relations in Albania and in the Western Balkans
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Following the respondents’ assessment on the current state of interreligious relations
in Albania and in the Western Balkans, they were asked to give their opinion on future
developments of interreligious relations. On a scale from 1 (will seriously worsen) to 7
(will significantly improve), respondents rated that over the next five years, interreligious
relations in Albania will remain the same (average of 4.5).

Figure 5: Interreligious relations in the next five years
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Respondents did not think that Albania’s deeply rooted values of religious harmony will
be affected in the next five years. A civil society leader notes that:

‘

the establishment of Centre for Interfaith Cooperation, the continuous
work of the Interreligious Council of Albania and the opening of the
Balkan Institute for Religious Studies and Democracy will have a positive
impact on interreligious relations over the next five years’.

A high-level cleric also foresees a significant improvement of interreligious relations,
especially because the religious communities have such a good relationship with each
other. Another cleric does not share this view. He expects that the ‘growing awareness of
the specific teachings of different religions […] naturally increases the distance between
believers of different religions’. One journalist thinks that it is the ‘apparent religious
radicalism’ and ‘foreign agendas of the religious communities’ that may cause a slight
worsening of interreligious relations in Albania.
In the Western Balkan region, respondents did not predict significant changes in regards to
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the interreligious relations. On a scale form 1 (will seriously worsen) to 7 (will significantly
improve), the average assessment was 3.76, meaning that interreligious relations will remain
difficult (see also Figure 4). According to one respondent, the EU accession process could
be the cause of stronger divisions between Western Balkan countries, if it is ‘differentiated
between the Western Balkan states’. One religious leader noted that, compared to Albania,
the situation in the Western Balkans will remain challenging due to the perception of
ethnic divisions when speaking about religion. Another high-level cleric points out that
‘religious communities have shown readiness to strengthen the relationships between
different religious groups’, and therefore expects that interreligious relations will improve
over the next five years.

Figure 6: Threats to interreligious relations in Albania
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Threats and opportunities for religious tolerance in Albania
When asked their opinion on the biggest threats to interreligious relations in Albania,
the respondents named a wide variety of possible threats. Most often mentioned was
the abuse of religion for political gain. Respondents expressed their concerns regarding
mixing religious arguments with political discourse, and with politics interfering in what
one respondent calls ‘the religious domain’. These answers indicate that the respondents
think it is important that politics and the state should not interfere with religious affairs
and vice-versa, as is also stated in the Albanian Constitution.
Another often-cited threat to religious harmony is the misinterpretation of religion, the
rise of religious extremism [not specifically in Albania] and the stereotypes that are built
around religious conservatism. In the 2018 study on religious extremism in Albania, it was
noted that over 30% of Albanians associate women wearing a veil or men having an Islamic
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beard with ‘religious fundamentalism and extremism’.116 According to the respondents to
this survey, it is important that (violent) religious extremism is not confused with religious
conservativism. Similarly, respondents think that hate speech among different religious
groups, especially when based on stereotypes, can be a potential threat to interreligious
relations.
The third most-cited threat to religious harmony in Albania, according to the respondents,
is the foreign influence that exists in religious communities in Albania. Some respondents
cite the institutions economic dependency on foreign funding, while others are particularly
concerned with the more conservative teachings that come along with young, foreign-trained
religious clerics. The remainder of the most prevalent concerns concerned the ignorance
on general or alternate religious cultures, the lack of integrity and professionalism on
the part of religious leaders and the absence of interreligious dialogue and cooperation
between the main religious institutions.
Despite seeing threats to interreligious relations in Albania, the respondents also noted
that religion can have a positive influence on society. Specifically, the vast majority of the
respondents said that religion can help improve political developments, democracy, interethnic relations, social cohesion, and peaceful coexistence. Social cohesion was believed
to be the most prone (N = 27) to positive influence by religion. Respondents highlighted
religion’s important role as a preserver of a society’s morals and existing social values. By
preaching good morals, emphasising what unites people, and encouraging believers to
lead a moral life, religious institutions and representatives can unite people in communal
activities. This, respondents say, can ‘strengthen the communal sense’ and ‘express the
message of religious tolerance’, despite the potential differences in religions.
Besides teaching good morals, the respondents also highlighted that religious institutions
and representatives can preach democratic values and practices, which would increase
active citizenship. One civil society leader argued that religious institutions should
become more active ‘in protecting the rights of the vulnerable groups by using institutional
mechanisms’. A legal expert also sees an opportunity for religious leaders to speak up when
there are social issues or misrule, but urges ‘religious institutions to distance themselves
from political ideologies’. Lastly, another civil society leader suggested that, in order to
improve the state of tolerance and peaceful coexistence in Albania, religious institutions
and representatives should lead by example, ‘by staying neutral, tolerant and away from
extremist ideologies’.
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Survey report Bosnia and Herzegovina
By Lejla Hodžić

Survey sample
In assessing the role of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina and analysing the multiconfessional context of the country, the report relies on the findings from an opinion survey
and a range of secondary sources. The survey, administered during April 2019, aimed at
gathering the opinions of influential figures in political, cultural and economic sphere in
Bosnia and Herzegovina on the role of religion. It is based on a questionnaire which was
distributed to over 50 influential figures, of which 30 provided quantitative and qualitative
answers to questions addressing religion’s impact on society.

Religion and society
According to research conducted by Silvestri and Mayall (2015), in Bosnia and Herzegovina
people tend to identify with their religion rather than with their state.117 One of the most
comprehensive surveys on the role of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, conducted by
university professors from Mostar, which analysed the importance of religion in transitional
societies, found that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a traditional society in which religion
and religious communities play a significant role, especially because religious affiliation
overlaps with ethnic belonging.118 Religion plays an important role in everyday life of 66.8%
of Bosnians and Herzegovinians, while 17.3% are ambivalent towards the role of religion.119
It is noteworthy that the importance of religion in everyday life increases among younger
generations, whereas it decreases among more educated societal groups.120
According to our survey – which was conducted among influential individuals involved in
political, cultural and economic spheres in Bosnia and Herzegovina – showed that religion
is important to a certain extent. On the scale of 0 to 7 which measures importance of religion
in the society, where 0 marks complete irrelevance and 7 marks significant influence, the
average answer was 5.63, where 11 respondents considered religion very important and
13 respondents considered religion had moderate importance. The respondents who
considered religion as very important were primarily university professors, journalists,
and those involved in NGOs.
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When it comes to the influence of religious arguments on attitudes towards societal issues
such as poverty, justice, equality, crime and social cohesion in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
respondents showed mixed opinions. According to respondents, religion has a moderate
to strong influence on attitudes to societal issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the
average answer of 4.76 (on a 1 to 7 scale) given by respondents. Eight respondents said
they believe religious arguments have moderate influence, while seven respondents said
religious arguments have very strong influence on these societal issues.
Respondents also believe that religious leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina are influential
within their own community of believers. Ten consider them to be very influential, whereas
eight respondents consider them somewhat influential, and six respondents consider
them influential. Two respondents refused to provide an answer on this question. Overall,
the majority of respondents believe they have a strong influence within their community
with an average answer of 5.78. Respondents also believe that religious leaders and their
representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina have medium to strong influence on public
opinion in general, with an average answer of 5.2.
The relationship between religion and politics became stronger in all countries of
southeastern Europe after the fall of communism as religion recovered the influence it had
before.121 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, religion and politics are considered as interdependent,
but the state has not achieved much in creating an inclusive political community for all
religious groups, and especially for minorities.122 The opinion survey conducted for this
report demonstrated that ten respondents believe religion has a significant impact on
political questions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and only one respondent believes it has no
impact on politics. Overall, respondents believe religion has strong influence on political
questions since the average answer was 5.24.
In the opinion survey from 2010–2011 on the relationship of religion and politics in
contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina, the large majority of citizens (74.5%) said that
the role of religion in politics should not be stronger.123 Interestingly, of the 19.4% who
believe that religion should have a stronger role in politics the majority are from younger
generations.124 Comparing this to the results of a survey conducted at the end of the 1990s
which showed that this generational group had the lowest affiliation towards religious
values, the change in the impact of religion is evident. It is indicative of a radical shift
in the system of values supported by the younger generation, which is explained by the
strengthening of the role of religious communities and institutions in the society.125
Previous data indicates that religion plays an important role in society, family and politics
and that religious leaders are influential figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but these
findings do not substantiate religion’s influence on concrete societal developments. As
part of the survey conducted for this report, respondents were asked to give their opinion
on whether religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public discourse,
positively or negatively influenced the development of political processes, democracy,
inter-ethnic relations, social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful
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coexistence, and good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. Figure
7 shows the opinions of respondents on the way religion influences different societal
matters. The majority of respondents believe that religion has a negative impact on most
spheres in society, or its impact was neutral. The most negative influence of religion is
visible in the sphere of political processes and inter-ethnic relations, while tolerance and
peaceful coexistence and good neighbourly relations were also negatively affected by
religion, according to the respondents’ opinion. A small number of respondents believe
religion positively influences these spheres. Moreover, many respondents believe religion
has no influence on economic well-being, democracy and social cohesion.

Figure 7: The influence of religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina (in %)
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Respondents, therefore, consider that religion and religious leaders have failed to positively
contribute to areas where religious communities are usually the driving force of change
e.g. social cohesion. Efforts of religious leaders to enhance social cohesion and inclusion
at the local level have been seldom, whereas international religious organisations have
provided substantial humanitarian assistance during and after the armed conflict.126 In
addition, many international denominational organisations, especially those from North
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America, have contributed to reconciliation through interfaith dialogue and training on
conflict resolution.127

Religious diversity – threats and opportunities
The peaceful coexistence of different confessional groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina has
been disrupted by the 1992–1995 armed conflict, and insufficient interfaith dialogue in the
post-conflict period has sustained the rift between different religious groups. Transition
in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been described as situation of ‘negative peace’ (simply
the absence of war), indicating a failed reconciliation among different ethno-religious
groups.128 Even though religion was not the underlying cause of conflict, the religious
context sustains the conflicting positions of and furthers divisions between the three
ethno-religious groups.129 Since the end of the conflict, there have been no substantial
efforts of religious leaders to promote universal values and principles, which would
promote coexistence as well as a unified attitude towards some societal matters. While
religious leaders have engaged in interfaith dialogue more substantially through the
Inter-Religious Council (IRC), formed in 1997,130 this and similar initiatives tend to focus
on religious leaders themselves, students of theology, youth and women’s groups within
religious communities, while disregarding other segments of society.131
The fact that little has been done regarding improvement of interreligious relations in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is supported by the answers given by influential figures in the
political, cultural and economic spheres. The results of the survey show that, generally,
respondents perceive interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina as somewhere
between outright religious hatred and religious harmony, but closer to religious hatred.
Only one respondent thought there is religious harmony in the country, two respondents
thought there is religious hatred in the country, whereas nine respondents thought the
interreligious relations were closer to religious hatred than to harmony. On the scale
of 1 to 7 where 1 marks religious hatred and 7 marks religious harmony, respondents’
average answer was 3.67 indicating their perception is that interreligious relations in
Bosnia are slightly closer to religious hatred, which is depicted in Figure 8 below. However,
respondents believe that interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are slightly
better than those in other countries of the Western Balkans. On the scale of 1 to 7, on
average respondents believe interreligious relations in the Western Balkans are 3.5, which
is lower than their perception on the same issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
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Figure 8: Interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina
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When asked about the future of interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
majority of respondents (13) believe they will stay the same. None of the respondents
believe that they will seriously worsen, or significantly improve. Based on their answers,
three respondents believe that the relations will improve depending on political stability
and the economic situation. The reasons that the respondents gave when explaining why
interreligious relations will stagnate in the future were varied. Four respondents believe
that interreligious relations will not improve because interfaith dialogue is non-existent
and there is no willingness among religious leaders to establish the dialogue. Another
four respondents recognised the detrimental effect of the relationship between politics
and religion, where religious communities continue political relations which have been
negative. A journalist who believes there will be no improvement in interreligious relations
said that: ‘There is no will of leaders of religious communities and groups to interact with
other religious leaders and communities in accordance with the basic moral principles of
sacred texts, but that they interact on the basis of political preconceptions and attitudes.’
Other reasons cited by the respondents include failed post-conflict reconciliation and the
slow pace of development of an interfaith dialogue, as well as lack of tolerance among
the religious groups. Those respondents who believe there will be some, but limited
improvement of interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, gave particular
importance to the Inter-Religious Council and its activities, as well as to cooperation
amongst religious communities. Nevertheless, these respondents also noted that there
has been symbolic and formal cooperation between religious communities, but no
constructive efforts to build on the interfaith cooperation. Others believe the driving force
the improvement of interreligious relations will come from the international community,
and the European Union in particular. One of the respondents, a university professor, said
that:

‘

since religious and ethnic identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina coincide,
and political goals are conflicting, religious leaders must support the
interests of their community, although Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism
overcome the borders of a state. Religious leaders and religious teachers
in Bosnia and Herzegovina can raise their own religious leaders in the ethnic
and religious plural state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I see such readiness
with the bishops, imams, priests and teachers in state schools.’
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The respondents expressed similar opinions on the improvement of interreligious relations
in the Western Balkans. The majority of respondents (13) believe that interreligious
relations in the Western Balkans will remain the same, three respondents did not express
their opinion on the issue, while only one respondent believes there will be significant
improvement. A director of an NGO said that he believes:

‘

that there will be some improvement because political elites of the Western
Balkan countries, taught by previous conflict experiences, have realised
that it is impossible to establish a functional democracy in a state with
impaired interreligious relations.’

On the scale of 0 to 7 where 0 marks the deterioration of interreligious relations and 7
significant improvement, the respondents’ average answer was 4.14.
According to respondents’ opinions, the biggest threats to interreligious relations in Bosnia
and Herzegovina are related to the political situation, which is shown in Figure 9. Political
instability, the behaviour of politicians, the relationship of politics and religion, or the
abuse of religion for political purposes were named the biggest threats. The absence of
interfaith dialogue, the rise of nationalism and insufficient education and knowledge were
named as the three next biggest threats. History and lack of reconciliation, as well as false
interpretations of religion and the development of extremist movements were named
as additional threats to interreligious relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Respondents
often cited lack of knowledge and understanding of religion as one of the threats to
interreligious relations in the country, indicating insufficient education in this regard. For
example, an assistant university professor said the three biggest threats are:

‘

lack of the curriculum for the subjects of history and religion which
would affirmatively speak about value of diversity, common cultural and
historical heritage, affirmatively about the other and differences (not the
fear of the Turks); lack of projects on interreligious dialogue; and nonengagement of religious leaders in passing interreligious reconciliation and
mutual understanding on to ordinary citizens in all communities/counties
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.’

According to the Stuebner (2009), there is no comprehensive effort to enrich school
curricula with the study of religious culture or history, and the politicisation of education
systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina is sustaining the lack of cooperation among religious
groups on this issue.132
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Figure 9: The biggest threats to interreligious relations
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In the survey, respondents were given the opportunity to explain the ways religion can
improve certain aspects of society such as politics, democracy, social cohesion and others.
Overall, respondents consider that religion can attain a more positive role in all of these
aspects if religious leaders engage more actively in the promotion of universal and ethical
values and strengthening interfaith dialogue at the level of local communities. On the
question of how religion can improve political processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
majority of respondents mentioned a total separation of religion from the state, promotion
of universal or ethical values among people and condemnation of bad/detrimental
political practices. Other suggestions for improving political processes included educating
believers on political pluralism, interfaith dialogue and reconciliation, and stimulating
active voting among citizens.
Respondents believe that religious leaders should promote more democratic principles and
universal values, as well as coexistence and respect of religious groups in order to improve
the processes related to democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Respondents also believe
that religious leaders need to take a more active role in teaching and promoting tolerance,
since the majority of respondents considered this to be the key for the improvement of
inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Religion can improve social cohesion, through the promotion of universal or ethical
principles and social equality, while promoting entrepreneurship and social justice would
be beneficial for economic well-being in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Considering that the majority of respondents thought that religion negatively influenced
tolerance and peaceful coexistence, this is the area where religious leaders should
assume a more active role. Generally, respondents think that tolerance and coexistence
are insufficiently promoted by the religious leaders. A significant number of respondents
consider that the Inter-Religious Council should have a more prominent role, especially in
establishing interfaith dialogue.
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Without doubt, religion can trigger positive developments in Bosnian and Herzegovinian
society, especially in those areas where it is important to reconcile the needs of different
groups within society. In addition, respondents felt strongly that religious leaders should
promote and teach universal values, as well as condemn negative practices in politics,
economics, human rights, and other spheres of society. However, a significant number of
respondents said that religion cannot improve these spheres at all, especially in terms
of political processes, economic well-being, good neighbourly relations in the Western
Balkans, and democracy.
The promotion of interethnic tolerance and coexistence was mentioned most frequently
as a way to improve good neighbourly relations through religion. Religious leaders in the
region should meet more often, organise visits and events together, and promote peace
in the entire region. Notably, respondents believe that good neighbourly relations should
be primarily ensured within the borders of respective states, in order to ensure good
neighbourly relations across the region. Finally, promotion of peace among the youth is the
key in creation of good neighbourly relations in the region, according to the respondents.
One of the respondents said that religion can improve good neighbourly relations in the
Western Balkans through:

‘

mutual contacts, unofficial and official meetings, visiting memorials
for victims of war crimes, joint visits to believers in areas where they
represent minorities, working with young people, paying special attention
to returnees and minority groups.’
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Survey report Kosovo
By Romario Shehu

Survey sample
During April and May 2019, approximately 120 surveys were distributed to high-level
individuals involved in political, economic and cultural spheres in Kosovo. A total of 19
respondents completed the survey. The respondents include influential individuals from
civil society (N=7), government and the political elite (N=5), religious communities (N=5),
and academia (N=1). One respondent did not state his occupation. As regards the gender
of survey respondents, 15 were male (79%) and four female (21%). Of the respondents,
half of them have MA degrees (N = 9), six have BA degrees, and the remaining hold PhD
or postdoctoral degrees. The average age of the respondents is 31 years old, with the
youngest 27 and the oldest 58 years old. It is important to highlight that this report suffers
from two major limitations. First, is the low number of respondents compared to other
countries, and second, that all respondents are ethnic Albanians. Both of these limitations
were caused by low responsiveness to the surveys we distributed.

The role of religion in Kosovo
In Kosovo, there is a strong sense of secularity in the political and intellectual sphere.
In former Yugoslavia, Dr. Bashkim Iseni argues, integration and modernisation policies
implemented in some Muslim-populated areas gave birth to an atheistic political and
intellectual elite, as well as to a radical marginalisation of the Muslim clergy.133 Islam was
reduced to the private sphere: reserved only for worship practices, annual religious feasts
and traditional ceremonies for weddings and deaths. According to a 2016 study on the
impact of religion on ethnic identity in the state-building period of Kosovo, the quest for
the country’s independence was not religiously motivated134. Most Kosovars envisioned a
secular state, particularly because of the absence of a unitary religion. It was only after
the Kosovo War and the subsequent NATO intervention in 1999 that religion became more
important due to a combination of circumstances such as a weak economy, political
instability, and societal disorientation.135 As a result, religion became more visible in all
public spheres, from personal lives to the society at large. Especially since the introduction
of mass media and increased access to the internet, public debates about religion, have

133

B. Iseni, National Identity, Islam and Politics in the Balkans (Stuttgart: Akademie der Diozese,
2009).

134
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increased over the years.136
In the current survey, respondents were asked how important religion is for most people
in Kosovo. Respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very
important), the importance of religion today for most of people. The average answer was
5.3, where five respondents considered religion very important and nine other respondents
considered religion to have a moderate to strong importance (see Figure 10). There is a mix
of opinions and no common trend among individuals with similar occupations. Some of the
respondents from a specific occupation think religion is important while their colleagues
are more sceptical. For example, a respondent working in government has rated religion
as not important (2), while another respondent working in government has rated religion
as very important (7).

Figure 10: Importance of religion today for most of the people in Kosovo
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When asked about the influence of religion on the attitudes of the majority of people on
societal issues such as poverty, justice, equality, crime and social cohesion in Kosovo,
respondents had diverse reactions. According to them, religion has a moderate influence
on attitudes regarding societal issues in Kosovo with an average answer of 4.57 on a scale
from 1 to 7 (see Figure 11).

Figure 11: Religion’s influence on societal and political matters
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J. Mehmeti, ‘Faith and Politics in Kosovo: The Status of Religious Communities in a Secular
Country. The Revival of Islam in the Balkans’, 2015, pp. 68–69
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Although the respondents perceive that religion may have some influence on societal
issues in the country, they appear to be more sceptical over the influence of religion
on political matters. According to the majority of respondents (N = 13), the influence of
religion on the attitudes of people in Kosovo towards political matters such as democratic
participation, voter behaviour, and political parties in Kosovo is very modest. On a scale
of 1 (not important at all) to 7 (very important), the average answer was 3.7. Only six of
respondents believe religion has a moderate influence on political matters (see Figure 11).

Religious leaders
The respondents believe the religious leaders in Kosovo are influential among their
respective community of believers. Eleven respondents believed religious leaders are
either influential or very influential. Six of the respondents believe they have a moderate
influence, while only two respondents believe they have modest influence. On a scale from
1 (no influence) to 7 (very influential) the average answer of respondents is 5.47 (see Figure
12). In terms of the influence of religious leaders on wider public opinion in Kosovo, the
majority of respondents (N = 12) believe religious leaders have a moderate influence. On
a scale from 1 (no influence) to 7 (very influential) the average answer is 4.38 (see Figure
12). Only three of respondents believe religious leaders are influential or very influential
on public opinion. Three others believe they have little or very little influence on public
opinion in Kosovo. Based on these findings, religious leaders are perceived to be influential
within their own community of believers, but have only a moderate influence on society
as a whole.

Figure 12: Religions’ influence on its community of believers and public opinion
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The role of religion on developments in Kosovo
As part of the survey conducted for this report, respondents were asked to give their
opinions on whether religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public
discourse, positively or negatively influenced political developments, democracy,
interethnic relations, social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful
coexistence, and good neighbourly relations among the Western Balkans countries. The
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following figure (see Figure 13) shows their responses on all these spheres. Overall, the
majority of respondents believe that religion had either a positive or neutral impact on all
the spheres.
According to the respondents, religion had a particularly positive influence on tolerance
and peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, and interethnic relations. Respondents gave the
‘positive influence’ answer most often in the sphere of tolerance and peaceful coexistence,
with the vast majority of respondents (N = 14) believing that religion has positively influenced
tolerance and peaceful coexistence in Kosovo. Only five respondents believe religion has
negatively influenced Kosovo’s tolerance and peaceful coexistence. For both social cohesion
and interethnic relations, 12 respondents felt religion had a positive influence. More mixed
responses were given with regards to political developments, democracy, and good neighbourly
relations among Western Balkan countries. In terms of Kosovo’s political developments,
five respondents believe religion has positively influenced political developments, and five
others believe religion has negatively influenced them. As regards the role of religion on good
neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries, seven respondents believe religion
has played a positive role in this aspect, while five believe religion has played a negative role.
In terms of the role of religion on Kosovo’s democracy, eight of respondents believe religion
has positively influenced Kosovo’s democracy, and seven believe it has negatively influenced
it. Lastly, almost half of the survey respondents believe religion has played a neutral role in the
economic well-being of Kosovo. Five respondents believe religion had a positive role and three
others believe it had a negative role.

Figure 13: Religion’s influence on spheres of society
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Religious diversity in Kosovo
Data from the 2011 official census shows that 95.6% of the population in Kosovo identifies
as Muslim, 2.2% as Roman Catholic, and 1.4% as Serbian Orthodox.137 However, this census
was boycotted by ethnic Serbs, resulting in the underrepresentation of this ethnicity and
of Orthodox Christians in general.138 Other religious communities include the Protestant
community, which claims 20,000 followers (1.1% of the population), and the Jewish
community (with only 56).139 Although the overwhelming majority of its citizens are Muslim,
Kosovo has a diversity of religions. Therefore, in a religiously diverse country, interreligious
relations are of great importance to the progress of society.
Hence, respondents were asked to rate today’s interreligious relations on a 7-point scale
from 1 (religious hatred) to 7 (religious harmony). With an average answer of 5.57, the
results show that respondents tend to believe the interreligious relations in Kosovo are in
harmony (see Figure 14).

Figure 14: Religious relations in Kosovo and the Western Balkans
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Eight respondents believe there is religious harmony in the country, six believe interreligious
relations are closer to religious harmony. Three responders believe the interreligious
relations are neither harmony nor hatred, and only two believe the interreligious relations
in Kosovo are closer to religious hatred.
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On the contrary, respondents believe that interreligious relations in the Western Balkan
are slightly worse compared to interreligious relations within Kosovo. Respondents were
asked to rate on a 7-point scale from 1 (religious hatred) to 7 (religious harmony) and
they characterise today’s interreligious relations in the Western Balkans as moderately
harmonious (average answer is 4.1).

Interreligious relations development in the next five years
When asked about the future of interreligious relations in the next five years in Kosovo,
half of the respondents believe these relations will improve. Only two respondents
believe they will worsen. The respondents were asked to rate on a seven-point scale from
1 (will seriously deteriorate) to 7 (will significantly improve) and the average answer was
4.6. The most frequent argument supporting the idea that the relations will improve, is
that Kosovo’s interreligious tolerance is deeply rooted and interfaith coexistence has
occurred in Kosovo for centuries. A member of the civil society sector also added that, ‘my
nationality is more important than my religion, thus, my religious faith will never have an
impact on my decisions, but the good sides of religion, such as charity will be conducive
to my behaviour.’ Sceptical voices in the other hand put an emphasis on radicalisation,
the low level of accountability among religious institutions and uncontrolled activities of
religious NGOs. Some of the respondents believe that the future of interreligious relations
in Kosovo will depend on the political and economic processes taking place in the region.

Figure 15: Interreligious relations in the next five years
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In their responses concerning the future of the Western Balkans’ interreligious relations
the ‘will remain the same’ option was the most selected one (N = 7). Six respondents
believed interreligious relations in the Western Balkans will improve, while four others
believe they will deteriorate. The average answer was 4.23, which is lower than for Kosovo.
The optimistic arguments were the impact of international community and civic awareness
over their religion. Negative expectations consisted in the interplay of religion and politics
and the radical interpretation of religion. Just as in the case of Kosovo, respondents
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believed that interreligious relations in the Western Balkans will reflect the future political
and economic conditions of the region.

Threats and opportunities for interreligious relations in Kosovo
Respondents were asked to list the top three threats to interreligious relations in Kosovo.
They offered a variety of answers (see Figure 16), but the most dominant threats that
they saw to interreligious relations were religious propaganda, the country’s struggling
economy and the lack of opportunities hindering youth prospects. Religious extremism
imported from outside, and the interplay of religion and politics were also listed as threats
to interreligious relations in Kosovo. As regards to imported religious extremism, this is
an issue that countries all over the world are facing today. However, what is particularly
pressing about the situation in Kosovo is that the religious communities are not formally
recognised as legal entities and do not receive any funding from the state to conduct
their activities, train clergy or to maintain or (re)build property. Consequently, religious
communities seek funding from elsewhere, for example from foreign governments or
religiously oriented NGOs.140
As regards to this threat, the respondents listed Arab countries, Serbia, and Turkey as
potential exporters of religious extremism to Kosovo. Islamophobia as well as unequal
treatment of religions were listed as threats by some of the respondents.
Figure 16: Biggest threats to interreligious relations in Kosovo
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Although it is surprising to see that a Muslim-majority country suffers from Islamophobia,
this finding is confirmed by other literature on the topic. Despite widespread religious
freedom, studies have shown there is a stigmatisation of conservative religious believers,
especially of the Islamic community. One study argues that practising believers are
sometimes prejudiced and stereotyped based on their outlook (for example because of
Islamic dress).141 Respondents of our survey pointed to the media and government as
generators of Islamophobia. Some of the respondents emphasised the role of religious
leaders in dealing with threats to interreligious relations in Kosovo. A respondent from
one religious community argued the ‘inadequate inclusion of religious leaders in dealing
with the negative phenomena, especially with those who have to do with extremism and
radicalism may be a potential threat to the interreligious relations in Kosovo.’ In terms of
the unequal treatment of religions, this threat was listed four times, and it corresponds
with the discontent of both the Muslim Association of Kosovo and the Serbian Orthodox
Church, which have accused the government of discrimination towards their communities,
albeit for different reasons.142
After expressing their opinion on the biggest threats for interreligious relations, respondents
also listed what they saw as opportunities for a positive role of religion in society. Overall,
respondents were optimistic about the role of religion and believe that it can have a
positive impact on interethnic relations, social cohesion, peaceful coexistence and good
neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. However, respondents note that
this can only be achieved if religious leaders engage more actively in the promotion of
moral values (such as mutual respect, harmony, friendship, solidarity and tolerance) and
work on strengthening interreligious cooperation and dialogue.
Another respect in which respondents believe religion can have a positive impact is
democracy. The most frequent response was that religion can help by promoting democratic
values such as dialogue, sympathy, justice, democracy, and human rights. Additional ways
in which religion can improve democracy include encouraging citizens to take part in
public hearings and decision-making. One respondent argued:

‘

religions preach peace and tolerance, which are per se very compatible with
the values of democracy, and if they are correctly explained, they can play
an important role in the successful implementation of democratic values.’

The only two aspects where responses were neutral or argued that religion can have a
limited role were political developments and economic well-being. Nevertheless, some
respondents believe that religion can also improve the political development in Kosovo
by increasing the public presence of adequate religious leaders and by preventing the
interplay between religion and politics. One of the respondents said that religion can help
improve the political developments by ‘encouraging their audiences to take part massively
in elections.’ With regards to economic well-being, a few optimistic respondents argued
that religion can have an impact on this aspect by encouraging people to work, refuse
corruption and nepotism, as well as by doing charity and helping those in need.
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Survey report Montenegro
By Nenad Zekavica

Survey sample
During March and April 2019, a survey was conducted as part of the regional project that
deals with the role of religion in Western Balkan countries. The survey was conducted as
part of a research project and was conducted among members of the cultural and political
elite of society. Its purpose is to give a sketch of the religious beliefs of different societies.
The survey itself was developed as the result of the mutual cooperation among four
partner institutions in the Balkans.
After the selection of respondents, around 60 surveys were sent to the candidates. As a
result, we received 25 surveys with the data. The respondents included politicians and
government employees (N=3), religious leaders (N=3), academics (N=5), civil society leaders
(N=6), journalists and opinion-makers (N=4) and young leaders (N=4). Of the respondents,
19 were male (76%) and six (24%) were female. The average age of the respondents was
39 years, with the youngest respondent being 24 years old and the oldest 58 years old.
With regard to respondents’ education, seven respondents have a bachelor’s degree, 13
respondents hold an MA, while five of them have obtained a PhD degree or above.

The role of religion in Montenegro
In the first part of the survey, respondents were asked to estimate the importance of
religion for most people living in Montenegro on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 marks complete
irrelevance and 7 marks significant influence, the average mark was 4.56.

Figure 17: Importance of religion in Montenegro
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Respondents were then asked to grade the influence of religion on societal issues, such
as poverty, justice, equality, crime, social cohesion etc. The respondents answered with an
average assessment of 4.4 on a scale from 1 (no influence at all) to 7 (significant influence).
This is only a small drop from the average grade in the first question.
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But when asked about the influence of political issues in Montenegro, such as democratic
participation, voter behaviour, political parties and others, respondents distributed
differently along the same scale as in the previous question and gave the average grade
of 4.04.

Figure 18: Influence of religion on political and social issues in Montenegro
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Religious leaders
The next segment of the survey dealt with the influence of religious leaders in their
religious communities in Montenegro on the one hand and their influence on wider public
opinion on the other hand. As in the previous questions, respondents were asked to rate
this on a 1–7 scale, where 1 stands for ‘no influence at all’ and 7 marks ‘very influential’.
When it came to the influence within their respective communities, the average was 4.72.
With regard to the influence of religious leaders on broader public opinion, the average
was a bit lower at 4.56. The difference between the two is not as large as in some other
countries in the Western Balkans. Based on these survey results, it seems that religious
leaders in Montenegro are influential to some extent in their respective communities but
in public opinion also.

Figure 19: Influence of religious leaders in Montenegro
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The influence of religion on developments in Montenegro
Respondents were asked whether they perceived that religion, as dominantly interpreted
and presented in the public discourse, has positively or negatively influenced developments
in Montenegro. The specific kinds of developments influenced by religion they were asked
about are political developments, democracy, interethnic relations, social cohesion,
economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful coexistence and development of good
neighbourly relations among countries in the Western Balkans.
Concerning the political developments, people mostly see religion as a negative influence
(N=10), a smaller number did not see an effect of religion (N=7) and only five saw a
positive influence (two of were religious leaders), while three respondents marked that
they do not know. The answers related to the development of democracy show similar
results. Out of 25 respondents, ten of them did not see the influence on this, while five
saw positive and six saw negative consequences for the development of democracy. The
section regarding interethnic relations showed us that respondents (N=5) tend to believe
that religion does not affect the development of those relations; 44% of respondents saw
religion as having a negative influence on the development of interethnic relations; with
an additional 28% of respondents who claimed that religion has a positive impact. When
asked about the influence of religion on social cohesion respondents seem to be almost
equally divided on positive influence (N=8), neutral influence (N=7) and negative influence
(N=9). It is interesting to note that religious leaders all saw the positive impact of religion
on social cohesion, while the four out of six members of civil organizations see it the
other way around. The attitude of the respondents is pretty much the same as in other
Western Balkan countries when it comes to economic well-being. The largest part of the
respondents saw no active influence on the economic state of the people (N=16), while five
respondents saw the negative impact and only two the positive one. Among those two are
one young leader and one religious leader.

Figure 20: The influence of religion on politics and society in Montenegro
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The next section of this question dealt with the development of tolerance and peaceful
coexistence. When asked about the influence of religion on the development of
tolerance and peaceful coexistence in Montenegrin society, respondents depicted that as
predominantly negative (N=12). However, there were eight who believed that religion helps
with the development of tolerance and peaceful coexistence, while four respondents said
that religion does not influence this development and one respondent who answered
‘Don’t know’. The last part of the question dealt with the religion’s influence on the
development of good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. It seems that
a small majority of the respondents recognised the negative (N=9) influence of religion on
relations between Western Balkan countries, with an additional six respondents who did
not recognise the influence of the religion in this matter at all. Eight of the respondents
claimed that religion positively influenced this development.

Religious tolerance
The next part of our questionnaire dealt with the issues of religious tolerance and
interreligious relations in Montenegro and in Western Balkans. Participants of the survey
tried to assess the state of today’s interreligious relations. They were first asked to give
their answer on a 1–7 scale, where 1 represents religious hatred and 7 represents religious
harmony. Based on these two questions we can see that the respondents see interreligious
relations in Montenegro in a worse condition than they are in the Western Balkans as a
whole. The average mark of the state of interreligious relations in Montenegro was 3.92
according to our respondents. When it comes to the present state of the interreligious
relations in the Western Balkans the results seem to point to slightly better relations with
an average score of 4.32.

Figure 21: Interreligious relations in Montenegro and the region
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The respondents were then asked to estimate the future development of interreligious
relations over the next five years in Montenegro and in the Western Balkans and to further
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explain their selection. Once again they had to choose from the scale 1–7, where 1 indicated
‘will significantly deteriorate’, 7 indicated ‘will significantly improve’ and 4 indicated ‘it will
remain the same’.
Our respondents doubt that any significant change will happen over the period of the
next five years. The majority of respondents tended to think that relations will stay exactly
the same. In the case of Montenegro, nine respondents do not see any kind of change in
those relations, while in the case of the Western Balkans 11 respondents feel that relations
between different religious organisations and communities will not change to a large
extent. The respondents seem to be a bit more optimistic when it comes to interreligious
relations in the Western Balkans compared to Montenegro. Eight respondents (32%)
believe that mutual relations in Montenegro will further, but not drastically deteriorate,
while nine respondents believe that those relations are going to improve to some extent
in the Western Balkan countries. Some of the stated reasons for the unsatisfactory state
of their relations is connected with the new draft law on freedom of religion and the
problems between Serbian Orthodox Church and Montenegrin Orthodox Church on the
one hand, but also an increasing level of problems between the Serbian Orthodox Church
in Montenegro and members of the Albanian minority lately.

Figure 22: How interreligious relations will develop in the next five years in Montenegro and
the region
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Threats and opportunities for religious tolerance in Montenegro
The final part of the conducted survey explored the possible threats for the further
development of religious tolerance but also explored possible opportunities for the
development of religious tolerance in Montenegro. The last question dealt with the
possible areas of influence for religion in Montenegro. Our respondents were asked to
list the three potential threats to religious tolerance. Most of the respondents’ mentioned
politics in some form to be the biggest threat to the religious picture of Montenegro. For
example, one of the members of academia claims that the ‘new draft law could be very
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problematic in terms of the property of religious communities, it could create problems
and tension in the region and not only in the religious picture of Montenegro’. Some
respondents also noted that authorities tend to influence religious affairs and that some
politicians capitalise on the religious feeling of Montenegrins in order to recruit potential
voters. One representative of an NGO saw other factors including: ‘Religious leaders and
communities lack openness and readiness to have an honest dialogue with members of
other communities’. One religious leader, besides political influence, saw education as one
of the problems for better understanding between the distinctive religious communities
in Montenegro: ‘It would be good to include some kind of formal religious education
in primary and secondary schools in order to raise the level of knowledge about one’s
own religion, but also about the religion of others. It seems to me that it is the easiest
way for people to make a distinction between their religion and ethnic identity’. One of
the religious leaders also pointed out the way media reports shape public opinion: ‘For
them [media], the essence is not about the story itself, but rather in the bringing as many
readers or viewers to read or watch them. With that kind of approach, all good initiatives
and good examples of mutual respect and life in multi-ethnic parts of the country will
stay less visible than incidents’. Although the situation regarding religious tolerance and
interreligious relations in Montenegro is not without difficulties, respondents recognise
the existing potential for things to change. However, there are many limiting factors which
tend to change slowly and gradually, and stop the positive development of them.

Figure 23: The biggest threats to interreligious relations in Montenegro
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Despite that, one academic said: ‘There is plenty of room for the upgrade of capacities
for democracy by applying twin toleration in mutual relation between state and religious
organisations’. Another member of academia sees the unused potential in religious
communities when it comes to tackling different social issues from poverty to other
inequalities in Montenegrin society. Interreligious initiatives focused on this could lead to
a higher level of social cohesion.
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Survey report North Macedonia
By Viktorija Borovska

Survey sample
One of the activities of the project ‘Role of Religion in Western Balkan Societies’ was an
elite survey that enabled us to gain an insight into views and perceptions on issues related
to religiosity, the role and influence of religion, threats and opportunities of religious
diversity and suggestions on how religion can contribute to the different social aspects
of the various countries of the region. The survey in the Republic of North Macedonia
(RNM) was conducted in the period April–May 2019 with a targeted sample comprising 39
representatives from 7 categories: government and political elite (6 respondents), civil
society leaders (5 respondents), journalists and opinion-makers (5 respondents), cultural
elite (7 respondents), religious communities (6 respondents), academia (5 respondents),
and young leaders (5 respondents). The respondents gave qualitative and quantitative
answers to the questions.
The gender structure of the sample comprised 22 males (or 56.4%) and 17 females (43.6%).
The average age of the respondents was 38.5 (the youngest 26 years and the oldest 68
years old). In terms of education 14 respondents hold BA degrees, 12 respondents hold MA
degrees and 13 hold a PhD degree.

Religion in North Macedonia – context
North Macedonia is multi-ethnic and multi-confessional country. According to the
2002 census, the religious map of North Macedonia is as following: 64.8% are Orthodox
Christians, 33.3% are Muslims, 0.35% Catholics, 0.03% Protestants.143 However, the current
demographic map is expected to be different bearing in mind the fact that the last census
was in 2002, while the next has been announced for 2021. According to a Brima/WIN-Gallup
international survey, Balkan countries, with the exception of Bulgaria and Albania, remain
in the group of the most religious countries in Europe, and Macedonia, with 88% of people
being religious,144 is the regional leader in terms of religiosity.
Regarding interreligious tolerance, the survey conducted by IPIS-Skopje in 2017 shows that
citizens who belong to the two largest religions in Macedonia are religious and to a lesser
or greater extent practise their faiths, and a relatively high percentage of them have no

143

Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia 2002, available
at http://www.stat.gov.mk/Publikacii/knigaX.pdf

144

’Religion Remains Powerful in Balkans’, Balkan Insight, 15 January 2018, available at:
https://balkaninsight.com/2018/01/15/religion-remains-powerful-in-balkans-surveyshows-01-15-2018/
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problem communicating with members of other religions, that is to say, there seems to
be a high degree of interreligious tolerance in the country.145 The interreligious tolerance
and peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups in North Macedonia was
recognised by Pope Francis when he made his first foreign visit to North Macedonia.146
However, multi-religious character of the RNM was always intertwined with the multiethnic composition of the country. This has always been indicator of the mutual tolerance
and an indicator of possible fragility and sensitivity when facing political crisis or tensions
in the country.147

The role of religion in North Macedonia
On the question, ‘how important is religion today for most of the people in your country’,
the results show that the opinion of the majority of the respondents is that religion is
rather important for the citizens of RNM. Only 10.3% (cumulative from answers rating 1
to 3) of the respondents think that religion is to some extent not important, but 74.4%
(cumulative from answers 5 to 7) of the respondents consider that in North Macedonia
religion is important or very important to the people.
On the scale of 1 to 7 measuring the importance of religion in society, where 1 marks
complete irrelevance and 7 marks significant influence, the mean was 5.21, which again
shows that the opinion of the respondents is that religion is of great importance today for
most of the people in North Macedonia.

Figure 24: Importance of religion in North Macedonia (in %)
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The opinions were quite divided when it came to the question of the extent of religion’s
influence on attitudes regarding societal issues such as poverty and justice. About 41%
(cumulative from answers rating 1 to 3) of the respondents said that religion has no or little
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Institute for Political Research – Skopje, Macedonia as multiconefessional society-perceptions
of the influence between religion and the state, 2017, Available at: https://www.kas.de/c/
document_library/get_file?uuid=93e2a101-c2d7-7896-2cfe-213ba7e4c804&groupId=281657
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‘Pope in North Macedonia: respect for human dignity, diversity for a future of peace and
prosperity’, 2019, available at: https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2019-05/popefrancis-north-macedonia-apostolic-visit-authoritie-welcome.html
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Institute for Political Research – Skopje, Macedonia as multiconefessional society-perceptions
of the influence between religion and the state, 2017, Available at: https://www.kas.de/c/
document_library/get_file?uuid=93e2a101-c2d7-7896-2cfe-213ba7e4c804&groupId=281657
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importance regarding the societal issues, but for 43.6% (cumulative from answers 5 to 7)
religion has significant impact on societal issues. Or according to the respondents, religion
has a moderate influence on attitudes about the societal issues for the citizens of North
Macedonia, with a mean answer of 4 (on a scale from 1 to 7).
The results are similar regarding the extent of religion’s influence on political matters.
35.9% (cumulative from answers 1 to 3) of the respondents believe that religion does not
have significant influence, and 41% (cumulative from answers 5 to 7) think that the religion’s
influence on political matters is quite significant. Or according to respondents, religion has
moderate influence on political matters for the citizens of North Macedonia, with a mean
answer of 4.18 (on a scale from 1 to 7).

Figure 25: Religion’s influence on societal and political issues in North Macedonia (in %)
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Religious leaders
According to the survey results, the influence of religious leaders among the respective
communities is almost equally distributed between the two extremes of the scale. For
46.2%, this influence is significant (cumulative from answers 5 to 7), while for 35.9% it is
insignificant (cumulative from answers 1 to 3). The mean answer was 4.36, which can be
assessed as a medium influence of religious leaders on their respective communities.

Figure 26: The influence of religious leaders in North Macedonia (in %)
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Although the majority of respondents think that the influence of religious leaders among
their respective communities is generally moderate to more significant, the majority of
respondents (41%) also think that the influence of religious leaders on public opinion in
general is less significant. Cumulative results from those who think that their influence on
public opinion is significant is 33.3%. The mean answer was 3.84 (on a scale from 1 to 7),
which shows that the influence of religious leaders is slightly lower than medium.

The influence of religion on developments in North Macedonia
One set of questions from this survey was about the opinion of the respondents whether
religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public discourse, positively or
negatively influences the development of political processes, democracy, interethnic
relations, social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful co-existence,
and good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. Regarding this set of
questions, we have an interesting insight when we compare the answers by religious
representatives to representatives from other categories.
Regarding the influence of religion on political development, the majority of the
respondents answered that religion has a negative influence, 61.5%. But out of those who
think that religion has a negative influence on political development, only 4.2% (or one
respondent) is a religious representative.
The answers to the question about the positive or negative influence of religion on
democracy display the same divergence between religious representatives and the others,
but the general results (56.4%) show that religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented
in public discourse, has a negative influence on democracy. However, none of the religious
representatives think that that is the case, in fact 66.7% of them think that religion has
a positive influence on democracy and 33.3% think that it has a neutral influence. But
none of the respondents from the other elite categories think that religion has a positive
influence on democracy.
It is also interesting that none of the respondents from this survey think that religion has
a neutral influence on the interethnic relations. Most think that religion has a negative
influence (74.4%), while almost all (5 out of 6) of the religious representatives think that
religion has a positive influence on interethnic relations.
Regarding the question about the influence of religion on social cohesion, answers are
similar. Although the percentage of answers that cited religion as a negative influence on
social cohesion was lower than in previous questions.
On the question about the influence of religion on economic well-being, the dominant
answer is that it has a neutral influence, with 53.8% of responses. Regarding the influence
of religion on economic well-being, answers from all categories of respondents are
distributed fairly equally.
Again, most of the answers to the question about the influence of religion on tolerance
and peaceful coexistence are that it is negative, with 53.8% of respondents sharing this
opinion. The answers of the religious representatives to this question are again different
from the others. They think that religion in fact has a positive influence on tolerance and
peaceful coexistence, but the majority of respondents from the other categories think
differently, that religion has a negative influence.
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About the influence of religion on the good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan
countries, the majority of the respondents think that religion has a negative influence
(51.3%). Again, the answers of the religious representatives differ markedly from the other
respondents. None of the religious representatives think that religion has a negative
influence on good neighbourly relations.

Figure 27: The influence of religion on politics and society in North Macedonia
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From the results of the respondents regarding the influence of religion on different
societal issues: development of political processes, democracy, interethnic relations,
social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful co-existence, and good
neighbourly relations among the Western Balkans countries; one can conclude either that
religion and religious leaders have failed to positively contribute to society, or perhaps that
their positive influence is not obvious or visible to citizens outside religious institutions.

Interreligious relations
Regarding the question about interreligious relations in Republic of North Macedonia on a
scale between religious hatred (1) and religious harmony (7), the majority of respondents
think that interreligious relations are somewhere in between, but slightly inclining towards
interreligious intolerance (41%), but none of the respondents think that the RNM is in a
state of religious. The average grade for this question is 3.82, which confirms what has
previously been stated.
Respondents had a slightly different opinion when it came to interreligious relations in the
broader region. Respondents predominantly thought that religious hatred or intolerance
is generally present in Western Balkan region. The mean of this question (from the scale
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of 1 to 7) was 3.05, which is lower than a medium grade, and therefore is closer to the
assessment that it is slightly inclining toward religious hatred.

Figure 28: Interreligious relations in North Macedonia and in WB countries (in %)
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About the opinion on how the interreligious relations will develop in our country, the
majority of the respondents think that they will remain the same (51.3%).
The explanations of the respondents to this question were that they do not expect
changes because the period of five years is too short for any major changes, and there are
no indications that religious leaders will change their behaviour or rhetoric. Here again
respondents complain that there is no sufficient contact between different religions, that
prejudice and ignorance of religions are persistent, that there are only formal contacts
between religious communities and that religious leaders do not promote interreligious
relations. A few of the respondents think that interreligious relations will worsen due to
an ethnic and religious gap which will increase because religious communities will still
be under the influence of politics and that polarisation between the people in North
Macedonia after five years. However, there are few more optimistic expectations regarding
this and hopes that the new generation of religious leaders will be far more willing to
cooperate and ready for coexistence than the previous ones, and that there is also an
expectation for a substantial manifestation of mutual respect and help between different
religions.
Respondents’ opinions on how they expect interreligious relations to develop in Western
Balkan countries in the next five years are less optimistic than expectations for North
Macedonia. 38.5% (cumulative % from answers 1 to 3) think that they will worsen,
and 38.5% that they will remain the same. Only about 10% of respondents think that
interreligious relations in the region will improve. This more pessimistic views on the
matter are explained on the grounds that there are still existent and active political issues
among Balkan countries, and fear that that the different religions in the Balkan countries
divide people more than they unite them. Namely, political elites would not give up their
tendency to abuse the religious communities for political purposes.

Elite survey reports

71

Figure 29: How interreligious relations are expected to develop in the next five years in
North Macedonia and in the region
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Threats and opportunities
Regarding the respondents’ opinion about the top three threats to interreligious relations
in the Republic of North Macedonia today, we can summarise the answers in these
categories:

•
•
•
•
•
•

Interference of religion with politics in terms of interference of religion in politics
and politics in religion;
Poverty;
Ethno-religiosity;
Hate speech, interreligious intolerance, bad religious leaders, using religion to
spread interreligious and interethnic intolerance and violence, interreligious
polarisation, threatening rhetoric of religious leaders;
Being uninformed about their own and other religions; and
Media propaganda and social media influence.

And finally, respondents of this survey were asked to give ideas about how religion can
improve certain aspects of the society such as politics, democracy, social cohesion,
tolerance and peaceful coexistence, interethnic relations, economic well-being and good
neighbourly relations. For each of these aspects, a certain percentage of respondents think
that religion cannot help in any way. But here are the categories that can be distinguished
from their answers.
Regarding the question of how religion can help improve political developments in the
country, the summarised answers of this open-ended question can be divided in these
categories:
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•
•
•
•

Religion should not interfere at all in politics, nor give opinion on the issues, and
should stay away from political parties;
By promoting tolerance and neutrality towards political parties;
By showing proactivity in addressing issues of general interest and public interest;
and
Religious leaders should calm the rhetoric, and should educate their members
about faith’s truth, promoting human and ethical values.

Opinions about whether and how religion can help improve the state of democracy in the
country, the summarised answers can be divided in these categories:

•
•
•
•

By promoting human and ethical values, tolerance, acceptance of diversity;
By supporting democratic processes and promoting democracy as a value;
With real secularisation, separation of the state from religion; and
To separate religion from politics and political parties.

The question as to how religion can help improve the interethnic relations in the country,
the summarised answers are as follows:

•
•
•
•
•

By building bridges of trust;
With direct participation in resolving interethnic conflicts;
Preaching human values, tolerance, respect, understanding;
By not getting involved in daily political activities; and
By intensifying interreligious dialogues and promoting values that bring different
groups closer.

Opinions on how religion can improve the social cohesion in the country are summarised
in these categories:

•
•
•
•

With the joint celebration of the main religious holidays;
Promoting acceptance, discussion and dialogues between different religions;
Through mutual introduction of different religions and interreligious forums; and
By helping the disadvantaged and poor with humanitarian aid.

Although the general opinion of the respondents regarding the influence of religion on
economic well-being showed that religion has a neutral influence, they also gave opinion
on how religion can improve the economic well-being in the country:

•
•
•

By fostering ethics in the economy and encouraging ethics in ecology;
Promotion of labour as a source of happiness, peace and well-being;
Taxation, regulation and transparency of economic transactions for religious
services; and
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•

Religious leaders to try not to enjoy material goods (e.g. expensive cars) and
dispatch them in favour of the poor.

Respondents were asked to give their opinions on how religion can improve the state of
tolerance and peaceful coexistence in the country, and their answers were summarised in
these categories:

•
•
•
•
•

By promoting human values that are common to all religions, and by encouraging
believers to practice tolerance toward other religions and ethnic communities;
By rejecting prejudice towards different religions;
Spreading messages of coexistence;
By intensifying interreligious dialogues; and
By teaching tolerance.

The summarised answers to the last question on how religion can improve the good
neighbourly relations among WB countries are as follows:

•
•
•
•
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To promote tolerance and peace, acceptance of others;
To show respect instead of directing hate speech to other countries or groups;
To develop real cooperation and encounters between religious leaders/religious
groups; and
To abandon xenophobic discourse and development of ecumenical tendencies.
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Survey report Serbia
By Nenad Zekavica

Survey sample
During March and April 2019, a survey was conducted as part of a regional project which
deals with the role of religion in the Western Balkan countries. The survey was conducted
as the research part of the project and it was conducted among members of cultural and
political elite members of society. Its purpose is to give a sketch of the religious topography
of different societies in the Western Balkans.
The respondents were carefully selected and around 80 surveys were sent to the selected
candidates. As a result, we received 30 completed surveys with necessary data. We have
tried to follow guidelines and to receive feedback form people with different occupations:
politicians and government employees (N=3), religious leaders (N=4), academia (N=7), civil
society leaders (N=6), journalists and opinion-makers (N=5) and young leaders (N=5). Of
the respondents, 21 were male (70%) and nine (30%) were female. The average age of the
respondents was 35.5 years, with the youngest respondent being 25 years old and the
oldest one 54 years old. With regard to respondents’ education, six respondents have a
bachelor’s degree, 15 respondents hold an MA, while nine of them have obtained a PhD
degree.

The role of religion in Serbia
The questions were designed to show how religion is perceived in Serbia and to see its role
in Serbian society, and also in other Western Balkan countries.
The first question was related to the level of importance of religion today for most of the
people in Serbia, on the scale, 1–7 where 1 represents ‘not at all’ and 7 stands for ‘very
important’. The average grade was 4.37. Overall, we could say that religion is moderately
important for people in our society. Additional data which can show the importance of
religion for people living in Serbia comes from the census in 2011,148 when it was shown
that more than 94.4% of the population identified as religious – as a member of a church
or religious community/organisation. The disparity between these two is quite obvious.
Specialised surveys show that a high percentage of people are not believers in terms of
practising religion, but they rather choose their religious affiliation on the basis of their
traditional belonging to a specific confession. The number of atheists and agnostics is
growing. This is the reason for the opinion that in large surveys, such as national censuses,
it is hard to get precise data on religious affiliation. Hence specialised surveys are more

148
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suitable for collecting that type of data.149
Therefore, the data collected on the census is more connected to the personal feelings of
traditional belonging than on active participation in religion, i.e. the activities of a religious
organisation or community.
Figure 30: Importance of religion in Serbia
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However, when it comes to the level of influence of religion on people and their attitudes,
things change. The influence of religion on societal issues, such as poverty, justice, equality,
crime, social cohesion tends to drop significantly. It drops down to an average grade of
4.03. It drops even further down when respondents were asked to scale the influence on
people’s attitudes when it comes to political issues, such as democratic participation,
voter behaviour, political parties. Our survey has shown that the average grade is 3.77.
When we compare the two questions which deal with the influence of religion on people’s
attitudes on both societal and political issues we can observe that respondents opted for
an above average grade of 43.29% for societal and only 23.31% for political issues.

Figure 31: Influence of religion on societal and political issues in Serbia
7
2

9

8
4

Inﬂuence on political matters
Inﬂuence on societal issues

7
5

5

3

5
2

0

1
2
has no inﬂuence

3

4

5

6

1

2

7
very inﬂuential

Religious leaders
When asked about the influence of religious leaders in their respective communities and
their influence on public opinion in general the results changed a bit. Interestingly enough,

149

See Etnomozaik 82, (Нада Радушки, Методолошки аспекти и проблеми у истраживању
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one would expect that the influence in religious communities would be seen as significantly
higher than in the general public. However, the difference between the average grades of
the two is almost insignificant. The reason for this could be the fact that the majority of the
people declared as religious and that there is not much difference between the religious
communities and society in general. However, the influence is not equally distributed
throughout the scale, showing that around a third of people in religious communities
are not highly influenced by their respective religious leaders. Despite that fact, religious
leaders are still pretty influential. The significant difference is with the average grade of
the influence of religion and of religious leaders. We can see that the average grade in the
questions dealing with the role of religion is somewhere between 3.77 for political and 4.03
for societal issues. However, when it comes to the religious leaders’ influence, it is notably
higher – somewhere between 4.47 and 4.63.

Figure 32: The influence of religious leaders in Serbia
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The influence of religion on developments in Serbia
The next question is designed to show if religion influences different developments
in society and to show to what extent it is influential. The respondents were asked to
say if religion has a positive or negative influence on specific developments or has no
influence at all. The specific areas of influence of religion they were asked about were
political developments, democracy, interethnic relations, social cohesion, economic wellbeing, tolerance and peaceful coexistence and development of good neighbourly relations
among countries in the Western Balkans.
According to this question only, people tend to see religion as a phenomenon which affects
different areas of society in Serbia. If we combine all of these sections together we have 47
votes for positive influence, 73 for neutral and 70 opted for negative influence, while 20 did
choose to respond. These results are similar to those in the previous questions. Religion
has only relative influence – and it is more perceived as negative than as positive. We will
now get more details about particular areas of development.
According to the first section of the tenth question, which deals with political development,
people do not see any kind positive influence of religion. They tend to see religion as
predominantly negative (N=14), or neutral to a lesser degree (N=13). However, strikingly
enough, there was not a single respondent that sees religion as having a positive effect on
political development.
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When it comes to the development of democracy the situation is pretty much similar,
although there were few (N=5) who tend to believe that religion has a positive influence
on the development of democracy. The vast majority once again opted for either neutral
(N=13) or negative (N=9) impact of religion on the development of democracy.
The issue of interethnic relations showed us that only a few people (N=4) tend to believe
that religion does not affect its development. Contrary to the previous questions where
a high percentage of respondents did not recognise the influence of the religion on
political developments and on the development of democracy, the role of religion in the
development of interethnic relations seems to be significant. However, this influence is
mostly recognised as negative (N=14), with an additional nine respondents who see a
positive influence for religion on interethnic relations. Therefore, religion is seen as one
of the reasons causing problems in interethnic relations in Serbia. The underlying reason
for such a negative impact could be the fact that ethnicity and religion almost completely
resonate with each other in Serbia.150
Based on this survey people seem to see more of a negative influence for religion on various
aspects of society – only tolerance and peaceful coexistence and social cohesion were
recognised as being positively impacted by religion. But even these two developments are
not univocally seen as such. Both of them are almost equally considered to be negatively
influenced by religion. When it comes to tolerance and peaceful coexistence we can see that
there is quite a small difference between the positive (N=11) and negative (N=9) influence.
Social cohesion was similar, where most people (N=13) tending to see positive aspects of
religion. However, with a very small difference in number, other respondents said it has
no impact (N=4), or that it has a negative impact (N=10). In all other developments, the
negative role of religion seems predominant, or respondents have opted almost equally
for neutral and negative aspects of religion.

Figure 33: The influence of religion on politics and society in Serbia
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However, when it comes to economic well-being the respondents in the vast majority
(N=19) stated that religion does not impact it, five opted for negative influence and three
for positive one.
The last section of question number ten dealt with religion’s contribution to the
development of good neighbourly relations among Western Balkan countries. It seems
that the majority of the respondents recognise a negative (N=11) influence of religion
on relations between Western Balkan countries, with additional 11 respondents who do
not recognise the influence of the religion in this matter at all. Only 20% (N=6) of the
respondents claimed that religion positively influenced this development.

Religious tolerance
The next part of the survey dealt with interreligious relations in Serbia on the one hand
and in the wider region of the Western Balkans on the other. We asked our respondents
to describe the current situation in Serbia and the Western Balkans as a whole. They had
to choose on scale 1–7, where 1 stands for religious hatred and 7 for religious harmony.
As we can see from the graph below, people are very critical of the current state of the
interreligious relations in the country. Regarding the situation in Serbia, the majority (N=16)
do not see those relations as harmonious and good. The remaining respondents (N=14)
claimed that religious relations are leaning toward the positive side of the scale. When
asked about Western Balkan interreligious relations, our respondents seem to be even more
critical about it. A fairly large number of respondents (N=22) described current religious
relations as poor at the moment. Only eight respondents think that relations are good at the
moment, and only one claimed that they can be described as religious harmony.

Figure 34: The state of interreligious relations in Serbia and the region
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The respondents were then asked to estimate the future development interreligious
relations in the next five years in Serbia and in the Western Balkans (see graph below) and
to further explain their selection. Once again, they had to choose from the scale 1–7, where
1 stood for ‘will significantly deteriorate’, 7 for ‘will significantly improve’, and 4 for ‘it will
remain the same’.
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Figure 35: Development of interreligious relations in Serbia and the region over next five
years
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Our respondents showed doubt in high percentages that things will change significantly
in any direction. The majority of 56.67% (N=17) do not see any incoming change in terms
of interreligious relations in Serbia, four respondents see the relations deteriorating
a bit, and five see those relations slightly improving. When asked about the future of
interreligious relations in Western Balkan countries, respondents seem to be a bit more
optimistic. Namely, only six of them think that relations will deteriorate, while the majority
sees relations as staying the same (N=13) or improving at some level (N=11). However, the
small differences are only in the distribution of the respondents. Overall, the vast majority
of respondents feel that relations will remain the same or slightly improve or deteriorate
(N=26 for Serbia and N=24 for Western Balkan countries).
When asked about the rationale behind their selection, a few responses stood out by their
frequency: influence of political factors (in the context of the Western Balkans in the first
place) and lack of initiative for interreligious cooperation.
The main reason for relations staying more less the same is because of the influence of
regional politics, or politics in general, on the religious institutions at some level. Political
influence was recognised either as a rise of the right across the Western Balkans or as an
entanglement of nationalism with religion, or at the highest frequency as an influence
of daily politics on religion, i.e. religious institutions and representatives, or as one
member of academia phrased it: ‘The inter-religious factors are determined by political
relations in WB. They will continue to develop along those lines’. On the other hand, one
of the representatives of an NGO claimed that ‘the 5-year time period is too short for any
significant change - there can be only small changes toward religious harmony or otherwise.
The reason for this is the historical burden which lies on the top of our interethnic and
inter-religious relations in region’. Another respondent pointed to the gap between the
formal interreligious meetings between leaders of distinctive religious communities and
other believers. In his opinion: ‘...those meetings do not have any significant influence on
believers’.
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Threats and opportunities for religious tolerance in Serbia
The last part of the survey deals with the threats and opportunities for interreligious
relations in the country and in the whole region. An absolute majority (N=23) repeated
their concerns from the previous questions. The religious relations in the Western Balkans
and in Serbia will continue to be determined by political factors in Serbia and in other
Western Balkan countries. Some of those political factors are the rise of the right and
nationalism, interests of political elites etc.
People were also worried by the low level of knowledge about religion in general (due to
the long heritage of communism), but by a low level of education in general, which affect
one’s critical approach.

Figure 36: Biggest threats to interreligious relations in Serbia
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Some of the respondents (N=8) were worried by the fact that people who were involved in
the war in Syria have returned to their homes in the Western Balkans and that they present
an imminent threat, not only to the religious relations, but to general security.
One of the recognised potential threats (N=7) is the fact that there are not many initiatives
which work on improving religious relations or on improving of mutual respect and
knowledge about other religious communities.
Despite the low level of influence of religion as a whole and predominantly negative
influence of religion on different areas in society people also seem to be rather positive
and open about the potential role of religion in Serbia and wider. For example, its benefits
could be seen in the areas of economic well-being, especially when it comes to helping the
poor and those who need help by organising special programmes of assistance.151
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Current study quote. This kind of interreligious initiative has been seen by three respondents as
a way of improving not only economic well-being of the poor but also interreligious relations.
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Cross country comparison
By Viktorija Borovska

Political, economic and cultural elites in the Western Balkans share common views on
the role of religion in society, but different perspectives on the challenges and concerns
related to interreligious relations. Sharper differences in relation to challenges and threats
to religious diversity and interreligious dialogue are observed in the region’s multi-ethnic
societies.
Albania and Kosovo are more homogenous societies in terms of ethnicity. Although
Albania and Kosovo have a heterogeneous religious structure, the structure of ethnicity is
fairly homogenous. In Albania 97% are Albanians, and in Kosovo 92.9% of the population is
Albanian. North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are ethnically very heterogeneous.
In North Macedonia, according to the last census from 2002, 64.2% are Macedonian, 25.2%
Albanians. Macedonians are generally Orthodox Christians and Albanians are generally
Muslims. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the last census from 2013, the case is
even more diverse, 50.11% are Bosniaks, 30.78% are Serbs, and 15.43% Croats. Bosniaks are
generally Muslims, Serbians are Orthodox Christians and Croats are generally Catholics.
Also, when we talk about ethnically heterogeneous structure it is important to bear in
mind that it makes a difference if there is religious heterogeneity as well. For example,
Montenegro has also ethnically heterogeneous structure with 45% Montenegrins, 28.7%
Serbs, and 8.6% Bosnians, but Montenegrins and Serbs (which comprise the majority)
are both Orthodox Christians. The ethnic diversity in combination with religious diversity
seems to have been more prone to political manipulation and tensions even in the post1990s conflict period in some of Western Balkan countries.
Regarding the importance of religion for most of the surveyed elites in each of the countries,
it is obvious that religion plays an important role in society and it is an important aspect
for citizens that live in the Western Balkan region. This is most noticeable in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (with a mean of 5.63) and least noticeable in Albania (mean 4.1).
Religion has a moderate influence on the attitudes of the majority of people regarding social
issues (the highest influence on social issues was observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina
with a mean 5.24, and the lowest influence in North Macedonia with a mean of 4 and in
Serbia, 4.03).
Sharp differences between ethnically homogenous and multi-ethnic societies are observed
in relation to the influence of religion on the attitudes of people regarding political matters.
Namely, in Macedonia the mean is 4.18, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina it is 5.24, which
shows that religion in these two countries has a significant influence on political matters.
Unlike these results, in Albania and Kosovo the value of the mean is lower (3.26 in Albania
and 3.7 in Kosovo) which indicates that religion is perceived as not having a significant
influence on political matters.
There are also differences regarding the influence of religious leaders among their
respective communities of believers. If we compare the means of these six countries, it is
noticeable that Bosnian religious leaders (mean 5.2) and those in Kosovo (mean 5.47) have
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a greater influence on their respective communities. This influence is weakest in Serbia
(mean 4.47) and North Macedonia (mean 4.36).
Generally, the influence of religious leaders on public opinion in general is lower. However,
in Bosnia and Herzegovina alone (mean 5.2) according to surveyed members of elites there,
religious leaders have a significant influence on public opinion. This influence is lowest in
Albania (mean 3.43) and North Macedonia (mean 3.84).
The next set of questions from the survey were about the opinions of the respondents
as to whether religion, as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public discourse,
positively or negatively influences the development of political processes, democracy,
interethnic relations, social cohesion, economic well-being, tolerance and peaceful coexistence, and good neighbourly relations among Western Balkans countries. The crosscountry analysis of surveyed elite members’ opinions suggest that in more heterogeneous
countries (such as North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) generally the influence
of religion on the social aspects mentioned is negative. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and
North Macedonia the influence of religion is mostly negative upon political developments,
democracy and interethnic relations. Serbia has similar results on this matter, but leaning
more toward neutral influence. Montenegro’s results are similar with the tendency to
see religion as dominantly interpreted and presented in the public discourse as more
of a negative influence especially on tolerance and peaceful coexistence and interethnic
relations. Unlike these countries, the situation in Albania and Kosovo is quite different.
Generally, elite members from these two countries perceive religion’s influence in
society more positively. The most positive influence religion in Kosovo has is on peaceful
coexistence, social cohesion and interethnic relations. In Albania this influence is most
positive on peaceful coexistence, social cohesion, democracy, and interethnic relations.
In all of the countries the respondents have assessed the influence of religion on economic
well-being as neutral, which can lead us to the conclusion that religion has the lowest
influence on economy.
The biggest differences between the countries that emerged from the elite survey are
those regarding the interreligious relations in Western Balkan countries. Respondents were
choosing on the scale with seven degrees, between religious hatred and religious harmony.
In countries with a greater ethnic homogeneity, the mean is closer to religious harmony
(Albania mean 6, Kosovo mean 5.57). But we have a completely opposite image in the
countries with multi-ethnic structure which have experienced the severe consequences of
interethnic conflicts. In North Macedonia the mean is 3.82, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina
is 3.67. As we can see there is a great discrepancy in the results. One should bear in mind
that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995, and the armed conflict in North
Macedonia in 2001 have affected greatly the interethnic relations in these two countries.
But when we speak about the perceptions of the respondents of the interreligious relations
in the Western Balkan region we see a different picture. Surveyed respondents in most of
the Western Balkan countries perceive the interreligious relations in the region as leaning
towards religious intolerance (North Macedonia mean 3.05, Kosovo mean 4.1, Bosnia and
Herzegovina 3.5, Albania 3.74). Results from the Serbian survey show that they are more
critical about the interreligious relations in Western Balkan countries. Montenegro is the
exception in this matter. Respondents from Montenegro see the interreligious relations in
their country in the worst condition (mean 3.02) than interreligious relations in the whole
region (mean 4.31).
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Respondents from the six countries generally expect that interreligious relations in their
respective countries and in the region in general will remain the same, mostly because the
period of five years is short and there is no evidence for any major change in the matter.
The elite’s perceptions of what the biggest threats of interreligious relations are in these
six countries overlap to some extent. Generally, in all Western Balkan countries the
biggest threat for religion is politics. They view that relationship or the abuse of religion
for political gain, or in other words the shaping of religious relations by political factors
as representing one of the greatest challenges for religion today in the region. Even more
worrying is that the respondents don’t expect this situation to change in the future. For the
respondents from Kosovo and Albania one of the biggest threats is religious extremism
and Islamophobia. In Serbia one of the perceived threats is returnees from the Syria War,
not only as a religious but also a security problem. In Montenegro, surveyed elite members
see media reports on religious matters as an additional problem. Namely, they argue that
with media focuses mostly on incidents of religious tension while examples of mutual
respect and harmonious multi-religious and multiethnic life are less visible in the media.
Participants from all six countries complain that there is an absence of interreligious
dialogue, as well as lack of religious knowledge and understanding among declared
believers from all confessions.
Finally, regarding the positive opportunities or participants’ opinion on how religion can
help improve certain aspects of society, the majority of the respondents from these six
countries agree that religion can actually help in most of the areas mentioned. What
respondents suggest is that religion or religious leaders should do more to promote
universal and ethical values and strengthen interfaith dialogue. Religious institutions and
religious representatives should lead by example especially in terms of acceptance, respect
and tolerance towards other religious communities. Also, avoidance of any relationship
between religion and politics was mentioned in each country report as one of the steps to
improve the state of and opinion about religion.
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Concluding remarks

The opinion that religion in Western Balkan countries plays a crucial role in different
aspects and spheres of society prevails not only in the answers of the respondents, but
also in the previous work and research of academics and international organisations. While
it plays an important role, the impact religion has on the economy, politics, democracy and
society in general is not necessarily tangible or positive. Religious leaders need to act
more vigorously to promote religious values which would assist Western Balkan societies
in reconciliation and overcoming the challenges of past conflicts. Moreover, institutionally,
religion is perceived to have strong ties to political elites in some of the Western Balkan
countries. Overall, religion and its institutions should assume a more proactive role in society
in terms of perpetuating universal ethical principles and condemning populist rhetoric
that is in breach of democratic values. However, the prospect for such a development is
surrounded by scepticism because religion in some Western Balkan countries is abused
for political goals and sustaining the divide among ethno-religious groups.
Although religion may be important to people it seems that it has failed to show its positive
effects on different social aspects. The general opinion is that religion seen through
the practice and the rhetoric of its religious representatives in some of Western Balkan
countries it has not actively encouraged tolerance or peaceful coexistence.
Another very important conclusion that emerged from this survey is that religion (through
its religious representatives) must show initiatives and genuine practices of interreligious
cooperation, understanding, respect and acceptance. Religious leaders in Western Balkan
countries should engage more actively in establishing interreligious cooperation both at
the institutional and practical level.
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The Interfaith Council for Social Cohesion in the
Western Balkans
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Abstract
With the demise of the communist governments in the Balkan region in the early 1990s,
we have entered a phase in which serious religiously related issues challenging the social
cohesion of our societies need serious analysis and action at different levels. Interfaith
councils as a way of engaging the different religious communities in one society are not new
and not the same. Nor are they unquestionably accepted or easily dismissed as ineffective
in addressing challenges of peacebuilding and social cohesion in a religiously pluralistic
society. There are political, cultural, ethnic and national considerations beside religious
and educational ones which figure large in the role of an interfaith council and influence
its character and effectiveness, but their contribution to peacebuilding and the social
cohesion of our pluralistic societies cannot be ignored. As such this paper will explore,
from different perspectives, the role of an interfaith council as a helpful instrument for the
wellbeing of our societies.
The virtues of an interfaith council discussed in this paper should give us hope for fruitfully
addressing the challenge of different traditions in the same social space, but it remains
to be seen if it can win the support of the majority culture’s stakeholders with their
concerns in providing for a peaceful and harmonious society. The Albanian context with
its similarities and differences from the religious pluralistic context of the other countries
in the region provides a good case study to evaluate the merits of an interfaith council as
an instrument to facilitate tolerance and social cohesion.
Keywords: interfaith council, religious pluralism, peacebuilding, tolerance, social cohesion.

Introduction
The world we live in now in the third millennium is different from the one our parents lived
in until 2001, especially with regard to the resurgence of religion in Eastern Europe and the
Balkan region (Johnson, 2013), with predictions of secular modernity in need of adjustment
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(Appleby, 1994; Eggemeier, 2012). Our Balkan region has suffered long and even recently
from conflicts between different ethnic groups, but the relationship of religion, ethnicity
and nationalism deserves much more serious thought (Ruane & Todd, 2010; Poulton &
Taji-Farouki, 1997).
Perhaps due to the lasting influence of communist ideology in our region, alongside
other factors, it seems as if religion is not taken seriously by Balkan intellectuals and
those in positions of leadership. The observation of John Micklethwait in another context
sounds like an accurate description of our intellectuals as well: ‘If you gather together
a group of self-professed foreign-policy experts—whether they be neoconservatives,
realpolitickers or urbane European diplomats—you can count on a sneer if you mention
“inter-faith dialogue”. At best, they say, it is liberal waffle; at worst it is naive appeasement,’
(Micklethwait, 2007, p. 22).
Religious pluralism as a social reality is now here to stay, but tolerance as a necessary
ingredient of social cohesion in this context is not a given because tolerance is a cultural
achievement (Netland, 2001). We cannot afford not to pay attention to the religious
dimension of life in our region. This does not mean we only need to empower the state
again to deal with it – we perhaps know better than most what happens when the state is
overbearing and oversteps its boundaries with regard to freedom of religion, yet the state
needs to be involved.
In this paper I discuss the merits of the interfaith council as one important mechanism
to engage religious dynamics to strengthen the social cohesion in the Western Balkan
states. Methodologically, by virtue of analytic induction the argument of this paper is:
(1) Balkan countries need to address their interreligious dynamics by more consciously
including the different religious representative bodies within their societies; (2) an
explanation for the general lack of enthusiasm for utilising the interfaith council in our
region could be due to the dominance of one religion in the national identity and culture
of each country; (3) the Albanian Interreligious Council, as an expression of acceptance
by all religious communities in Albania of other religious communities as equals, is the
dependent variable of the difference in the nature of the role of religion in the make-up of
the national identity and culture.
This paper starts by highlighting the religious dimension of the tensions between different
groups in our societies that need social cohesion, then describe the form, purpose and
function of the interfaith council as a cooperation platform for different religious groups
followed by probing its relevance to address the issues of peacebuilding and social
cohesion from theological, political and peacebuilding perspectives, to conclude with one
illustrative case in Albania observing some potential challenges in other countries of the
region.

Profile of an interfaith council in fostering social cohesion
The interfaith council is not a new idea. The interfaith council is a reflection of the
significance of belonging together to the same social entity, some form of a democratic
sovereign state or a common society, in which we need to live together respectfully and
harmoniously. This implies the prior commitment to a common vision of society defined
by tolerance in pluralism, recognising and respectfully engaging religious others who are
our next-door neighbours while they also are embodiments of ‘the universe next door’
(Sire, 1997).
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The world’s largest and most representative multi-religious coalition is called Religions for
Peace (Religions for Peace, 2019). Their motto, ‘different faiths, common action,’ captures
well the attitude of respect for people of different faiths seeking to advance the common
goal of peace and wellbeing for all. Here we see the concern with ensuring the necessary
basis for a cohesive society which is peaceful coexistence.
The vision, mission, principles, structure and method of the Religions for Peace coalition
give a good picture of the kind of interfaith council this paper puts forward as a helpful
instrument for our societies. The interfaith council or interreligious council (IRC) is the
primary mechanism for interreligious cooperation envisioned by Religions for Peace
network. I will try to briefly describe aspects of the interfaith council – what it is and what
it does – but this is necessarily general, and I will illustrate this with the Albanian Interfaith
Council as one concrete example in our region.
The vision or the desired reality for an interfaith council includes ‘the vision of a world in
which religious communities cooperate effectively for peace, by taking concrete common
action’ (Religions for Peace, 2019). The mission or the work such a council does which
‘bears fruit in common concrete action’ includes organising interfaith dialogue, but we
should clarify that ‘cooperation includes but also goes beyond dialogue’ (Religions for
Peace, 2019).
Every group that cooperates together needs to be clear on the undergirding principles
of their cooperation and it is helpful when they are written down, so Religions for Peace
holds up five such principles of interfaith cooperation: ‘[1] Respect religious differences;
[2] Act on deeply held and widely shared values; [3] Preserve the identity of each religious
community; [4] Honor the different ways religious communities are organised; [5] Support
locally led multi-religious structures’ (Religions for Peace, 2019).
With regard to structure, Religions for Peace is a network of self-led interreligious bodies,
comprising representatives of the various religions who decide together on the specifics
of their organisation with equal deciding power. The function that the council should
perform necessitates that its structure is such that helps build trust in the members of
diverse communities and thus those elected (or those the respective communities have
already chosen as representatives) have the credibility needed to serve in the council
as bridges between communities to reduce hostility and create new positive perceptions
between them.
Before we look at the specific example of the Albanian Interreligious Council and its
relevance for the wider Balkan region, it seems important to anticipate some questions
and evaluate the usefulness of an interfaith council from three perspectives; theological,
political and peacebuilding perspective.

The interfaith council evaluated from three perspectives
Because of a view of religion influenced by the previous period of communist indoctrination
for over a generation, it may be difficult to convince people in the Balkans that religion is
very important for the cohesiveness of our societies or that it has already played a much
larger role than we thought possible in the conflicts that dismantled Yugoslavia. Part of the
difficulty may also be, as Arthur Schneier (Schneier, 2002) indicates, that religion is never
alone as a cause of conflict. Other scholars have explored in some depth the relationship
of religion, ethnicity and nationalism (Gorski & Türkmen-Dervişoğlu, 2013; Flora, Szilagyi, &
Roudometof, 2005; Duijzings, 2002) revealing the importance of religion in the mix.
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The theological perspective
One of the most important aspects of any religion is its theology and the system of
doctrines that governs the understanding of the world according to the specific revelation
a particular religious group cherishes. When approached from this perspective, the
function of the interfaith council is helpful in providing the safe space to explore different
theological perspectives in order to better understand each other better. This perspective
emphasises the importance of ideas and the power of ideologies to motivate action. It
is not necessary to hold, and here I appear to disagree with Neufeldt, that those who
approach the issue of peace and conflict resolution from the theological angle are blind to
religion being a cause of conflict (Neufeldt, 2011, p. 348). Furthermore, they are more aware
of the religious thought of the different traditions that contribute to peace and harmony,
and that is why their perspective is invaluable in peacebuilding as the necessary basis for
social cohesion and fostering cooperative action.
Some conscientious believers and religious leaders may be wary of interfaith councils
because there is, in the minds of some, another goal for interfaith dialogue, namely
‘active theology’ (Panikkar, 1978; Kellenberger, 1993; Singh & Schich, 2001). The theological
dimension of engagement in the context of the interfaith council, within the accepted
boundaries where all feel protected in their specific religious identity, finds much room
in the council interactions to develop friendships and appreciation for each other going
much farther than just general respect. This effective dimension of the dialogue is very
valuable and goes a long way toward finding solutions for problems that might arise in the
future (Hanson, 1993).
In such a context of respect, the interfaith dialogue, which may ensue under the auspices
of such an interfaith council, may arrive at a common language about shared values that
can then be disseminated to the broader base of adherents with the credibility of the
leadership that is represented at this level. Such is the value of joint statements that a
council may produce in the course of time and events. Thus, from the theological point of
view, the interfaith council is an important reference point for the respective communities
of faith and helps build trust in being free to live and propagate one’s faith, in conversation
with the other views and with respect for others in spite of theological disagreements that
will remain.

The political perspective
Politics had to deal with religion after 2001, and many international political peace efforts
started then in different places, including our region, which considered the interfaith
dialogue important (Mojzes, 2006). Looking at the usefulness of the interfaith council from
the political perspective means that the evaluation keeps in mind the goal of peaceful
coexistence of different religious communities in the same space. The politicians who have
this goal are more pragmatically interested in the interfaith council as a means to an end,
but in spite of those motivations and the danger of being used by politicians, the truth
is that there is commonality with the political goal of social peace and harmony, and the
council is well placed to mediate in the achievement of those goals.
Again, the interfaith council in this context would be very valuable because the
representatives are officially recognised by their communities to uphold their exclusive
view of reality (Omar, 2005). When such respected and trusted representatives take
a moderating stance on a certain issue, they are best placed to communicate in the
appropriate language, including through powerful symbolism and ritual, and to be much
more effective in convincing members of their community than a political declaration
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would be. They would also be better positioned to know how to interact with radicals
inside their own communities and bring them along to a better path to live in peace with
all by following their religion in an adjusted way.

The peacebuilding perspective
It bears repeating that our concern with social cohesion starts with the first step,
peacebuilding. The conflict resolution typology framed by John Paul Lederach presents four
levels where change can occur to create the necessary synergy for conflict transformation
(Ledarach, 2003). These four levels include personal, relational, structural and cultural
levels, and in each of these levels the interfaith council has a significant role to play. From
the theological angle we can see how the focus is on both the personal and relational
levels but much less on the structural and cultural levels. The political perspective
naturally addresses the personal level less than the relational level, which means the
adherents of one religion are motivated to relate more appropriately to the other. The
political perspective also is concerned with the structural level, which means that it is
possible that policies and processes may be influenced by religious leaders.
The third perspective, the peacebuilding perspective, seems to encompass all four of the
levels of change because it seeks to develop or cultivate a culture of peace and tolerance
in a sustainable way which can be seen as the basis for a cohesive society. Relating to
the levels we discussed above, peacebuilding efforts imply a dynamic process including
influence for change in perceptions, attitudes, behaviours and interests of persons and
communities – thus addressing both the personal level and the relational level. But beside
this level of change, the complex process of peacebuilding also seeks to address the
underlying structures where causes of conflict are also found to perpetuate the problems.
Religion is naturally seen as integral in this search for peace because there are also
reasons to see it implicated in the problem of conflict, and therefore, either way, it cannot
be ignored (Appleby, 2003).
The interfaith council provides a platform for joint action to address issues of concern
and get to the causes of problems together as well as ways to move forward by mobilising
different communities and actors in common action. The interfaith council, simply by virtue
of bringing representatives of different religious communities together, is an important
step toward the reality of living together in peace. The example set by representatives
coming together is a signal of the furthering of the cause to address the perceptions of the
religious other and to inform understanding about them.
Probably the most significant contribution of the interfaith council to social cohesion
and peacebuilding efforts is its ongoing nature – continuous collaboration not just for
occasional crises but as a way of life together, thus helping in different ways and at
different levels to cultivate that culture of peace and tolerance that is needed for the
social cohesion in our pluralistic societies.

Albania as a good case study of the interfaith council’s role in social cohesion
From the discussion so far it may seem that there are no further concerns to hinder
supporting whole-heartedly the creation and proliferation of interfaith councils in our
region, but there is much more to deal with in the specific context of each of our countries
which goes far beyond the scope of this paper. Overcoming these and other challenges
accumulated throughout the uneasy history in the Balkans is not a matter of simple
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acknowledgment of what is true and right, therefore we should seek to move forward
consistently but with modest expectations from our efforts. It is in this spirit that the
upshot of this paper – based on analysing the nature and usefulness of the interfaith
council in the context of our need for interfaith dynamics in the region – is to suggest that
the interfaith council can be an important factor for the cause of peace and tolerance by
fostering social cohesion in our societies of the Balkan region.
As mentioned earlier, more analysis is required of the specific make-up of the situation
in each country. Taking Albania as one example might be helpful to illustrate not only the
value of the interfaith council in addressing the challenge of religious divisions within one
country but also the importance of national dynamics in each case. In Albania there are five
religious communities recognised officially by the government accompanied by a formal
memorandum of understanding regarding the dynamics of cooperation and relationship.
The Albanian Interreligious Council (KNFSh) was established on 22 October 2007 with
representatives of four of the major religions in Albania – Sunni Muslim, Orthodox, Roman
Catholic and Bektashi. Since October 2018, the council’s presidential board has also
included Protestant Evangelical representatives on an equal footing with the other four
(knfsh.al, 2019).
There have been several occasions when the leaders of the Interreligious Council of
Albania have drafted important press releases related to different situations in the political
climate of Albania as well as presenting common concerns to foreign heads of state at
important junctures in our country’s road toward EU integration. On such occasions, it has
been important to recognise the way each community approaches the issue of belonging
to Europe and what are understood to be European values.
Another occasion that highlights the importance of the council in coming to use a common
language was in its expression of sympathy for victims of religiously based terrorism. The
form of wording included some discussion of the differences in perspectives about the
kinds and the portrayal of this kind of terrorism. Our religious backgrounds inform our
perspectives, and it takes hearing how the other perceives the same event to modify and
agree on common language in our joint declarations, which has a significant impact on the
building of good will between our religious communities.
More important, it seems, is the message that is communicated to Albanians in seeing
religious leaders together, visiting each other’s centres in formal expressions of good
will on occasions of specific celebrations for their communities. It sends a clear message
to the broader population that we can live together in social harmony while we remain
established in our individual religious commitments. These frequent contacts provide
ample opportunity for friendship among the representatives and privately addressing
sensitive issues of common concern.
On at least one occasion when the leaders of Albania’s three main Christian denominations
(Catholic, Orthodox and Evangelical) expressed their concern with the unbalanced
government support of events at certain religious celebrations, both the prime minister
and the president of the republic responded positively and adjusted their policy to
include the Christian request in their program of official events. As is also apparent from
the website of the Albanian Interreligious Council, there are other activities and exchanges
that are invaluable in fostering positive interreligious dialogue and understanding across
the theological divides of the different communities in an atmosphere of respect and
appreciation of the other’s point of view.
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Challenges for the interfaith council in the Western Balkans
Albania is a Balkan country, and we may assume many similarities with others in the
region, but Albania is also somewhat different from most of our neighbours, and this may
account for the existence of the interreligious council in Albania. Albanian national identity
is understood by Albanians as less connected with any specific religion, while almost all
of our Balkan neighbours would seem to have a hard time identifying an individual of
their country as a member of the specific nation without the typical religious designation
associated with belonging to their nation. An Albanian is not necessarily a Muslim, an
Orthodox Christian, a Catholic, a Bektashi or even an Evangelical, and no one in Albania
would doubt the Albanian identity of any Albanian-speaking citizen of any of these religious
persuasions. This is very important, and it is both a blessing and a handicap. It also may
help in understanding some aspects of the attitudes with regard to the interfaith council.
On the other side, in any other Balkan country the typical national of that country is
generally considered to be of the majority religion of that country, most likely of a national
Orthodox church (Anscombe, 2014, p. 237). Although the communist rule of the last halfcentury did much to blur the distinctions between nationalities based on religion, it was
not difficult for the old distinctions to re-emerge with the resurgence of religion after
1990. This dominance of one religion in one country is also very much a blessing but also a
handicap with regard to the cohesiveness of the society (Anscombe, 2014, p. 253).
The blessing of the Albanian plurality of religions is in the country’s experience with
accommodating the other that is different in the secondary aspect of religion, while being
fully one and the same in another more significant or the primary aspect of nationality.
The handicap is that, compared to the depths that religious sentiment can plumb in
uniting people, there will always be a shallower level of cultural unity between Albanians
of different religions. This means that it appears easier to accept the different religious
people represented as equals around the Albanian table in the form of an interfaith council
and at the same time also more important to facilitate good interaction between different
religious communities to preserve a functional national society.
On the other hand, generally speaking for the rest of the Balkan countries, the blessing of
a Balkan national is in having the opportunity of a much deeper union with the dominant
majority of one’s compatriots who also are of the same religion. But here as well, while
the blessing is significant, the challenge for the social cohesion of the whole society that
includes others of other religious minorities is also significant. In many Balkan countries,
the typical perception of a citizen of the majority religion is that a minority-faith citizen of
the same country, is twice as far removed from the standing of a typical national of that
country; compared to the perception of belonging to the same nation that Albanian citizens
of different religions consider as equal between themselves and any other Albanian of any
religion. This may mean that it is more difficult to accept religious minorities as equals
at the national table and less important in the eyes of the majority to risk giving more
credibility to the religious minorities by including them as equals in an interfaith council,
all the while imagining it easier to preserve a functional national society without much
cooperation between majority and minority.
I insist on these oversimplified generalisations because of the strange juxtaposition between
a social life that is deeply defined by religion at the culturally significant level of national
identity in our Balkan region, and the apparent lack of urgency for serious interreligious
engagement in the form of a helpful common platform such as the interreligious council
(Mojzes, 2006, pp. 30–31).
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The purpose of this paper was to indicate that the interreligious dynamic in the Western
Balkans is significant for the social cohesion of our societies, and that the interfaith
council is a valuable platform to include all relevant religious bodies for cooperation. The
existence of the Albanian interreligious council, as yet a rare case in the Western Balkans,
suggests that more light needs to be shed on the influence and interplay of the dominant
religion and the national identity and culture of our societies to explain more fully the
attitudes toward sharing a common interreligious platform in our pluralistic context.
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In pursuit of ‘twin toleration’: democracy and
church–state relations in Serbia and Montenegro153
By Marko Veković, PhD154, University of Belgrade

Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between church and state in Serbia and Montenegro
by examining the development of ‘twin toleration’. In particular, it aims to explain why
there is still no ‘twin toleration’ in these states, and why it is important to impose
such institutional arrangement in church–state relations. The ‘Twin toleration’ concept
suggests that institutional arrangements between the state and religious communities
in a democratic society should be based on mutual autonomy, in which the state should
not interfere in the matters of religious communities, and vice versa. However, since the
fall of communism and resurgence of religion, both the Serbian and Montenegrin states
have tended to have close relations with the dominant religious communities in order
to achieve their narrow political interests. On the other side, religious communities
often interfere in political issues. Such a situation does not contribute to the further
development of democracy in these countries. In this paper I employ content analysis
in order to investigate constitutions and specific laws on religious communities, if any,
in the states mentioned above. Besides its theoretical perspective, aim of this paper is
to offer practical suggestions on how to rearrange church–state relations in Serbia and
Montenegro in order to make these countries more democratic.
Keywords: religion, democracy, ‘twin toleration’, Church-state relations, Serbia, Montenegro

Introduction
The collapse of communism all over Eastern Europe, and Western Balkans, triggered two
equally important social and political processes. First was democratisation, a ‘transition
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from authoritarian towards more democratic regimes’.155 On the other hand, societies
of Eastern Europe, including the Western Balkan states, experienced the resurgence of
religion.156 I believe it is logical to presume that these two processes have been interrelated,
as religious communities are important historical, cultural and above all political actors in
Western Balkan societies. Did religious communities help or hinder the democratisation
process across the Western Balkans?157 Although this is a very important research
question, in this paper I will argue that Western Balkan societies are now in the stage of
consolidation of democracy. Therefore, in this paper I will tackle the issue of the role of
religion and religious communities in this process, by examining church-state relations
in Serbia and Montenegro and their consequences for the consolidation of democracy in
these two countries.
Of course, this paper does not argue that the role of religion and religious communities is
the single most important aspect of democratic consolidation in Serbia and Montenegro.
However, it strongly argues that the imposition of a specific form of church–state relations,
namely ‘twin toleration’, has a strong tendency to help democracy work by providing an
institutional environment in which religious communities can use all of their democratic
potential to contribute to the society.

Research design
Rather than focusing on Orthodox Christian political theology, this paper offers an
institutional argument for explaining why there is no ‘twin toleration’ in Serbia and
Montenegro, and why the possible implementation of such a church-state arrangement is
good for democracy. Such an approach situates this research in the area of institutional
comparative politics, which argues that institutions matter when it comes to religion and
democracy, and particularly to the question of the consolidation of democracy.
In terms of theoretical rationale, I offer answers on two main research questions. First –
why does ‘twin toleration’ matter for democratic consolidation? And, more importantly,
I focus on the question – Îs Orthodox Christianity an obstacle to democracy in the first
place? Based on content analysis of the most recent and relevant literature in the field, I
highlight major contestation points and disputes in this field.
In the second part of this paper, I analyse church–state relations in post-Milošević Serbia,
as well as in post-2006 Montenegro. I decided to narrow my analysis to this time frame
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for several reasons. First of all, post-Milošević Serbia represented a relatively stable
democratic society in which one religious actor, namely the Serbian Orthodox Church
(SOC), dominated the religious sphere. On the other hand, since 21 May 2006, Montenegro
has been an independent state working on its democratic capacities. However, I argue
that the incapability of the state to successfully manage its complex and specific religious
structure is one of the major deficiencies of its political system. In order to map specific
church–state relations in Serbia and Montenegro I will use qualitative descriptive methods,
mostly content analysis, by offering insights on how each country institutionally manages
its church–state relations. Therefore, I focus on constitutional provisions and other
legislation which deal with religion and religious issues.
In the final section of this paper, I will try to explain why there is no ‘twin toleration’ in
Serbia and Montenegro, and more importantly, what we can do about it.

Institutions matter: theoretical rationale
One of the fundamental debates in the field of religion and politics is the relationship
between religion and democracy. According to Alfred Stepan, this debate can be
encapsulated by the following question: ‘Are all, or only some, of the world’s religious
systems politically compatible with democracy?’158 The vast body literature in the field
tries to provide answers on this question. However, it seems that the answer is more
complicated than it was expected to be. When it comes to Christianity and its three major
branches, Peter Berger argued that, ‘In the cases of Catholicism and Protestantism, the
answer is pretty definitely yes. In the case of Orthodoxy, it is maybe. On the whole, this is
a far from depressive picture’.159 On the other hand, religious traditions such as Islam or
Confucianism have been seen as major obstacles for democracy.
The relationship between Orthodox Christianity (Orthodoxy hereafter) and democracy
is rather complex. For a long time, scholars have claimed that there is a clear link
between Orthodoxy and authoritarianism. For example, Arnold Toynbee argued that, ‘Like
communism, Eastern Orthodox Christianity is authoritarian’.160 Mostly based on Toynbee’s
work, as well as on Max Weber’s 1922 work Economy and Society, Samuel P. Huntington
wrote in his seminal, and notorious, work on the ‘clash of civilizations’ that Orthodoxy is
‘much less likely to develop stable democratic political systems’.161 Therefore, it is logical
to ask the following question: is Orthodox Christianity an obstacle for democracy in the
first place? There is no straight and simple answer to this question. I would say that
Orthodoxy, just like any other religious tradition, is politically ambivalent, or multi-vocal.
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This answer is based on research by Daniel Philpott and Alfred Stepan, among others,
who say that all religions have a significant political potential. The real question then is
not if Orthodoxy is compatible with democracy, but rather how we can use such religious
political ambivalence? In his influential work, Philpott argues that any religious actor can
be involved in different acts, such as political violence or democratisation. According to
him, there are two major mechanisms which can help us explain the political actions of
religious actors: political theology (ideas) and differentiation (the institutional relationship
between a religious actor and the state).162 A similar argument has been put forward by
Alfred Stepan, who argues that a person dealing with the issue of religion and democracy
should take care of several misinterpretations, including ‘doctrinal misinterpretation’.163
This misinterpretation lies in assumptions of ‘univocality’, claiming that ‘any religion’s
doctrine is univocally pro-democratic or anti-democratic’.164 This is simply wrong due to
the fact that all religions are actually multi-vocal, which means that all have the potential
to support both democratic and anti-democratic systems (or in other words, religions
are politically ambivalent, as Philpott suggested). This particular framework applies
to Orthodoxy too, as Elizabeth Prodromou has argued. She claims that, ‘there is ample
empirical evidence to suggest that Orthodox Christianity and democracy are generally
compatible, in theory as well as in practice. Yet there is no denying that Orthodox churches
often display a certain ambivalence about key elements of the pluralism that characterises
democratic regimes’165.
Now on to the next question: why does ‘twin toleration’ matter for democracy, and
particularly for democratic consolidation? Stepan explains twin toleration as ‘the minimal
boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions
vis-a-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-a-vis political
institutions’.166 It is of crucial importance for democracy to impose such institutional
arrangements due to the fact that, according to Stepan:

‘

Democratic institutions must be free, within the bounds of the constitution
and human rights, to generate policies. Religious institutions should not
have constitutionally privileged prerogatives that allow them to mandate
public policy to democratically elected governments. At the same time,
individuals and religious communities, consistent with our institutional
definition of democracy, must have complete freedom to worship privately.
In addition, as individuals and groups, they must be able to advance their
values publicly in civil society and to sponsor organizations and movements
in political society, as long as their actions do not impinge negatively on the
liberties of other citizens or violate democracy and the law’.167
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Moreover, he argues that all the world’s major religions are involved in a ‘struggle over twin
toleration’.168 In his further studies he developed this concept, particularly focusing on the
cases of Senegal and Tunisia. When it comes to Senegal, Stepan argued that the secular
fundamentalist vs. religious fundamentalist conflict in this country has lessened, due to
the fact that ‘twin toleration emerged as the dominant discourse and practice’.169 When it
comes to the particular case of Tunisia and its democratisation in 2011, Stepan argued that
its successful democratisation has been related to the ‘adhering to a relationship between
religion and politics that follows the pattern of what I have called in these pages and
elsewhere the twin tolerations’.170

Church–state relations in Serbia and Montenegro: a descriptive approach
This part of my study provides a brief descriptive look into church-state relations in both
post-Milošević Serbia and post-2006 Montenegro. Although one can argue about it, in this
paper I refer to both post-Milošević Serbia and post-2006 Montenegro as societies which
are still in the process of democratic consolidation.
After the breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Serbia was been ruled by the authoritarian
regime of Slobodan Milošević. The subsequent democratisation process in Serbia, in which
the dominant religious community (SOC) had an important role, ended successfully in
2000.171 However, in the immediate aftermath of 2000 Serbian political elites missed the
opportunity to impose a twin toleration concept. Even though Serbia has been declared
as a secular country where all religions are treated equally and where no religion will
be declared as state’s religion (Article 11, 2006),172 it is obvious that a dominant religious
actor in Serbia, namely the SOC, has been a significant political actor too, influencing
different aspects of social and political life of post-Milošević Serbia. While the current
Serbian constitution provided a general framework for religion and religious communities
– including the above-mentioned secular nature of the state, granting that all churches
and religious communities are equal and separated from the state (Article 44), freedom of
religion (Article 43), and the ban on religious discrimination (Article 21)173 – Veković argued
that this specific area needed a deeper and more insightful legal regulation, due to several
reasons, including but not limited to ‘complexity of religious mosaic in Serbia, issue of
returning of the expropriated property by the former communist regime, State’s support
for clergy’s pension insurance, and the introduction of the religious education in Serbian
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school system’.174 That is why the new ‘Law of Churches and Religious Communities’ (2006)
has been introduced.175 Although there is a strong argument for regulating the religious life
of a country with a specific law, in this case several shortcomings have emerged.176 In short,
another great opportunity has been missed for implementing ‘twin toleration’ in Serbian
legislation.
In the case of Montenegro, the situation is similar and yet different. After the 21 May 2006
referendum, Montenegro has become an independent state. From that moment, all the
former Yugoslav republics had become independent states. Just like Serbia, Montenegro
is also a secular country. This fact has been confirmed in the Constitution of Montenegro
of 2007, Article 14 of which states, ‘Religious communities shall be separated from the
state. Religious communities shall be equal and free in the exercise of religious rites and
religious affairs’.177 Freedom of religion is guaranteed under Article 46 of the Constitution.
In the case of Montenegro, it is particularly important to mention the draft law on religious
communities, which is supported by the political elite. The most important critiques of
this law are based in how it regulates the property of religious communities. Moreover,
according to Article 52 of the draft, all religious buildings built before 1 December 1918
which it can be confirmed were built using state funding or support, becomes state
property. This fact will, of course, directly influence the major religious communities
in Montenegro, and particularly the SOC which is one of the wealthiest institutions in
Montenegro. Support amongst religious communities for the draft law, has only come from
the Jewish community and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church.178

Towards an explanation:
why there is no ‘twin toleration’ in Serbia or Montenegro?
There are, at least, six approaches for explaining why there is no twin toleration in Serbia
or Montenegro. These are: history, stateness, religious structure, identity, (geo)politics and
symphonia. We will briefly discuss each of them in the following section.
When it comes to history, it is important to note the long-term historical role played by
Orthodox Christianity in both Serbia and Montenegro. Shortly after the foundation of the
medieval Kingdom of Serbia in the thirteenth century Serbian Orthodox Church achieved
autocephaly. Since then the religious life of many Serbs has been regulated by the SOC,
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and as a consequence the SOC has become more than a religious actor, and an important
historical, cultural and above all political actor in both Serbia and Montenegro. The political
potential of the SOC, along with its specific form of church-state relations in the 21st century
draws from way back in history. In addition to the historical argument is the ‘stateness’
problem. Stateness refers to a situation when ‘a significant proportion of the population
does not accept the boundaries of the state (whether constituted democratically or not) as
a legitimate political unit to which they owe obedience’.179 I use to this term to explain the
significant political role of SOC today in both Serbia and Montenegro. When the Serbian
state ceased to exist during after the Ottoman conquest, the idea of the restoration of
the state survived in the institution of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Some authors even
emphasise the fact that the SOC represented the state itself during the long period of
Ottoman rule. Once the Serbian state had been restored, the relationship between the
state and the church was very close, and historically, the SOC has held various privileges
as a result.
On the other hand, the religious structure of both Serbia and Montenegro seem to represent
a problem for twin tolerations. Orthodoxy is the dominant religion in both Serbia and
Montenegro (Serbia – 85%; Montenegro – 72,1%).180 Due to that fact, the SOC does not
regard its political interests as equal with those of other religious communities, but rather
it seeks from the state to recognise its dominant role via state regulation. However, in the
case of Montenegro things are quite different, as the state supports the non-canonical
Montenegrin Orthodox Church.181 Although this religious community has a smaller number
of believers, it is important to mention in terms of state’s relationship with the SOC.
Besides this, the identity of people in Serbia and Montenegro has been deeply rooted in
religion, and particularly Orthodoxy. According to various sources and research, there is a
strong correlation between national identity and religious affiliation. This fact has been
highlighted in Serbia. The consequences of such a situation makes the SOC an important
political actor, which has its own political interests and motivations, while individuals tend
to shape their political view and values according to their religious affiliation. Therefore,
the state tends to have closer and friendly relationship with the SOC, particularly in Serbia,
in order to achieve its political goals and objectives.
The Western Balkans region has always been subject to geopolitics, and the political
interests of world’s powers. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, one of the key foreign
actors is Russia. It is well known that the Orthodox Church is used as one of the ‘soft
powers’ of Russian foreign policy. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that the SOC is
regarded as the ‘extended arm’ of Russian influence in both Serbia and Montenegro. On the
other hand, political elites, particularly in Serbia, tend to have close relations with Russia
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and the Russian Orthodox Church. This is why it is not simple for the state to introduce a
institutional arrangement with the church on the base of twin toleration.
And last but not least, there is an ideal type of church–state relations nurtured in the
Orthodox Christian political theology, namely symphonia. This represents a specific
institutional arrangement, which dates back to the Byzantine era, in which neither church
or state is held to e dominant but complimentary.182 Is symphonia in contradiction with the
twin toleration concept? This is a very interesting question, which calls for deeper analysis.
In short, the answer would be ‘yes, it is but…’.

What can we do about it?
I strongly believe that both Serbia and Montenegro need to use the democratic potential,
which Orthodoxy possesses. In order to achieve this goal, it is my firm opinion that the
twin toleration concept should be introduced in both states. It would benefit the state,
with the flourishing of democratic societies, and it would benefit to the religious actors
as well. Although it would not be easy to achieve this goal, it is doable. I offer a very brief
description of this process.
One of the first steps is to open a public debate on the role of religion in public life, in
which academics, clergyman and political elites are included. This debate should consider
major issues arising around this question, but limited by the secular character of the state.
The main goal of the debate should be a deeper explanation of the twin toleration concept,
its comparative advantages and consequences, based on recent experiences around the
globe. Orthodoxy should be given equal treatment with all other religious communities.
The registration of religious communities should be regulated by the autonomous state
body, and should not discriminate against any religious community. On the other hand, the
state should regulate its own policy independent of the influence of religious institutions.
However, when specific regulations referring to religious communities are going to be
imposed, the voice of religious communities should be taken into account.
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The struggle of Kosovo policymakers to upgrade
the law on religious affairs
By Jeton Mehmeti183, University of Graz

Abstract
Apart from guarantees over freedom of religion, in the last two decades, authorities in
Kosovo have made little progress in advancing its legal framework to accommodate the
emerging needs of religious communities. The only law that regulates religious affairs in
Kosovo is the 2006 Law on Freedom of Religion. The law is framed in very broad terms,
and has received a lot of criticism for failing to properly regulate the status of religious
communities. Representatives of these communities have consistently asked for changes
to legislation that would grant them the status of legal entities. Without legal entity status,
religious communities can only function at the most basic level. The government has tried
to introduce a new law almost every year since 2011, but every attempt to change the
law has failed so far. Why? Part of the answer is to be found in the legal complexities of
Kosovo’s dealing with religion.
Keywords: Kosovo, religious identity, secularism, laicism, freedom of religion

Introduction
The Muslim presence in Kosovo goes back to the time of the Ottoman’s when Islam
spread gradually among Albanians. Although the majority of Kosovo Muslims are
Albanian, other ethnic groups like Turks and Bosniaks also constitute a large number
of the Muslim population. In addition to the Sunni majority, there are small Sufi orders
active in Kosovo. According to the latest national population census organised in Kosovo
in 2011, the overwhelming majority of the population declared themselves as Muslims.
Out of a population of nearly 1.8 million people, over 95% identified as Muslims, 2.2% as
Roman Catholics, and 1.5% as Serbian Orthodox.184 There are other communities too, like
Protestants, Jews, and those who did not declare their religious affiliation.
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The interreligious harmony that was cultivated for a long time in Kosovo was disrupted
during the war of 1998–1999. Religious sites and monuments became a target of war and
retaliation. To avoid any religious favouritism, the international community introduced a
model of strict separation between state and religion. Kosovo was declared a secular state,
with no official religion and with a neutral stance on religious affairs. The Constitution
of the Republic of Kosovo incorporates three models of state-religion relations – the
American concept of the secular state, the French concept of laïcité, and state neutrality
towards religious affairs.
Apart from guarantees over freedom of religion, in the last two decades Kosovo’s authorities
have made little progress in advancing the country’s legal framework to accommodate
the emerging needs of religious communities. The only law that regulates the status of
religious communities in Kosovo is the 2006 Law on Freedom of Religion. This law, in
general, speaks about the freedom to express one’s religion and freedom of religious
association, and while it emphasises that there is no official religion in Kosovo, the law
recognises five religious groups in the country, namely the Islamic Community, the Serbian
Orthodox Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Religious Community and the
Protestant Evangelical Church. The law is framed in very broad terms, and has received
a lot of criticism for failing to properly regulate the status of religious communities. The
law does not address, for example, a critical aspect for the normal operation of religious
communities, namely the right of religious communities to acquire legal form and to gain
status as legal entities. This is of paramount importance if they are to carry out the full
range of their legitimate activities. Without legal entity status, religious communities can
only function at the most basic level.
An initiative to modify the law was taken for the first time in 2011, when a new Bill on
freedom of religion was approved by the government. However, the government withdrew
the Bill on the day that was supposed to be discussed in parliament. The same scenario
has been repeated almost every year since then as three different cabinets have tried to
modify the religious freedom law. But why do religious communities want a new law, and
most importantly why is the government failing to deliver? Part of the answer is to be
found in the legal complexities of Kosovo’s dealing with religion.
This paper proceeds in three parts. The first part elaborates the principles of the secular
state in a liberal democratic tradition. The second part provides an overview of the legal
framework on freedom of religion in Kosovo. And the last part consists of an analysis of
the struggle of policymakers to accommodate the demands of religious communities in
any prospective new law.

Secular states within the liberal democratic system
According to a study by the Pew Research Center, Kosovan Muslims, along with their
Bosnian and Albanian neighbours are among the most liberal Muslims in the world.185
Such studies have shown that Balkan Muslims have been able to embrace modernity
without abandoning their religious identity, seeing themselves as fully Muslim and fully
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European.186 This explains why the secular model was never contested in the region. In
Kosovo, the idea of a secular state was not introduced in 1999 when the country entered
a new political era. The origins of the process date back to the early days of communist
Yugoslavia, when major integration and modernisation policies were implemented in
some Muslim-populated areas, which led to rapid secularisation. This process gave birth
to an atheistic political and intellectual elite, as well as to a radical marginalisation of
the Islamic clergy. Islam was thus restricted to the private sphere: worshiping practices,
annual religious feasts, and traditional ceremonies for weddings and deaths.187
However, a secular state within a liberal democratic system is largely different from that
in the socialist system. Unlike the socialist regime, which was characterised by enforced
separation and an ideological hostility towards religion, in a liberal democratic system
the emphasis is more often on the cooperation between the state and religion. To
demonstrate this point, we may take the definition of a secular state given by Donald
Eugene Smith. According to Smith, the secular state (in a liberal democratic system) is ‘a
state that guarantees individual and collective freedom of religion, treats individuals as
citizens, regardless of their religion, is not constitutionally linked to any religion, and does
not attempt to promote or interfere in religion’.188 From this definition, Smith derives three
types of relationships: religion vis-à-vis the individual, the state vis-à-vis the individual,
and the state vis-à-vis religion.
The first relationship concerns only religion and the individual, where the principle of
freedom of religion is in effect; the individual is free to believe or not to believe in any
religion; and where individuals are free to associate in religious groups. The role of the
state in this relationship is minimal, only in the sense that it provides legal grounds to
guarantee such freedoms. The second concerns the state and the individual, where the
principle of citizenship is in effect. In other words, in a secular state, religion becomes
completely irrelevant to the definition of civic status and the rights and obligations of
citizens are equal. Here citizens are part of the sovereign body, regardless of their beliefs,
and together they give legitimacy to the law. The third relationship concerns the state and
religion, where the principle of separation is in effect. All religions are separated from the
state. Religious groups are autonomous entities; this means they are responsible for their
own organisation, they formulate their own beliefs and discipline, establish their own
institutions, and finance their own activities.189 It is this third relationship – ‘the separation
of state and religion’ – which is usually mentioned when defining the secular state, however,
Smith argues that the other two are equally important in liberal democratic traditions.
All three relationships can be found in Kosovo’s legal framework, as we will see in the
next part of this paper. However, one can find ambiguity, if not controversy, as to what
constitutional model of state–religion relationship is promoted in Kosovo. Article 8 of the
English version of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo states that ‘the Republic of
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Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs’. While the English
version uses the term ‘secular state’, the Albanian version of the same article uses the
term ‘shtet laik’ (laik is the Albanian for laïcité). So, is it possible for a state to embrace
both the secular and the laicist model? Are they the same thing? Despite similarities, some
scholars argue that the two models are different. The laicist model is seen as anti-religious
– a model that seeks freedom from religion (as illustrated by revolutionary France and
Kemalist Turkey after the demise of the Ottoman Empire), whereas the secular state seeks
to protect religions from state intervention (such as in the United States).190

The legal foundations of freedom of religion in Kosovo
In June 1999, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 1244, which
became the juridical foundation for the international administration in Kosovo. According
to Resolution 1244, the Secretary-General was requested to appoint an international
representative who became known as the Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) to Kosovo. He was in charge of a new civil administration in Kosovo, known as
United Nation Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which became the
main international civil authority. The SRSG was given full legislative, executive and legal
authority.191 In the following years, the SRSG would sign UNMIK Regulations, which were
legislative provisions; would make executive decisions and would appoint and remove
prosecutors, as well as decide when to arrest and take into custody anyone suspected of
violating the law.
One of the most important documents enacted by the head of UNMIK was the Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, which was signed by Hans Haekkerup,
the SRSG, on 15 May 2001. This document guarantees all the basic human rights, including
the right to exercise one’s religion. Article 3.1 of the Constitutional Framework states that ‘all
persons in Kosovo shall enjoy, without discrimination on any ground and in full equality,
human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Furthermore, Article 4.1 states that ‘communities
of inhabitants belonging to the same ethnic or religious or linguistic group (Communities)
shall have the rights set forth in this Chapter in order to preserve, protect and express
their ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic identities’. In addition, communities and their
members were guaranteed the right to preserve sites of religious importance (Art. 4.4.f) and
to operate religious institutions (4.4.n).192
From 2001 to 2008 there was a gradual and smooth transition of competences from
UNMIK to Kosovo’s new domestic institutions and, on 17 February 2008, Kosovo declared
its independence. The Constitution, which was adopted two months later, was based on
the Ahtisaari proposal – designed to make Kosovo a multi-ethnic and secular state in
which no ethnic or religious group would have supremacy. Therefore, to avoid any religious
favouritism, first and foremost, the Ahtisaari proposal demanded that the Constitution
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of Kosovo must affirm that Kosovo has no official religion and that it shall be neutral on
questions of religious belief. The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, which was ratified
on 9 April 2008, prescribes that ‘the Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in
matters of religious beliefs’ (Art. 8). Article 38 speaks about the freedom of conscience for
individuals, while Article 39 concerns the rights of religious communities to organise their
activities:

‘

Freedom of belief, conscience and religion is guaranteed. Freedom of
belief, conscience and religion includes the right to accept and manifest
religion, the right to express personal beliefs and the right to accept
or refuse membership in a religious community or group. No one shall
be required to practice or be prevented from practicing religion nor shall
anyone be required to make his/her opinions and beliefs public. Freedom
of manifesting religion, beliefs and conscience may be limited by law if it is
necessary to protect public safety and order or the health or rights of other
persons. (Article 38)193

‘

The Republic of Kosovo ensures and protects religious autonomy and
religious monuments within its territory. Religious denominations are free
to independently regulate their internal organization, religious activities
and religious ceremonies. Religious denominations have the right to
establish religious schools and charity institutions in accordance with this
Constitution and the law. (Article 39)194

Unlike the Constitution, which does not mention any religions by name, the only law that
speaks about religious communities in Kosovo is Law 02/L-31 on Religious Freedom in
Kosovo that was prepared by UNMIK administration in 2006.195 Article 1 concerns freedom
of religion:

‘

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This right includes the freedom to have, not to have, to retain or to change
one’s religion or belief and the freedom, either alone or in community with
others, in public or private, to manifest one’s religion or belief, in worship,
teaching, practice and observance.196

The law reemphasises that there is no official religion in Kosovo, however the law recognises
five religious groups in Kosovo. Article 5 states that:
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‘

To all religions and their communes in Kosovo including Islamic
Community of Kosovo, Serbian Orthodox Church, Catholic Church, Hebrew
Belief Community, and Evangelist Church, shall be offered any kind of
protection and opportunity in order to have rights and freedom foreseen
by this law.197

Furthermore, the law stipulates that religious communities shall independently regulate
and administer their internal organisation (Art. 7.2).
Looking at the content of the Law on Freedom of Religion, one can come to the conclusion
that the primary goal of the UNMIK administration was to acknowledge the existence of
various religions in Kosovo rather than to accommodate their needs and interests. It fails
to regulate even the most basic need of religious communities – the status of a legal
person. A religious community without the status of a legal entity may not exercise its
rights, such as owning or leasing property, maintaining bank accounts, employing workers,
or providing legal protection to the community, its members and its assets.198
Three different governments have tried to upgrade the law so far. The first attempt was in
November 2011, when the government of Kosovo approved a new draft law on freedom of
religion. On the day that the Bill was expected to be discussed in parliament, the government,
as sponsor of this law, requested that it be withdrawn for further consultations. A new
version was again approved by the government in 2012. When it was eventually brought to
parliament, it failed to receive the necessary votes.199 In 2016, the government approved yet
another draft Bill,200 which was never submitted to parliament for discussion and voting.
A more serious attempt was made by the current government, which submitted another
draft to parliament in late 2017. Eventually, in November 2018, the Kosovan parliament
approved in principle the draft law. However, the process has stagnated since, and to the
day this paper was written, the draft law has not been brought for final approval.
But this is no ordinary law. Under the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo this law falls
under the category of ‘legislation of vital interest’.201 Firstly, laws of vital interest cannot be
submitted to a referendum, according to the Constitution. And secondly, the Constitution
states that such laws shall require for their adoption, amendment or repeal both a majority
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the Constitution; Laws on the use of language; Laws on local elections; Laws on protection of
cultural heritage; Laws on religious freedom or on agreements with religious communities;
Laws on education; Laws on the use of symbols, including Community symbols and on public
holidays.
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of the Assembly deputies present and voting and a majority of the Assembly deputies who
hold seats which are reserved or guaranteed for representatives of Communities that are
not in the majority. In other words, any changes require a majority of votes from both
the Albanian majority and the non-Albanian minorities represented in parliament. The
Kosovo Assembly has 120 seats, of which 20 are guaranteed for representatives of minority
communities. Of these guaranteed seats, 10 are guaranteed for the Kosovo Serbs, and 10
for the rest of the minorities. Practically speaking therefore, the minorities can block the
amendment of this law.

How have religious communities reacted to the current draft law?
The repeated government attempts to modify the law demonstrates that the law, as
contained in the 2006 UNMIK regulation, is at best vague and at worst ineffective and as
such it needs to be changed. Although different drafts have been prepared since 2011, here
we will only focus in the content of the current draft law that is awaiting a final approval by
parliament. This draft law aims to regulate, first and foremost, the legal status of religious
communities. According to the current draft, a new state agency will be established for the
registration of religious communities as legal persons. It also regulates the manner and
conditions for the registration of a new religious community in Kosovo. The condition is
that the religious community has to have at least 50 members on the date of its registration
who are adult citizens of the Republic of Kosovo.202
The new draft law recognizes one more religious community in addition to the five religious
communities that are recognised under the UNMIK version – the Tarikat Community of
Kosovo. According to the explanatory memorandum of the law, the Tarikat Community has
about 60,000 people and has existed for 350 years in Kosovo.203
The draft law also regulates the issue of cemeteries and rites of burial. Cemetery places
shall be assigned on a neutral and non-discriminatory basis by public authorities without
the intervention of other religious communities and religious rites are to be performed
in accordance with the wish of the deceased or, in the case of a lack of his/her desire,
to be made in accordance with the desire of families/relatives of the deceased unless
it is not contrary to public order. Burials and burial rites in cemeteries are also to be
organised in a neutral way, and persons belonging to a religious or confessional minority
should not depend on persons belonging to a majority religious community for matters
related to aspects of their burial. For which the government foresees the need to issue
supplementary legislation.204
With regard to funding, the draft law says that the government shall not finance any of these
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Republic of Kosovo Assembly, ‘Draft law on amendment and supplementation of Law
no.02/L-31 on Freedom of Religion in Kosovo’, Art. 7, 10 October 2016 http://ligjet.
kuvendikosoves.org/Uploads/Data/Documents/06-L-001_pCErUBna5B.pdf
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Government of the Republic of Kosovo, ‘Explanatory Memorandum on Amendment And
Supplementation of Law No.02/L-31 on Freedom Of Religion In Kosovo’, http://ligjet.
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meSxXgzWyG.pdf
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religious communities.205 However, various tax exemptions for religious communities are
also regulated by other laws. For instance, the law on the taxation of immovable property
contains an exemption for the properties of religious institutions that are maintained and
used for religious purposes. Moreover, the draft law provides that the government may
invite religious communities to apply for funds related to the maintenance of cultural/
religious monuments which they own. The draft law also obliges religious communities
to ensure that all revenue, including via foreign donations, is processed according to the
financial legal system.
Despite its innovative approach, religious communities responded to the draft Bill in
different ways. The Islamic Community of Kosovo, for example, which is the largest
religious community and has often criticised the government for failing to change the law,
eventually objected some of the new provisions. To begin with, the Islamic Community was
against the new provision which recognises the Tarikat Community of Kosovo as a separate
religious community.206 Traditionally all Sufi orders in Kosovo have operated under the
authority of the Islamic Community, meaning that the proposed change will affect the
demographics of the Islamic Community, since Sufi Muslims would in the future register as
a separate religious community. The Islamic Community also suggested that the number
of adherents required for registration as a religious community should be raised to 500
instead of 50. This suggestion was rejected. They also proposed a new article which would
prohibit the activities of non-governmental organisations that deal with religious issues
without prior permission from the relevant religious community.207 This suggestion was
also rejected as it conflicts with the law on freedom of association.
With regard to funding, the Islamic Community suggested that the government should
allocate funds from the state budget to pay the monthly income of the community’s
employees and that the government should finance religious communities on a proportional
basis according to the number of believers.208 This request was not taken into account
either. Furthermore, the Islamic Community also requested that secondary education
include religious education in the form of elective courses. This was also rejected by the
government.
The Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church proposed that the article that
obliges religious communities to submit an annual financial statement to the Kosovo
Tax Administration be removed from the draft law. This proposal was accepted and the
article has since been deleted. The Serbian Orthodox Church proposed an article which
maintains that ‘religious communities freely manage their immovable property, dealing
to, but not limited to acts of ownership, construction, building additions, repair, and all
other work necessary for free religious life to the preservation of religious and existing
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Republic of Kosovo Assembly, ‘Draft law on amendment and supplementation of Law
no.02/L-31 on Freedom of Religion in Kosovo’, 10 October 2016, Art. 12, http://ligjet.
kuvendikosoves.org/Uploads/Data/Documents/06-L-001_pCErUBna5B.pdf
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B. Bislimi, ‘Drejt ligjësimit të bashkësive fetare, BIK-u i pakënaqur’, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, 1 October 2016, http://www.evropaelire.org/a/28026050.html
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buildings owned by religious communities. For such actions religious communities do not
need special permission or approval by the competent body’.209 This proposal was not
taken into account.210

Conclusions
The secular state is not a new concept for Kosovan society, given that Kosovo operated
within the secular system of socialist Yugoslavia for more than five decades. However, as this
article has shown, there are differences between a secular state under a socialist system,
and a secular state under a liberal democratic system. While the former is characterised
by separation – with an ideological hostility towards religion, which relegates religious
authorities to the background and protects the state from any religious influence – the
secular state in a liberal democratic tradition, while also characterised by the separation
of church and state, is also about the cooperation between the two. But the cooperation
between the state and religion in Kosovo has not developed beyond formal recognitions.
Religious communities are regulated by a law is very broadly defined and therefore
ineffective. The law currently fails even to grant communities legal personhood. Operating
without the status of a legal entity means facing difficulties in property ownership; in
maintaining bank accounts; employing workers; and providing legal protection to the
community, its members and its assets. The repeated failures of policymakers to upgrade
the law shows the complexities involved in regulating religion in Kosovo. The system
introduced by the international community may have been appropriate for protecting the
rights of religious minorities in a post-conflict era. Today it raises the question of state
pragmatism in delivering the needs of its communities, including religious communities.

209

Ibid. p. 35
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Ibid. p. 34. No justification was given in the explanatory memorandum for refusing this
proposal other than ‘the proposal was not taken into account’.
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Religions as loci of conflict prevention: local
capacities of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s religious
communities
By Julianne Funk, PhD 211

Introduction
Conflict and coexistence remain in a tense balance in the Western Balkans. Latent conflict,
in which one’s ethno-religious community denotes which side you are on, persist after
the violent breakup of Yugoslavia. These frozen and potential lines of conflict were laid
decades and centuries ago, when religious affiliation diversified. At the same time, these
religious, ethnic and national communities have a history of suživot: everyday relations
with one another, or coexistence. The close geographic proximity of communities makes
functional relational systems, which determine when, where and how people tend to
interact, a practical necessity.212 As a result of this necessity to coexist, religions in the
Western Balkans usually perceive ‘decent’, neighbourly behaviour and friendly relations
with ethno-religious others as a sign of faith (Funk Deckard 2012, Funk 2013).
Both conflict and coexistence signal relationship; as the peace scholar-practitioner John
Paul Lederach puts it, ‘relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its long-term
solution’ (1997, 26). In the post-war setting of Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, relationship
with one’s former opponents is generally unwanted and even avoided. Ethnic cleansing in
wartime successfully segregated Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethno-religious communities
in terms of geography and the violent methods produced emotional segregation. Social
segregation, however, fails to engage the basic fact of relatedness within the state structure,
not to mention a shared history and future. This choice to not relate may seek to avoid
conflict, but it can also limit opportunities for change. Notably, the country is currently
stuck in polarised, nationally oriented politics, hindering necessary reforms. Citizens and
external observers commonly see these stalled reforms and oppositional politics as a
major obstacle to the country’s development and the well-being of all its people.
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A well-known example is the practice of visiting neighbours and friends from other ethnic
groups on their religious holidays. However, this practice requires particular care: Christians
would make halal cakes for their Muslim visitors on Christian holidays or Muslims would
attend the Christmas mass, but only after all their Christians neighbours had found space
within the church.
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Trusted religions in a distrustful society
On the one hand, relationship-blocking behaviours are often interest-based: a protectionist
agenda pitting ‘us’ against ‘them’ is a proven strategy for maintaining positions of political
and religious power. On the other hand, these behaviours are also based upon and
supported by feelings and attitudes remaining from war experiences. A key one of these is
a fundamental distrust that pervades the relations that do exist across communities, but
also between people from the same ethnic group (UNDP 2009). As such, the social fabric
is worn thin. The average local resists considering an ‘opposing’ perspective as viable and
the context is polarised such that one often feels compelled to position oneself against the
other or risk losing one’s own communal belonging (Volkan 1997). Individual and collective
trauma from the war left its imprint of fear and helplessness; some residents would rather
cope with the indirect, structural violence of the current political and economic situation
rather than risk a return to direct violence by protesting the status quo. Meanwhile, each
community has developed and adopted a story of suffering and victimhood at the hands
of the other(s), which further distances groups from engaging (Moll 2013).
This distrust extends to public institutions as well. In 2015, around half of Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s citizens continued to distrust government institutions, while 77.2% distrust
political parties. On the contrary, religious institutions have the highest level of trust
(65.2% of citizens surveyed), with NGOs following close behind (63.4%) (Analitika 2015).
The salience of religious institutions, therefore, raises the potential for them to have
impact and influence upon the post-war social context. The collectivist and protective
characteristics of the three main religions in the Balkans, pointed out by religious scholar
Paul Mojzes (2003), may explain this social trust. The collectivist characteristic, in which
‘the main relationship is not of the individual with God but the collective with God’ (ibid, 5),
binds the believer to the community. The protective role of religious leaders being ‘pastor
or shepherd … responsible for the flock’s survival’ (ibid) is likely to inspire profound trust.
Lederach’s call for relational reconciliation as conflict prevention
This paper draws attention to the capacity of trusted and morally authoritative religions
to support the necessary transformation of destroyed relationships in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It highlights local religious actors and initiatives working to transform these
social dynamics by non-violently and constructively ‘engaging’ communities rather than
‘disentangling’ or ‘minimizing’ contact between groups (Lederach 1997, 26). Lederach’s
widely accepted assertion in peace and conflict studies/praxis, is that encounter is crucial
for truth and reconciliation. An opportunity to not only express one’s trauma, loss and
grief, the pain of the memories and the anger at the injustice to the other, but also to be
heard by the other can provide validation of one’s story and emotions. Acknowledgement
of the other’s suffering ‘represents the first step toward restoration of the person and
the relationship’ (ibid) and is usually missing after armed conflict. Too often such
activities of personal expression and listening are limited to high-stakes court cases or
public commemorations. Religious actors, on the other hand, are able to host low-stakes
encounters without legal repercussions. The focus of sharing is on personal experience
rather than collective narratives and positions, however, to avoid the danger of exclusive
narratives about the past. Lederach therefore rejects the influential idea that separating
parties prevents violence. While separation can provide crucial initial security from direct
violence, it is not a sustainable, long-term method for positive peace.
Besides expressing and acknowledging the past, Lederach points further to the need to
envision a shared future, since ‘[i]n all contemporary internal conflicts, the futures of
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those who are fighting are ultimately and intimately linked and interdependent’ (ibid, 27).
Imagining a shared future is next to impossible without an acceptance of relationship
and a willingness to relate, both of which require dealing with deep fears and vulnerable
hopes. Lederach’s ‘reconciliation-as-encounter’ claims that acknowledging the past (truth)
and envisioning the future are ‘the necessary ingredient[s] for reframing the present’ (ibid).
Religious actors and communities can provide a safe and trustworthy environment plus
trauma-sensitive methods to foster a meaningful and hopefully transformative encounter.
Transforming how residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina relate with each other should help
break the cycle of violence, therefore preventing future violent conflict.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s challenge to religious peacebuilding
While religions are well placed and socially empowered to encourage relational
reconciliation, they are also known to have endorsed wartime violence and some continue
to shore up divisions and indirect violence through supporting national positions and
agendas. Religious institutions rarely oppose national platforms and policies that
structurally and culturally discriminate against ethnic others/minorities, even though all
three groups’ teachings prioritise treating one’s neighbour with equal if not greater care
and respect than one’s own group members. For many secular actors working for peace,
religious institutions and actors have therefore been highly suspect in their attempts at
multi-ethnic, civic initiatives. Only recently has ‘religious peacebuilding’ been recognised
by secular organisations and governments as a valuable contribution, primarily, again,
due to the significant role religions play in people’s lives and the trust they inspire.213
What follows are a small study from Bosnia & Herzegovina of such relationship-building
religious peacebuilding (see Funk Deckard 2012 for these and other examples).

Religious peacebuilding for conflict prevention in Bosnia and Herzegovina
This section focuses on four cases of faith-based civil-society initiatives for peace located
in an ethnically divided setting, where religions lie at the fault lines of conflict. The author
focuses on these ‘track three’ or grassroots initiatives rather than elite level, track one
phenomena primarily due to the all-too-frequent complicity of religious actors in national
agendas that do not prioritise rebuilding inter-ethnic relations.214 As Spahić Šiljak and
Funk have noted (2018, 112), there seems to be an overall ‘lack of interest among religious
communities themselves’ to develop religious peacebuilding. For example, the Islamic
Community has no office of peacemaking nor does it educate its teachers or imams in
conflict transformation, while the Serbian Orthodox Church requires a special blessing
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Other characteristics of religions are increasingly being explored for their positive
contributions. One example is the benefit of religiosity or faith for resilience, or is the ability
to bounce back emotionally and psychologically from extreme stress, which is key for mental
health and recovering or healing from trauma. Another is the role of meditation or prayer
(e.g. especially in Islamic prayers which include movement) for de-stressing. Yet another is
the social connectedness and support that religious traditions and communities can provide.
(see Hayward 2018; Taylor 2019)
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Even at the civil-society level, faith-based actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina have nearly
always chosen to situate themselves within secular organisations because of the stigma
linking religions with conservative agendas and/or nationalism (and therefore, contrary to
social cohesion, dialogue and human rights objectives).
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(blagoslov) for any official link of the faith tradition with peace projects (ibid). ‘Practically
speaking, therefore, religious peacebuilders must be in line with the church’s position, a
position that does not promote peacebuilding and reconciliation’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, two
institutional-level initiatives should be noted before moving to the four civil-society cases:
one old, with questionable results, and one newer, exhibiting early signs of effectiveness.
The Interreligious Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina arose soon after the war on the
initiative of international actors,215 (Merdjanova and Brodeur 2009) with the idea that the
heads of four of the country’s religions (Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox and Jewish) would
represent their communities in interreligious dialogue and negotiations as well as
oversee local projects (ibid., 64). For many years, the Council has been known primarily
to issue statements against violent acts and to appear together in the media. While not
underestimating the significant symbolic power of these acts, the Council is not known for
proactive efforts at rebuilding relations in the country. Additionally, as this article goes to
print, the author has learned that top religious representatives (the Riyaset of the Islamic
Community and the Metropolitan of Orthodox Dobar-Bosnia) have obstructed a USAIDfunded local project to train religious teachers and priests/imams from the three main
religious communities in peace education. Surprisingly, the Interreligious Council did not
assist, intervene, or in any way facilitate the project, whose aims the Council shares, but
instead declined to get involved due to the ‘sensitive’ nature of the situation.216
A new and promising initiative is a new master’s program on Interreligious Studies and
Peacebuilding implemented jointly by three university theology faculties: the Faculty of
Islamic Studies; the Catholic Theological Faculty at the University of Sarajevo and the
Serbian Orthodox Faculty St Basil of Ostrog of the University of East Sarajevo. This project
arose from a query made by the international head of Catholic Relief Services for how
best to support interfaith peace in the country. Drawing MA students from a variety of
disciplines, the classes are held at the three locations with theology and other professors
of relevant fields (especially conflict and peace studies). The programme seeks to provide
a ‘unique opportunity for a clear positioning of religions as sources and catalysts of peace
and for religious institutions to profile themselves as advocates of a more just and better
society’ (ESITIS 2019). One generation has graduated to date.
The rest of this article is dedicated to religious actors who, while not always speaking
officially for their religious communities, have a clear influence at the local level and also
through their international engagements and with their global religious communities.
Given the lacuna at the institutional level, they provide the most notable faith-based
activity with the aim of preventing conflict.
A Serbian Orthodox Abbot builds trust in Herzegovina
Father Danilo was sent by the Serbian Orthodox Church to the Herzegovinian village of
Žitomislić to reconstruct the 16th century monastery destroyed during the war and facilitate
the ‘return of Orthodox priests to the Neretva Valley’ (Ramadanović 2011). However, he saw
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The World Conference of Religions for Peace was the initiator with the support of the Mercy
Corps, the United States Institute of Peace, etc.
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Another reason given was the level of ‘time and energy’ required with ‘a very questionable
outcome’, despite the Council’s acknowledgement that ‘the idea is generally good and bearing
in mind USAID's support to our work’ (as per communication of the Executive Board to the
local Country Director of the project).
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this not only as a material task, but also recognised the key aspect of simultaneously
building relationships within the local community, which carries a history of violence
against its resident Orthodox Serbs during the 1990s and the Second World War. Contact
between the majority Croats and minority Serbs of the village was consequently minimal
to none when he arrived.
Fra Danilo pleasantly surprised locals by attending Roman Catholic Christmas and Mass,
inviting Catholic priests to his Orthodox Mass, having Croats and Muslims at Orthodox
Christmas and Easter celebrations, visiting the mosque for Bajram and even welcoming
the Muslim muftija to speak at his church. These actions broke the status quo of distanced
relations and non-interaction and have been generally welcomed. In Fra Danilo’s words:

‘

From the first day we were open to everyone and we tried to make contact
with all the people from the surrounding area, considering it the best way
for the Church to be a witness. Today Žitomislić is recognizable precisely
by the fact that people are glad to come to here no matter to what religion
they belong. … I am most delighted with the fact that we are fully integrated
… and that people experience us as their own (Pavlović 2012).

Fra Danilo’s accessible Easter messages in Bosnian newspapers, explaining Orthodox
traditions and the meaning of the holiday also encourage ‘the previously common
experience of knowing one’s neighbor’s religion and traditions and celebrating with
him/her on holidays’ (Funk 2019, 153). Such actions characterise the local flavour of
coexistence called suživot, demonstrating engagement with rather than withdrawal from
strained relationships. Fra Danilo recognises his influential role, saying religious leaders
must be wise and responsible in their political engagement. ‘[T]he Church is faced with
a great temptation, but also the challenge to use its only trump card, which is to be …
the declaration of the kingdom of heaven on earth. More than anywhere else, the Church
in Bosnia should preach the gospel truths about the equality of all nations and people’
(Pavlović 2012).
Krajina imams engaging interreligious leadership and youth in transformation
After their personal experience of wartime violence in Sanski Most, Vahidin Omanović
and Mevludin Rahmanović have sought to turn it into a city of peace. The two imams’
own stories of transformation from the pain, trauma, anger, and desire for revenge to
openness, trust, hope and courageous activism are the backbone of their work at the Center
for Peacebuilding (Centar za Izgradnju Mira, or CIM). For both individually, their Muslim
faith was not only key to their individual transformations, but ‘Islam and the revelation’
continues to be the ‘main source’ and ‘motivation’ for their peace work. Mevludin claims
he personally ‘cannot see a difference between being an imam and doing peace work except that this peace work is much more important’. 217 Both cite the Prophet Mohammed
as an inspiration for non-violent social change and openness to others and the two aim to
demonstrate Islam as a path of peace.
After years of effort, CIM initiated an Interreligious Council (with Catholic and Orthodox
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priests and the head imam) in Sanski Most. On the one hand, Vahidin notes that many
people do not believe faith and peacebuilding are compatible, and yet when it happens,
they are deeply impressed. ‘Our example shows that it is not only possible, but [it] is even
adding value to the peace work,’ he reflects. Mevludin voiced the challenge of drawing
non-Muslims into their work in a Bosniak/Muslim-majority town in the Federation. People
outside are suspicious and resist. They find it ‘hard to accept that we can fight equally for
Serb, Croat and Bosniak rights…. [since the dominant] narrative is pro-Bosniak’. Distrust
also seems to stand in the way of the Interreligious Council’s current attempts to engage
with religious leaders in the neighbouring Serb-majority town, Prijedor.
CIM’s Peace Camps also stand out as events that are changing the post-war landscape of
the country. These annual camps for youths from all ethnic backgrounds provide a safe
space to interact across segregated nationalities, the opportunity to consider their own
groups’ stories, stereotypes and prejudices and also envision a new future of positive
relationship. Of particular note is the explicit consideration of religious identity, which
tends to function as an ethnic marker more often than as a sign of personal faith. The
two imams explain their own, opposite relationships with religion as: a critical stance
to ethnic belonging alongside a wholehearted and clear religious vocation for peace. As
Vahidin expressed it to me in 2008, ‘I believe this [peacebuilding] is one of the reasons why
God gave me this breath of life’. CIM’s Peace Camps are sustainable in that they not only
engage the next generation, making them into leaders, but these young people are often
transformed by their encounter with each other and the challenging topics they work
through together. Every year, multiple peace activists emerge dedicated to their country
and a life together and CIM follows up with them after they go home to continue to have
an impact there.
A Bosnian Franciscan priest uses music as a ‘bridge of souls’ (Pontanima)
Central Bosnian Franciscans have been recognised as the front-runners and ‘most vocal
faith-based peace activists’ (Spahić Šiljak and Funk 2018, 112) in Bosnia and Herzegovina
both during and after the war of the 1990s and Friar Ivo Marković is perhaps the most known
religious peace activist. Fra Ivo understands the ‘experience of conversion and the grace of
God’ as ‘forgotten potentials for peace’ within religions, because one can change direction
to follow God’s ‘way of love, peace, forgiveness, goodness and good deeds’ (Tanenbaum
2007, 116). Fra Ivo claims his own actions are ‘a sign of the experience of grace’.
The ‘core’ of Fra Ivo’s work is cooperating with faith-motivated people from different
religious traditions ‘to collectively promote peace and spiritual healing’ (ibid., 115). This is
fundamentally about engaging similarly peace-oriented people, providing a bridge through
believers themselves into the ethnic communities.218 For himself and these believers:

‘

Faith is a personal experience, and not the passion that comes from
belonging to a group … In my opinion, the tragedy of the Balkans stemmed
from replacement of personal faith with the passions of belonging to
the group. That is the fundamental question for the traditional Balkan
religions of Catholicism, Orthodoxy and Islam’ (ibid., 116).
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The author has noted another such bridge formed through the regional network Vjernici za
mir (Believers for Peace): http://www.vjernicizamir.org/
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Fra Ivo initiated the Pontanima Interreligious Choir during the war to bring together singers
from all religious (and non-religious) backgrounds to sing religious music from various
traditions. The choir has sung for audiences all over the world. Pontanima’s concerts
provide opportunities to hear and be touched by ‘enemy songs’. According to trauma
healing and peacebuilding experts Randy and Amela Puljek-Shank (2008, 147):

‘

In listening to the choir the healing enters in the space that is most sacred,
i.e. religious identity. These songs create space for listening to the other
that otherwise would not happen. The choir brings an especially strong
message of healing when it performs in the towns and cities that have
experienced massacres on a large scale’.

Fra Ivo claims that audiences are positively shocked when the feared unknown becomes
intimate and prompts reflection (Conrad 2009, 5). The music provides a gentle but firm
insistence upon the need to change attitudes that are inconsistent with the beauty of this
‘mosaic of fine art’ (ibid).
A Sarajevo Muslim peace educator pushes believer activism into civil society
Amra Pandžo became a peace activist during the siege of Sarajevo and her life’s work is
changing the common characterisation of Islam as violent to Islam as a religion of peace
(Funk Deckard 2012). She points to the Arabic letters for Islam – s, l and m – as the same as
those for the word peace, selam. ‘Islam then means peacebuilding (as a verb), selam (as
a greeting) means peace be with you, [and] to be a Muslim – means to be a peacebuilder’
(Pandžo 2010, 4).
Amra’s sees her faith as not only a ‘deep motivation and strength,’ but she also believes
her work for peace is ‘the path to be saved’ (Spahić Šiljak and Funk 2018, 114). However,
like others working from a faith-basis, Amra has struggled against being marginalised in
the civic sphere. ‘Everything related to nationalism or, God forbid, religiosity was removed
from civil society’ she reports (Spahić Šiljak 2014, 290). Like others, her NGO ‘Small Steps’
is officially secular even though she and most of her staff are believers (Christians and
Muslims). Like the two imams, Amra sees the mixing of faith and peace activism not only
as complementary but something greater in combination, and she explores this in her
practice and research.
Amra published a Manual for the Teachers of Islamic Religion on the Peaceful Dimensions
of Islam (2008) in Bosnia and Herzegovina containing stories of non-violent action from
the Islamic tradition, which she has distributed to more than 900 public school teachers of
Muslim religious education along with training them in its classroom use. Her intention with
this religious peace education tool is to expose young people to a ‘peaceful interpretation
of the sacred text of Islam’ and encourage an understanding of ‘faith as a bridge to others’
(Pandžo 2010, 5). While this notable initiative seeks to deal with the controversial issue of
confessional religion taught in public schools from within the Muslim community itself,
the manual has unfortunately received no official support from the Islamic Community of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Funk Deckard 2012).
Amra is also regularly engaged in interreligious projects outside the country. For example,
the author discussed her own experience of being welcomed as a Christian to regularly
attend prayers at a Sarajevo mosque with Amra’s group of Albanian and Serb women from
a divided town in Kosovo. We then visited a mosque and a church to learn about and feel
comfortable in those spaces together. As such, Amra’s work is primarily about relating and
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bridging divides between people, in line with Lederach’s theory that engagement is more
effective at transforming current and preventing future conflict than minimising contact
or segregation.

Conclusion
Highlighted here are the sustained efforts to develop relationships of trust by a Serbian
Orthodox Abbot in Herzegovina, two imams from Krajina, a central Bosnian Catholic priest
and a Sarajevan Muslim peace educator. Each of these cases demonstrates a method for
turning conflict-avoiding behaviour into engagement; they facilitate safe, even healing
spaces for encountering the ‘feared other’, through religious traditions, rituals, music
and identities, and providing practices that empower the conflict-averse with non-violent
strategies of relating. At the same time, they explain their actions according to their
own religious frameworks, which support attitudes and behaviours of trust, forgiveness,
and love. Consequently, we can see ways in which religious communities in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the region as a whole possess a capacity for preventing violent conflict as
well as the ability to drive conflict towards violence. As a wise story about two inner wolves
reveals at its end, the one who wins this struggle is the one you feed.

Papers delivered to the conference

125

References
Analitika – Center for Social Research. 2015. Fact Sheet. Survey Results: The Trend of
Citizens’ Distrust in Political Parties and Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina Continues.
http://www.analitika.ba/sites/default/files/publikacije/povjerenja_gradana_u_vlast_
eng.pdf
Conrad, Keziah, ed. 2009. Portrait of Pontanima. Sarajevo: Interreligijska Služba Oči u
Oči.
European Society for Intercultural Theology and Interreligious Studies (ESITIS). 2019.
Interreligious Education for Peace. Roundtable at the ESITIS Conference, The Hope and
Despair of Religions. Exploring the Nexus of Theory and Praxis, 24-27 April, Sarajevo.
Funk Deckard, Julianne. 2012. ‘Invisible’ Believers for Peace: Religion and Peacebuilding
in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unpublished dissertation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,
Belgium. https://www.academia.edu/19817236/Invisible_Believers_for_Peace._Religion_
and_Peacebuilding_in_Postwar_Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Funk, Julianne. 2013. Women and the Spirit of Suživot in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina. In
Spirituality of Balkan Women, ed. N. Furlan Štante & M. Harcet, 171-184. Koper, Slovenia:
Univerzitetna Založba Annales.
Funk, Julianne. 2019. Bosnian Diaspora Experiences of Suživot or Traditional Coexistence:
Bosanski Lonac, American Melting Pot or Swiss Fondue? In Both Muslim and European:
Diasporic and Migrant Identities of Bosniaks, ed. Dževada Šuško, 150-164. Leiden: Brill.
Hayward, Susan. 2018. Enduring War and Enduring Peace: Religion and Resilience.
Paper presented at the ‘Religion and Culture in Conflict and Peace Conference,’ University
of Winchester, 21 June.
Lederach, John Paul. 1997. Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Merdjanova, Ina, and Patrice Brodeur. 2009. Religion as a Conversation Starter.
Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans. London: Continuum.
Mojzes, Paul. 2003. Interview by Mitja Velikonja. The Role of Religions and Religious
Communities in the Wars in Ex-Yugoslavia 1991-1999. Religion in Eastern Europe 23
(August): 1-42.
Moll, Nicolas. 2013. Fragmented memories in a fragmented country: memory competition
and political identity-building in today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nationalities Papers.
The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 41, no. 6: 910-935.
Pandžo, Amra (ed.). 2008. Manuel for the Teachers of Islamic Religion the Peaceful
Dimensions of Islam. Sarajevo: Organization for Dialogue in Family and Society ‘Small
Steps’.
Pandžo, Amra. 2010. On the Path to Peace. Peace Office Newsletter 40 (July-September):
4-5.
Pavlović, Fra Danilo. 2012. Razgovor s ocem Danilom Pavlovićem, igumanom manastira
Žitomislić [Interview with Father Danilo Pavlović, abbot of Žitomislić monastery]. Katolička

126

ROLE OF RELIGION
IN THE WESTERN BALKANS’ SOCIETIES

Tiskovna Agencija, 18 January. http://www.ktabkbih.net/info.asp?id=31753
Puljek-Shank, Amela, and Randy Puljek-Shank. 2008. The Contribution of Trauma
Healing to Peacebuilding in Southeast Europe. In Peacebuilding in Traumatized Societies,
edited by Barry Hart, 155–183. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Ramadanović, Jusuf. 2011. Orthodox seat in Mostar revived. Southeastern European
Times, 26 January.
Spahić Šiljak, Zilka. 2014. Shining Humanity – Life Stories of Women Peace-builders in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Spahić Šiljak, Zilka, and Julianne Funk. 2018. Bringing Faith into the Practice of Peace.
Muslim Paths to Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Reconciliation in Global
Context: Why It Is Needed and How It Works, ed. B. Krondorfer, 105-127. New York: SUNY
University Press.
Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding. 2007. ‘Would You Shoot Me,
You Idiot?: Friar Ivo Marković’. In Peacemakers in Action: Profiles of Religion in Conflict
Resolution, edited by David Little, 97–122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
United Nations Development Programme. 2009. The Ties that Bind. Social Capital in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo: UNDP.
Volkan, Vamik. 1997. Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux.
White, Taylor. 2019. Science and religion can work together to boost mental health
outcomes. National Association of Science Writers, 19 March. https://www.nasw.org/
article/science-and-religion-can-work-together-boost-mental-health-outcomes?fbclid=I
wAR0llAKneeBcyeErNvJSrvZGT6lsAdBaJNXnifNAF1fJcrBJwW94JpLAidU

Papers delivered to the conference

127

“Islamic tradition”: questioning the Bosnian model
Zora Hesová219, Charles University, Prague

Introduction
Debates over whether there can be a ‘European Islam’ have not ceased since 1990s when the
term was coined by Bassam Tibi. Decried as an assimilationist imposition on Muslims for
whom Islam does not bear adjectives, it still lives on in other forms, such as in Emmanuel
Macron’s ‘Islam of France’. Since the mid-2000s the case of the ‘other European Muslims’ in
the Balkans has attracted attention and questioning: are there not already autochthonous
European Muslim communities with an experience of existing within secular state?220
Indeed, the oldest of these communities and its form of the religion, ‘Bosnian Islam’, has
since been held up as a potential model for other European Muslims and their relation to
modern secular states.221
When Riada Asimović Akyol recently wrote in the Atlantic that ‘the history and practice
of Bosnian Islam yields a number of noteworthy lessons for those seeking to cultivate a
liberal Islam in Europe’, she identified such a liberal version of Islam with the Bosniak’s
acceptance of the modern state during Austro-Hungarian rule, in the administrative
centralisation of its institutions, in the prominence of Islamic modernism in Bosnia and
in history of secularisation – in short, the Bosniak’s adaptability to modernity and secular
contexts is a model to be imitated.
This paper aims to question the idea of a ‘progress towards a liberal Islam’ as being
too straightforward by providing historical, political and also intellectual context to the
practice of Islam in Bosnia and, above all, by analysing the present logic of looking for a
particular Islamic identity. I will propose a reflection on what the ‘Bosnian model’ might
mean in three steps – defining the Bosnian model; placing it in historical context; and
reconstructing the context of the contemporary Islamic community’s efforts to define the
Bosnian Islamic tradition and assessing its results.
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A Bosnian model for Europe?
The attractiveness of the Bosnian model is based on two main factors: first, it represents
a modernised sort of Islamic practice while being autochthonous and legitimate, and
second, it has the potential to become a template for other Muslim communities. Asimović
Akyol points to Bosnian’s capacity for ‘embracing modernity without abandoning religious
identity’ and highlights that an ‘institutionalized, centralized form of Islam can be highly
successful, as seen in the case of the Islamic Community’ of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Acknowledging the impossibility of replicating concrete institutions elsewhere, she is
nonetheless confident that Bosnia can indeed function as a positive example of how Islam
and Europe, are ‘far from incompatible – in fact, they have been intertwined for centuries’.222
French historian Xavier Bougarel agrees that ‘all of these debates can be boiled down to
a central issue: that of the relationship between Islam and Western modernity’.223 In his
view, Bosnia clearly presents tendencies towards a kind of European Islamic modernity.
Its major proponent, Fikret Karčić, is also the author of the influential definition of the
‘Bosnian Islamic tradition’, which in his view comprises five key elements: 1) Hanafi–
Maturidi doctrinal belonging; 2) Ottoman–Islamic cultural heritage; 3) the Islamisation
of pre-Ottoman practices; 4) the tradition of Islamic reformism in the interpretation of
Islam; 5) the institutionalisation of Islam in the form of the Islamic Community; and 6) the
practice of expression of Islam in a secular state.224
In Bougarel’s view from the mid-2000s, Karčić’s vision of ‘individualised Islam in a secular
state’, represented one possible trajectory among others including, identifying Islam as a
‘common culture’, and a politicised vision of Islam as a nationalist ideology. These were,
implicitly, in competition. In Bougarel’s analysis, the first position would not necessarily win
out. Karčić’s vision was influenced by the former Yugoslav secular and reformist framework,
whereas the other visions were motivated by the necessities of the new political context:
a need for national identity and for national mobilisation.
Increasingly, Bosnians themselves have presented their Muslim practice as an explicit
model for Europe. In Zagreb in 2006, Mustafa Cerić – Reis ul-ulema (the elected leader of
Bosnian Muslims) from 1993 to 2012 – presented his vision in his Declaration of European
Muslims,225 in which he called for mutual tolerance and respect and a development of
European Islamic institutions. The declaration was noticed in Europe: Bosnian Islam was
portrayed in Germany as ‘a model for Muslims in Europe’.226
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Reis Hussein Kavazović, his successor, systematically speaks of Bosniaks, as the
autochthonous European Muslims. In his lecture at the University of Pecs in 2016,227 he
gave elaborate exposition as to what makes Bosniaks European and Muslim at the same
time. Firstly, their Islamic tradition in terms of law, since the Ottomans bestowed ‘the
most flexible’ of the four schools of Islam on the Balkans. Secondly, the fact that Bosniaks
did not ‘become Turks’ but retained local customs such as outdoor prayers and never
took to polygamy. Thirdly, the occupation by Austria-Hungary in 1878 meant the end of
a ‘traditional form of religious and ethnic self-isolation’ and the necessity of religious
and intellectual dialogue with another civilisation. It meant ‘confrontation’ with, and
‘reflection’ upon various styles of thinking, governing and social conduct. It finally resulted
into a process of ‘securing an autonomy’ within this new modern world by building a selfgoverning religious institution. Finally, since Bosniaks ceased to be subjects of universal
empires and became a part of a periphery, European identity has come to represent a
‘universal’ anchorage for them. Reis Kavazović refers to Bosnian religious intellectuals who
highlight the need for the ‘meeting between religion and science’ (H. Neimarlija), and the
necessity of a secular state (F. Karčić) and of a ‘dialogical consciousness’ (E. Karić).
Another prominent Bosnian Islamic figure, the former director of the Institute of the
Islamic Tradition of the Bosniaks Dr. Dževada Šuško, presents a similar self-understanding
of Bosnian Islam as European in her German text, ‘A model for Europe? History and Practice
of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, from 2017. While echoing the historical background
outlined by Dr. Kavazović, she elaborates on two other aspects: the tradition of Bosnian
Islamic reformist thought and the nature of the Islamic institutions. Bosnian traditional
clerics and modernist intellectuals helped namely to absorb ‘the civilizational shock’ of
losing the status of subjects of a universal religious leader (the caliph) and becoming a
religious minority under a Catholic emperor. In 1882 the Grand Mufti permitted Muslims
to serve in the Austrian army, and in 1884 the Tuzla mufti declared that it was permitted
under lslamic law to live in the Christian state. The social consequences of modernisation,
such as the presence of women in public places, the schooling of girls etc. became
controversial. Often, a strong Islamic case was made for modernisation and a leading
reformist, Džemaludin Čaušević, was elected as reis. The Islamic reformist tradition became
the basis of the Islamic revival from 1970s.
The Islamic Community (IC) became a ‘substantial part of the religious identity of the
Bosniaks’ (Šuško 2017). It offers itself as a model: it is self-financed, self-administered
and ‘half-democratic’. All important positions are filled through elections – direct at the
level of the džemat (local community) and indirect at higher levels, including the reis. The
IC in Bosnia and Herzegovina is ruled by a modernised constitution. Dževada Šuško also
highlights the centralised nature of the IC: all imams are nominated at the local level and
appointed directly by the reis. Imams and religious teachers are educated in six secondary
lslamic schools and three university faculties. As a result of the representative and
centralised nature of the IC, the institution is stable, adaptable and most importantly, she
notes, was able to withstand the danger of radicalisation. Indeed, due to its complex and
adaptable structure, the IC was largely able to impose its central authority on all mosques
and most informal fundamentalist groups, and continues to enjoy concrete legitimacy
among the faithful it serves and represents.
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Bosnian Islamic institutions in historical context
When Reis Kavazović says that the main heritage of the Bosniaks is their ‘religious
foundation and institutionalisation within the IC’, he may be supporting the optimistic
assessments of those who think that Bosnian Islam may be a direct model for Europe.
Yet traditions and institutions are organically grown social phenomena. When looking
at the ‘Bosnian model’ in its historical context, it becomes evident that modernisation,
institutionalisation, self-governance etc. are results of mostly non-linear, complex and
agonistic historical processes that could well have had very different outcomes.
One example is the above-mentioned proposal of former reis Mustafa Cerić. Alongside his
declaration of 2006, he engaged in many-faceted public diplomacy and spoke on behalf
on European Muslims in the aftermath of dramatic situations, in a moment when the
European Muslim diaspora had no recognisable representatives. He made a strong case
for the mutual recognition of Islam and secularism, for the institutionalisation of Muslim
communities in Europe and even for a single Muslim authority in Europe.228 The project was
unrealistic at the time, which Reis Cerić has since acknowledged. While European states
awkwardly work towards institutionalisation, or rather, a ‘churchification’ of Islam, there is
no clear end in sight for this process.229
Institutions, as well as theological consensus and identities, develop in conflicts with
unknown outcomes. It was not otherwise in Bosnia. Institutional autonomy, reformism
and the acceptance of secularism were as much products of circumstance as results of
intentional action.
Bosnian Muslims accepted their new existence as a minority within a Christian Empire
with reluctance. Even after accepting the Habsburg legacy and modernisation as a part of
their identity, Bosniaks continue to speak about the period as an occupation. After 1878,
Bosnian Muslim lived through what has come to be known expressively as ‘a civilizational
shock’. The ceding of administrative control of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary
by the Ottomans at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was mitigated by promises of religious
autonomy and continued attachment to the formal sovereignty of the Ottoman caliph.
However, in 1882 the Austrian emperor created the office of reis ul-ulema, in order to
detach Bosnians from the control of the Ottoman Sultan-caliph in Istanbul and elevating
the pro-Austrian mufti of Sarajevo to the office.
Later, when Bosnian Muslims mobilised for religious and administrative autonomy (1899–
1909) alongside Balkan nationalist movements, they wanted to return under the jurisdiction
of the caliph. Their demand for autonomy was primarily defensive – spurred on by the
Austrian state’s exploitation of Islamic endowments, forceful modernisation and by a fear
of Catholic proselytising. This mobilisation for autonomy was eventually vindicated after
the official incorporation annexation of Bosnia by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908,
and then after the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey by Atatürk in 1924.
Similarly complex was the destiny of modernist theology in the Bosnian identity. The fatwas
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in favour of continued life under a Christian emperor and serving in his army were responses
to almost existential crises – a large exodus of up to a fifth of the Muslim population, and
an uprising against a military draft. The ability of Muslim law to pragmatically interpret
precedents in Islamic history helped to save Bosniaks as a nation. Even more telling is
the later fate of modernist thought. In the effervescent interwar period, young Muslim
intellectuals were bringing in modernist ideas from Cairo and Istanbul and campaigned
for social reforms. A series of intellectual battles were fought between modernists and
traditionalists in their respective spheres. While many outspoken modernists could count
among themselves prominent personalities, such as the first Bosnian-chosen reis Čaušević,
they by no means were winning the culture war. In fact, Bosnia proved difficult for the
Austrian rulers to modernise. While benefiting from Austrian sponsorship of higher Islamic
education, Bosnian Muslim institutions managed to resist and stall many modernising
policies from traditionalist positions, such as women’s schooling (at a time when universal
schooling was law in the rest of the Austrian Empire). On the matter of female full veiling,
the modernising reis also lost the battle and was criticised for being too impressed by the
reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.230 In Bosnia, the fear of losing their identity through
changes in social norms was at least as great as the ideals of social development.
The identification of Bosinaks with Islamic reformism in fact comes from a much later
period – the last decade of Yugoslavia. In the 1940s, the fascist occupation and the
subsequent communist regime repressed or eliminated many Bosnian intellectuals,
especially the traditionalists like M. Handžić and M. Busuladžić. Between the 1970s and
mid-1980s, the communist regime relaxed its control of religious activities and a limited
Islamic revival ensued. Since then, the IC has focussed its limited resources on salvaging
Islam as a practice, culture and institution. It has succeeded in renewing educational
institutions, such as the faculty of theology in 1977 and a women’s madrassa in Sarajevo.
Secondly, its leaders, especially Husein Džozo, made rational inquiry, reformist thought
and practical legal questions key parts of the faculty’s curriculum.231 Modernised teaching
included recognition of the secular framework of Islamic law and practice. Finally, the IC as
institution has cemented its role as the umbrella organisation of Bosnian Muslims through
new media outlets, through incorporating Sufi lodges and through claiming a monopoly
on the wealth tax (zakat) in order to finance Islamic schools to preserve Muslim identity.
Hence, there was no straightforward process towards what makes Islam unique in Bosnia
today. Many of those remarkable characteristics of Bosnian Islam hailed today as liberal or
progressive were not based on a modernist consensus, but rather crystallised in complex
processes and often resulted from necessity. Centralisation, reformism and Islamic
education instead became defining elements of Bosnian self-understanding relatively
recently – in a moment when Islam became a question of identity.
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Defending the tradition
A second characteristic of the Bosnian model is the fact that Bosnians themselves have
started reflecting the specificity of the ‘Bosnian Islamic tradition’ recently and in the
context of a new religious pluralism. This has driven institutions to make active efforts to
define, strengthen and preserve the Bosniak tradition.
It is notable that what seems to be the basis of the official self-understanding of Bosnian
Muslims as defined above is that it is not treated as identity but is usually as ‘tradition’,
specifically, ‘the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’. This tradition, as defined by Karčić
in 2006, became a quasi-official position of the IC. Links to Karčić’s ‘What is the Islamic
tradition of the Bosniaks’, which was first published in the fortnightly outlet of the IC
Preporod, can be found on the official IC website, on the websites of regional organisations
of the IC in Bosnia and Germany and on official think-tanks of the IC.232 The five elements
are consistently echoed by Bosnian Muslim representatives. The reason is that the Bosnian
tradition is not only a practical self-definition, but an instrument of self-positioning in a
religious context that has suddenly become dangerously pluralistic.
Since the end of communism, Islam has faced three sorts of challenges in the region:
the politicisation of religion in nationalist politics of the 1990s; increased involvement by
foreign actors from the Muslim world during the war and after independence; and finally,
the pluralisation of the Islamic scene in Bosnia itself. All have thrown into question the
autonomy and authority of the IC in Bosnia. The IC has gradually learned to answer those
challenges. With substantial foreign help, it has rebuilt its infrastructure, opened secondary
schools and faculties, educated its religion teachers and imams, founded various organs
and publications, and managed a change in the direction of the IC. 233 In the early 2000s,
the IC liberated itself form the overwhelming influence of a political party and diversified
its financial support from various parts of the world – seeking alliances not only in the
Gulf, but also in Turkey and more recently in the EU.234 But the most demanding challenge
proved to be the inner pluralism in Bosnia itself.
Since the late 1990s, the penetration of various Islamic trends into Bosnia via the Internet
led to ‘a change in Islamic discourse in Bosnia’.235 Many hitherto absent ideas and types
of religious organisation were spreading rapidly: minority sects (Shia, Ahmadiya), Turkish
neo-Sufis (Hizmet, Suleymancis) and neo-Salafism.236
The last trend represented the only real challenge. Several neo-Salafi groups openly
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questioned the monopoly of the IC. Neo-Salafi groups started offering alternative fatwas
on their websites, separate Islamic education to adults and Qur’an courses to children.
Neo-Salafi leaders have also openly disputed the legitimacy of certain traditional religious
practices such as outdoor prayers, receiving ‘pocket money’ for funeral rituals, keeping
mausolea, the calculation of Ramadan timings, etc.
A dissident Islamic discourse was disseminated by Saudi-financed translations of religious
literature and Islamic centres founded by former mujahideen.237 Later, a generation of
Bosnian preachers took over and initiated an even fiercer attack on the legitimacy of IC’s
monopoly and its practices. Because dozens were educated in Saudi Arabia, they could
base their differing vision of Islamic practice on their mastery of Arabic, on the aura of
conservative authenticity and on a corpus of literalist neo-Salafi quranic references. The
years 2005–2007 were marked by debates about confessional belonging within Islam (the
madhabs) and they finally escalated in attempts by neo-Salafi groups to occupy or take
over mosques.238 In 2012–2013, dozens left for Syria and threatened the IC from there.
In a belated response, the IC sought to reaffirm its authority and legitimacy. It pursued
two main strategies: strict and soft. First in 2006, the IC adopted a ‘Resolution on the
interpretation of Islam’, calling upon imams to ‘be consistent in the interpretation of the
institutional learning of Islam on the basis of the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and our experience
in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, as well as reaffirmed its sole authority over religious objects
and in rules concerning the usage of religious houses.239 As it became obvious, asserting
authority is not the same as possessing it, and conflict ensued. It became necessary to
look for other means of legitimising the IC’s authority, and by defending that which the
challengers attacked – the Bosnian practice of Islam.
Although the ‘Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’ was a ‘constitutional category’ of the IC
since 1997 (pace Dž. Šuško), it remained a vague reference. Attempts to give the Bosnian
tradition a clear rationale became one of the main strategies for responding to what the IC
terms ‘exclusive’, ‘radical’ or ‘extra-institutional interpretations of Islam’.240
Prof. Karčić’s definition proved to a useful basis on which the IC could fully reassert
its authority. It was able to legitimise the initially empty notion by developing and
institutionalising the Bosnian tradition. In 2008, the rijaset (the executive office of the IC)
established the Institute for the Islamic Tradition of the Bosniaks (IITB). Under Dr. Šuško,
it was tasked with carrying out research into the history of the Bosniaks and engaging in
public debates about their tradition. It started research into many of the criticised aspects
of the Bosnian popular practice but also into the neo-Salafi criticism itself.241 The institute
started publishing works of Bosnian Islamic thinkers to build a corpus of national Islamic
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knowledge production – giving a basis for the claim of a distinct Islamic tradition.
The IC also began to regularly organise public conferences on the notion of ‘tradition’
– considered by some to be ‘the most important academic meeting organised by the IC
in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina’.242 The conferences allow to debate over what makes up
the Bosnian tradition, to bring arguments for its Islamic soundness and to discuss the
challenges. Their proceedings reflect various trends: the notion of a tradition, the plurality
of Islamic discourses, Sunni identity and finally empirical studies neo-Salafi groups and
their challenge the authority of the IC in theological argumentation and media attraction.
They also reflect a choice of Turkey as a partner in this endeavour.

Liberal process of constructing a tradition rather than tradition of a liberal Islam
While the meaning of the Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks remains somewhat suspended
between official and critical discourses that do not always meet, the Bosnian IC succeeded
in establishing the notion of a Bosnian Islamic practice worth defending, capable of uniting
the community, and open to some degree of discussion.
In his definition, Karčić made sure to say that he does not attempt to add any adjective to
Islam: there is no Bosnian Islam to promote against, say, Saudi Islam. He rather sought to
theologically locate the Bosnian practice and to list the characteristics that Bosnians care
about.243 Tradition is different from culture: it is based on adherence to certain principles,
but it is also a product of a common history and other norms and values (secularity,
coexistence and organisation). Talking about ‘tradition’ allows one to talk about a universal
system of religious and ethical norms in a specific, local guise. Only from the perspective
of tradition can reformism, institutionalisation and secularism become part of what a
people may be asked to adhere to. Tradition finally allows one to define one’s identity
without creating divisions – Bosnian tradition is a part of a Sunni tradition, and therefore
of Islamic tradition.
Even if only IC insiders were included in official events (along with several neo-Salafi
insiders who recognize the IC), many groups, including Islamic activist websites, neo-Salafi
websites and secular newspapers, participated in a larger societal debate. The last public
conference of the IC showed signs of mutual recognition between the official institution
and certain critical trends: a distinction was made between those Islamic groups who
criticise certain aspects of the IC position from within, that is, who despite reservations do
recognize the IC, and those ‘extra-institutional interpretations’ that dispute the IC outright
(Karčić, Subašić 2018).244
Hence, the process of constructing a tradition has proven flexible enough to slowly
encompass diversity rather than create division. It also allowed for changing positions and
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possibly even for creating a convergence on certain topics, on a moderately conservative
basis. For example, the IC seems to have reflected upon neo-Salafi successes. It has taken
account of the problematic status of informal payments for funeral rituals,245 and of the
absence of youth work. It has since initiated a series of programs for imams and, with
the help of Norway246 (Perry 2016:32) and the EU,247 for youths to promote moderation,
the Bosnian tradition and its European orientation. On the other hand, it made use of
the liberal value of freedom of religion to advance collective religious rights and entered
the debate about secularism and courts with a fatwa that defined the hijab as a religious
obligation.248
The success of tradition as a process does indeed confirm what Dž. Šuško has underlined:
the prevention of strife and extremes. The internal challengers have largely accepted the
necessity of a common framework for defining common values, identity, tradition, but
also recognised their agency in that very process. Nowadays, conservative or neo-Salafi
intellectuals are the most active writers on practical subjects of social relations, family
issues and religious morality, and they do so within the framework of the IC.249
Hence, the open process of tradition-finding does not make the Bosnian practice liberal
per se. On the contrary. The need to constantly justify its Islamic legitimacy in the context of
the ‘defence of a tradition’ may have pulled it towards more self-consciously traditionalist,
communal or socially conservative positions or at least towards an acceptance of such
positions. In this new context, the rational vision of an individualist religion that Bougarel
has ascribed to Fikret Karčić may be losing ground after all to more communal, conservative
projects of Bosniak Islamic identity.
But the process itself makes the tradition ‘liberal’ in another sense. The institution proved
capable of navigating the plurality of positions, ideologies and influences. The capacity for
evolution along a pragmatic set of rules while retaining a link to its foundational norms
could be a sign of what Charles Taylor defines as secularity.250 Bosnian institutions rarely
invoke religious authority anymore, but rather seek to gain legitimacy through inclusion
and persuasion.

Conclusion
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In most Bosnian Muslim self-descriptions, the Bosnian practice of Islam is based on a
centralised institution, the IC, and the experience of pluralism, reformism and secularism.
Such a self-perception does not reflect an explicit model – that is, a set of ingredients and
principles for a liberal, European Islam. Rather it is the sign of successful efforts in finding
responses to the multiple challenges of globalisation, religious pluralism, and challenges
to confessional authority through the construction of an ‘Islamic tradition of the Bosniaks’.
Some ten years ago, the Bosnian Islamic Community initiated a path to reaffirm its authority
and legitimacy through the notion of a Bosnian tradition. Tradition as a process seems to
have led to a more pragmatic framing of religious and ideological conflicts. It helped to
channel conflict into discursive controversy and institutionalising dispute into a process
for open-ended yet controlled identity formation. While the emerging identity cannot be
expected to be necessarily liberal or individualistic, it has a procedural character that
evolves within a modern, secular framework.
Not every Islamic community has its own ‘tradition’. Diasporic Muslims in Europe are very
plural if not divided in their respective national traditions, ideological trends; indeed
other Balkan Islamic communities struggle to even define their national traditions in the
face strong foreign influences. Bosnian Muslims have the advantage of being attached
to an organisation that is complex and adaptable enough to evolve and engage to some
extent in self-reflective processes. Rather than a set of principles, its ‘model’ consists in a
pragmatic and prudent organising of religious life in Bosnia and Herzegovina.251
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